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 1 
Summary 
 
 
This report presents a first inventory of measures aimed at combating 
radicalisation, extremism and terrorism (referred to in this report as 
counterterrorism policy) in Germany, France, Italy, Spain, the United Kingdom and 
the United States. Commissioned by the NCTb, the WODC (the Research and 
Documentation Centre of the Dutch Ministry of Justice) carried out a study into 
counterterrorism measures in place in the countries investigated in early 2006. This 
study comprises the first international inventory of a number of policy fields under 
development, whereby the counterterrorism policies discussed here are 
characterised by extremely rapid development and innovation. This inventory can 
serve as point of departure for the registration of policy developments and to 
obtain an insight into their effectiveness. The continuous monitoring of the 
developments is therefore recommended.  
 
Researchers in Germany, France, Italy, Spain and the United States have drawn up 
working documents, each with an inventory of the policy in place in that particular 
country, taking their information from public sources, mostly government 
publications and Websites, as well as articles, reports and books. Data on the 
United Kingdom were collected by the WODC. The closing date for the data 
collection was 1 February 2006.  
Besides the inventory, the researchers were invited:  
– to present a brief history of the development of the counterterrorism policy in 
the country in question, focusing on experiences with past terrorism and how 
it was combated  
– to devote attention where possible to (policy) assumptions on which more 
recent measures are based 
– to present available evaluations.  
 
Due to the study’s character of providing an inventory, differences may occur 
between the countries as regards topic detailing. This is “work in progress” 
involving a policy field in progress. There is no systematic comparison between the 
countries. It is not possible, therefore, to draw conclusions based on this report for 
the introduction of certain measures in the Netherlands. However, following a 
summary of the key study results, seven strategic issues were identified as they 
emerged from the material. 
 
 
Key points from the policy fields investigated 
 
1 Prevention of radicalisation and recruitment 
All countries investigated in the study recognise the phenomenon of radicalisation 
of young Muslims in particular (and the role the Internet plays in this). Some 
reports focus on the more general interpretation of the problem. Besides the 
Netherlands, the United Kingdom in particular seems to be devoting a great deal of 
policy attention to radicalisation. A somewhat detailed concept in the United 
Kingdom distinguishes between structural, motivational and environmental 
factors. The various government services involved in the United Kingdom try to 
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take into consideration the impact any measure may have on relationships with 
the Muslim community.  
 
The actual point of interference in the process in the countries investigated in the 
study also distinguishes the countries’ approach to radicalisation. Some European 
countries, such as the United Kingdom and the Netherlands, clearly aim to prevent 
radicalisation, focusing on early interference in the process. According to the 
working document, the United States opts for a broad interpretation of its freedom 
of speech, focusing on preventing recruitment for terrorist acts. The United States 
and the United Kingdom have also developed an international approach to 
radicalisation, based on the assumption that improving poor living circumstances 
and solving local conflicts may help reduce the breeding ground for extremism.  
 
2 Information to the general public 
There are major differences between the countries as regards their information to 
the general public on the counterterrorism policy in place and their attempts to 
involve the public. Together with the United Kingdom, the Netherlands appears to 
have the most far-reaching information policy: besides a leaflet that was 
distributed door-to-door, a special Website was set up. An alerting system was set 
up in some countries. A dilemma in the information policy is that while extensive 
information may promote support from the population, it may also help the 
terrorists themselves. Experiences gained with provision of information in the 
various sectors, and the development of theories in relation to this, could be used 
to improve the effectiveness of the campaigns.  
 
3 Institutional developments 
In most countries, save for the United Kingdom, special bodies have been set up to 
coordinate the fight against terrorism. These new bodies may include cooperation 
between investigation and intelligence service, or other organisations, such as 
ministries. These organisations often accommodate people from a range of 
ministries and services, and developments regarding the organisation of these new 
bodies are often still in full swing. Some studies which have already been 
published regarding the Department of Homeland Security in the United States 
suggest that on the conceptual and organisational levels many problems still need 
to be solved.  
 
4 Intelligence 
In order to gain insight in terrorist activity, governments use a combination of 
strategies. The working documents refer to human intelligence, low level 
intelligence and the use of (linking) personal data by means of data mining. The 
use of databases of personal data combined from a range of sources is emphasized 
in Germany (Rasterfahndung) and the United States, even if it is applied 
everywhere else, including the obligatory storage of telephone records for further 
analysis and investigation. Privacy is also an issue in all countries as regards topics 
such as data retention and dragnet investigations. Under a new Act of 2006, 
France, too, seems to favour a shift to databases, away from its traditional strong 
focus on human intelligence. It seems to suggest a certain technologicalisation of 
intelligence work. The exchange of information between national authorities 
within the countries themselves, between countries, and at the international level, 
continues to be a point for attention.  
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5 Protection of the critical infrastructure 
While this issue was not extensively dealt with in all working documents, it seems 
that all national governments have developed regulations and set up schemes to 
protect their critical infrastructure in case of a threat or actual terrorist attack. 
Cooperation with companies that are part of the critical infrastructure has been 
initiated in some countries. 
 
6 Legislation and regulations 
In international legislation a considerable level of agreement between the various 
countries has been reached, thanks to, amongst other things, the European 
framework decision . Differences between the countries continue to exist, however. 
For example, the United Kingdom has voiced reservations in respect of article 5 of 
the European Treaty in Human Rights introducing the ‘derogating control orders’ 
(see par. 3.12). 
Endeavours against terrorism are being furthered through legislation and 
regulation, and in this connection the report focuses on measures with respect to 
the financing of terrorism, measures under aliens law, new penalisation measures 
and criminal proceedings measures. The use of Information from intelligence 
services in the criminal process was only implemented into UK regulations, but has 
not yet been put to practical use.  
Certain national laws provide for the detention of terrorist suspects for longer 
periods of time without a formal charge, and the limitation of contact with lawyers 
or relatives (‘incommunicado’). National laws are often difficult to compare as the 
pre-trial or preventive detention must be regarded in the light of the legal tradition 
of the country in question. Also, some countries allow a restriction to be placed on 
the lawyers’ (complete) access to the police file for the trial.  
Certain national laws provide for restrictions with regard to (self)employment for 
individuals who are convicted for terrorist crimes.  
 
7 Implementation and evaluation 
It is expected that in the coming years most countries will have reports on the 
degree in which the measures taken meet their targets (and at which costs). For 
now, little has been found on the measures taken after September 2001. Some 
authors of the working documents call for the inclusion in the evaluation study of 
the question whether or not the measures developed by policymakers have actually 
been implemented.  
 
It is clear that many of the policies in place in the countries investigated were 
implemented recently, with the working documents frequently referring to 
emergency measures. These left little time for evidence-based policy making or the 
detailing of the assumptions behind the various measures. Researchers can play a 
key role in this by tracing and systematising policy assumptions. By using 
syntheses of existing studies, aimed at mechanisms assumed to play a role in 
counterterrorism policies, these assumptions can be clarified and checked.  This 
scope extends far beyond an analysis of only those investigations carried out as 
‘evaluations of counterterrorism policy’.  
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Strategic issues 
 
This report is an inventory of counterterrorism policies – in a broad sense - in 
place in Germany, France, Italy, Spain, the United Kingdom and the United States. 
What are the strategic policy issues that have emerged from the study?  
 
1 Learning from previous experiences? 
While the analysis of ‘old terrorism’ in the light of the most recent developments 
seems to have only just begun, it could prove very worthwhile (see chapter 2). The 
history of the rise and fall of terrorist movements may offer leads for today’s 
government policies. What are the conditions for negotiating with terrorists or 
their ‘political’ wings (Spain, Northern Ireland)? When could  amnesty schemes 
apply (France)? What can be learnt from the approach to RAF sympathisers in the 
nineteen seventies in deciding how to approach radicalising young Muslims today 
(Germany)? According to Wilkinson the IRA was inspired by the successful terrorist 
movements from the period of the decolonisation. The Netherlands was 
confronted by Malaccan actions in the nineteen seventies. What are the parallels 
with today’s situation?  
 
2 Mostly repression, or also emphasis on prevention of radicalisation?  
The overview of counterterrorism policy presented in this report yields a number 
of different ‘policy styles’, which may in part be dictated by previous experiences 
with terrorism and the (administrative) traditions in a particular country in 
general. All countries have introduced repressive measures through new 
penalisation systems and an extension of the investigation tools. A strategic 
question is how effective is it – in comparison – to concentrate on a broader 
policy which aims at stopping people from radicalising and joining extremist 
groups. In the United Kingdom in particular, prevention of radicalisation is a 
serious issue, in this case aimed particularly at improving relationships between 
the government and minority communities. As in the Netherlands, government 
memorandums on the subject of radicalisation have been published in the UK. 
 
3 How to solve tensions between population groups?  
Increasing polarisation can lead to radicalisation. Tensions between Muslims and 
persons of native origin increased after 9/11 in particular. The perception of the 
existence of groups strongly opposed to each other is not unusual. Extreme 
rightwing ideas amongst youngsters have been surfacing in some places. In the 
‘Islam debate’ some look for confrontation, with the Islam as codified religion 
(Quran, hadith, etc.) being pinpointed as the source – and therefore the cause - of 
jihadi terrorism. Governments opting for a cautious approach (as was the case in 
the Danish Cartoons affair) are sometimes accused of ‘appeasement’, reinforcing 
the ‘enemy’ by shying away from confrontation. Governments must find a balance 
in preventing tension between and within population groups. 
The presence of large Muslim minorities forces governments to develop a policy 
on the attitude to take vis-à-vis Islam. This is a sensitive topic in the countries 
investigated. France is taking government action to promote a moderate Islam. 
The United Kingdom seems to restrict itself to combating the most radical 
elements. Community impact assessments are used to try and obtain an insight into 
the response the policy evokes in ethnic communities. The question is whether this 
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should apply solely to the minority groups, or also (for example) to groups of 
potential supporters of extreme rightwing ideas.  
 
4 How to keep extremist elements out or how to deport them? 
All countries use their aliens policies in their fight against terrorism. Differences in 
nuance relate to differences in the degree to which extremism imported from 
abroad (GIA, PKK) and extremism developed amongst immigrants has surfaced in 
the past and present. A further analysis of these types of radicalisation and 
extremism is called for, one that goes beyond considerations taken solely within 
the context of the aliens policy. For example, the working document on France 
reports that while GIA terrorism is a form of ‘Islamic’ terrorism, it can only be 
interpreted in the light of the complex and decades-long relationship between 
France and Algeria. Obviously, there is also a form of ‘home grown’ terrorism, as 
appeared in London and Amsterdam, whose relationship with foreign influences is 
far more difficult to interpret in terms of the laws concerning aliens.  
 
5 An international approach?  
An international orientation is rooted in traditions which developed based on, 
amongst other things, the history of the international relations of (part and 
present) superpowers. The United States and United Kingdom in particular say 
they wish to contribute to solving regional conflicts in the Middle East and other 
countries where extremists originate or –more often – with whom they feel a 
connection (Palestine, Afghanistan, Iraq, Chechnya …) in an attempt to reduce the 
breeding ground for extremism. South European countries (particularly referred to 
in the working document on Spain) are working towards cooperation with all 
Mediterranean countries (Euromed), also to reduce regional tensions. Would it be 
possible for the Netherlands to step up its role in the international field? 
 
6 Informing the public without assisting terrorists 
As set out above in the summary, countries differ in how they inform the general 
public on terrorism and the efforts being made against it. There does not always 
seem to be an articulated and substantiated vision of the role which information 
should play. The working documents do, however, make casual mention of the 
different factors that play a role in this. For example, a UK document is quoted, 
which states that the public is kept informed of the developments, without helping 
terrorists to avoid the measures that have been taken. The idea that the other party 
is ‘listening’ has already led to the removal of a number of documents from 
Websites where they were originally accessible to the public.  
More explicit use of the available theoretical insights into the conditions in which 
the public may be involved in the policy is one of the options available.  
 
7 Balance between security and freedom 
Some of the countries investigated are building giant databases with data taken 
from a range of sources, also including privacy-sensitive ones. Germany in 
particular has a tradition of ‘Rasterfahndung’. Large databases are also being put 
together in the United States. The main difference between looking for patterns in 
databases and collecting information by means of human intelligence is that 
information gathering via informers and agents is aimed at specific individuals, 
while electronic analysis concerns large numbers of people, of whom only a very 
small number will be involved in extremism or terrorism. Critics have argued that 
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the ‘identifications’ are not always right and, moreover, difficult to correct. 
Supporters claim that this promotes the safety of these very same people. It goes 
without saying that the latter can be investigated. 
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1 Introduction  
 
 
1.1 Purpose and research questions 
 
Since the 11 September 2001 attacks, many countries, including the Netherlands, 
have taken a large number of measures aimed at combating radicalisation, 
extremism and terrorism. Many measures, both legal and organisational, were 
taken over a short period of time, in what was a fairly unknown policy field. To lay 
the foundation for obtaining an insight into the efficacy of this policy, the WODC 
– at the request of the Nationaal Coördinator Terrorismebestrijding (National 
Coordinator for Counterterrorism or NCTb) – carried out a first inventory of 
policies aimed at tackling terrorism in Germany, France, Italy, Spain, the United 
Kingdom and the United States1. The study’s primary purpose was to present an 
overview of the measures taken in these countries. This first inventory therefore 
includes a broad range of policy fields. 
 
The research questions for this study have been defined as follows: 
Which measures (including legislation and regulation) are taken in the field of 
combating radicalisation and terrorism and what are the considerations and 
assumptions in this?  
 
This study was based on the following four questions: 
1 How and to what extent do the (government) policies in the field of combating 
radicalisation and terrorism vary in how they are formulated, worked out and 
implemented?  
2 How does this relate to the current insights into the causes and backgrounds 
of radicalisation and terrorism and to the distinguishable factors which are 
open to policy influencing? 
3 Which specific policy measures have been taken? What are the targets, which 
means are being used and on which policy assumptions are these based?  
4 What is known about the implementation and execution of these policy 
measures? 
 
While the study is aimed first and foremost at the European and Dutch situation, it 
was decided to also involve measures from the United States, as this country – 
particularly in the period following September 2001 – took a large number of 
measures, about which a great deal is expected to be known. 
Collecting information from the Netherlands regarding measures taken in other 
countries requires cooperation with researchers in the countries targeted by the 
study. In consultation with NCTb it was decided to focus on the five EU countries 
and the United States.  
A separate route was followed for legislation issues. At the request of WODC the 
Radboud University Nijmegen made an inventory of legislation aimed at 
combating terrorism in the field of criminal law, including aliens law where 
relevant.  
 
                                              
1  Originally, Israel was to be involved in the project, too, but this was decided against for practical reasons. 
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1.2 Methodological substantiation 
 
1.2.1 Inventory of measures taken in Germany, France, Italy, Spain, the United 
Kingdom and United States 
 
The researchers in the five countries were contacted in August 2005. An English-
language project description was drawn up about the approach to be taken (see 
appendix 1). Partly based on literature2, this project description identified nine 
policy fields for attention: 
1 prevention of radicalisation and recruitment 
2 information of the general public 
3 measures involving asylum and migration 
4 special powers of investigation services  
5 institutional developments, such as the set-up of coordination centres, etc 
6 international cooperation and information exchange 
7 combating the financing of terrorist organisations 
8 securing critical infrastructure 
9 crisis management: preparing for a coordinated and controlled response to a 
terrorist attack or crisis 
 
Based on the agreements made with WODC, the inventory of counterterrorism 
policy was carried out by researchers in Germany, France, Italy, Spain and the 
United States.  
 
In the end we found partners in the following institutes: 
Germany  Max Planck Institute, Freiburg; (Michael Kilchling and Hans-
Jörg Albrecht) 
France     Institut des Etudes Politiques, Paris (Didier Bigo and Colombe 
Camus) 
Italy   TransCrime, University of Milan (Martina Montauti and 
Barbara Vettori)  
Spain   Institute for Criminology, University of Malaga (Alejandra 
Gómez-Céspedes and Ana Isabel Cerezo Dominguez) 
United States  Boston, Anthony Petrosino, independent criminological 
researcher, now working for Wested (knowledge institute).  
 
In the period up to February 2006 various versions of the working documents 
drawn up by our ‘correspondent researchers’ in the various countries were read 
and commented upon  to increase the level of information on the above policy 
fields in the Dutch context. As the project progressed, the research question was 
defined further. In consultation with NCTb, the researchers received a list of issues 
per policy field. They were asked to focus on these in any event, to allow 
comparison between the working documents. The list comprised a further 
detailing within the nine policy fields indicated (see appendix 1). While some 
information is lacking for some fields in some countries, this does not mean that 
nothing has been arranged or is available for the issue in question.  
Since compiling an inventory is the key objective, the information differs for each 
country, for example as to the degree of detailing and the degree in which 
                                              
2  Including Lum, Kennedy and Sherley (2005). 
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contemplative or critical comments on the policy have been incorporated in the 
working document. Since this is an inventory rather than a comparative study, we 
consider this variation acceptable. 
 
In the United Kingdom talks were held with staff of the various departments of the 
Home Office in October 2005, particularly the Crime Reduction and Community 
Safety Group and the Terrorism and Prevention Unit. An interview was also held 
with a representative of the Foreign and Commonwealth Office. In addition, for the 
gathering of information on the policy in the United Kingdom use was made of 
literature sources and the Websites of the Home Office and of the British 
Parliament for Parliamentary Papers. No separate working document was written 
about the United Kingdom. 
 
The working documents that emerged from this part project concentrated mostly 
on the most recent legislation introduced until end 2005. Previous developments in 
the history of terrorism and antiterrorism policies in each country were reviewed. 
These will be discussed in chapter 2. 
 
1.2.2 Study of counterterrorism criminal legislation in the five EU countries 
 
Prof Y. Buruma and Mrs M. Aksu LL M of the Radboud University Nijmegen 
carried out a delineated inventorying study on specific antiterrorism legislation in 
the EU countries. As for the inventory of measures in the nine policy fields (par. 
1.2.1), the study was restricted to Germany, France Italy, Spain, and the United 
Kingdom. Moreover, it was restricted to criminal measures, although, where 
necessary, laws concerning aliens were also considered. The working document by 
Aksu, Buruma and Van Kempen also comprises a chapter on key Dutch legislation, 
which is used as a point of reference. This means that unlike in the remainder of 
the report, a comparison with the Netherlands has been included for some 
legislation.  
In consultation with the WODC and the NCTb the following key themes were 
selected for the study in the field of legislation: 
– new penalisation 
– extension of powers of investigation 
– extension of options to detain persons preventively 
– use of intelligence in the criminal process 
– restricting people in their preferred profession and access to financial means. 
 
In creating the legislation overview use was made of drafts of working documents 
for Germany, France, Italy and Spain (par. 1.2.1). The working document of Aksu et 
al. was completed end March 2006. The layout in themes was later changed, as the 
use of information from intelligence services (intelligence) was barely considered 
in the material analysed, while other themes were treated separately. In the end, 
the following themes featured in the document:  
– New penalisation and extension of existing penalisation 
– Extension of (special) powers of investigation  
– Extension of options for preventive detention 
– Restricting people in their freedom to move and choices as regards their 
profession 
– Onus of proof 
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– Crown witnesses 
– Banning and dissolution of terrorist organisations and political parties  
 
1.2.3 Overview counterterrorism legislation ‘other EU countries’ 
 
At NCTb’s request and following on from the work carried out by Aksu c.s. (see 
above), WODC drew up an overview of counterterrorism legislation in the ‘other 
EU countries’, that is, all EU countries minus the Netherlands and the five 
countries in the study by Aksu et al. In preparation, a concept was drawn up, 
aimed particularly at the selection of information sources for this part of the 
project. In consultation with the NCTb the following information sources were 
selected:  
1 EU/EVSE: Legislation online 
2 Council of Europe: Country profiles CODEXTER Commission of Experts on 
Terrorism 
3 Council of Europe (2005a): Terrorism: Special investigation techniques  
4 EU: implementation of EU framework decrees and measures (EU, 2005) 
5 Counter-terrorism Legislation and Practice – A survey of selected countries 
(FCO-UK, 2005). 
 
These sources do not provide full information on all themes in all countries. The 
working document comprises an overview, which makes it clear for which 
countries these sources comprise information.  
 
This part survey was carried out by drs Lisette Vervoorn and dr. Rudie Neve of the 
WODC between January and March 2006. The working document is entitled: 
Counterterrorism Legislation, an Overview of nineteen EU Member States. 
(Working document 7). 
 
1.2.4 Policy conclusions not an issue 
 
This report does not pretend to be any more than a first inventory of a policy field 
that is still very much under development and in which a large number of 
measures have been taken, acts have been implemented and organisations have 
been set up or merged in a short period of time. Its aim is to provide an insight 
into the extent of the policy. A large number of policy fields were therefore 
covered, avoiding any intention to demarcate in advance subjects arbitrarily. A 
broad inventorying study does not pretend to make comparisons between the 
various countries. This report is aimed at creating conditions to be able to study 
the efficacy of policies on radicalisation, extremism and terrorism. It is not possible 
or desirable to draw conclusions as regards the content for the policy, such as the 
introduction of particular measures. This requires a different type of expertise, 
such as expertise on the operation, costs and effects of measures.  
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1.3 Study set-up 
 
Chapter 2 describes briefly for each country the experiences with terrorism and 
counterterrorism before the emergence of Jihadist groups in Western Europe and 
‘11 September 2001’. These descriptions were taken mostly from the working 
documents of staff operating in the countries3. No extensive study was carried out 
for this part and the descriptions are based on a ‘quick scan’ of the literature 
available and address mostly the history of (particularly domestic) terrorism in the 
countries in question. An attempt was made to show which lessons may be learnt 
from previous experiences in the current situation.  
 
Chapter 3 deals with the successive policy fields. In consultation with the 
supervision committee it was decided to drop, where possible, the distinction 
between ‘legislation’ and ‘policy’ made at the start of the project. After all, all 
policy fields have both ‘standardising’ and ‘organisational’ measures. A new layout 
was therefore made, as set out below:  
– Policy aimed at the prevention of radicalisation and recruitment. 
– Policy revolving around information to the public.  
– Policy aimed at institutional developments and setting up coordination 
centres. 
– Policy with regard to the intelligence work: powers and exchange. 
– Policy with regard to international cooperation. 
– Policy aimed at securing the critical infrastructure.  
– Policy and crisis management: preparing for a coordinated and controlled 
response to a terrorist attack or crisis.  
– Policy aimed at combating the funding of terrorism. 
– Aliens law, including measures on asylum and migration.  
– Criminal measures. 
– Measures in the field of criminal procedural law. 
– Administrative measures.  
 
These themes are discussed in Chapter 3, the key part of this report. 
 
Chapter 4 presents the final conclusion. Since the central objective was to provide 
an inventory, the focus lies particularly on the question whether or not sufficient 
information has been generated and which questions deserve further elaboration. 
 
Terminology 
In principle, this study is about policies targeting all forms of (counter ) terrorism. 
Particularly in today’s situation, after September 2001, this is often about religion-
inspired or legitimised terrorism, for which the working documents use different 
terminology. This report often refers to the terms ‘jihad’ (sometimes ‘jihadi’) and 
‘Islamic’ terrorism respectively. We are using these terms despite their 
disadvantages, particularly because the terms ‘jihad’ and ‘Islam’ have specific 
religious relevance for most Muslims. By adding ‘ism’, a specific meaning is 
created, that is associated with radicalism, extremism and terrorism. The term 
‘Islamic terrorism’ is avoided in this report, as is the term ‘fundamentalism’. 
                                              
3  Where other sources have been used, these are specified. The authors of the working documents are responsible for the 
sources used.  
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2 Experiences with terrorism and counterterrorism 
in Germany, France, Italy, Spain, the United 
Kingdom and the United States 
 
 
This chapter provides some context to the inventory of counterterrorism measures. 
It is based on the study in the relevant countries and on the report of the working 
visit which the WODC paid to the United Kingdom. The set-up of the paragraphs 
therefore differs slightly. As regards counterterrorism, some overlap with Chapter 3 
is unavoidable4.  
 
 
2.1 Germany 
 
German experience with terrorism is connected with the Rote Armee Fraktion 
(RAF), also known as the Baader-Meinhof group, which existed between 1970 and 
1998, but which was particularly active in the nineteen seventies. The RAF fell in 
the category of left social-revolutionary terrorist organisations, characterised by an 
explicit political programme and political objectives, whose final goal was to 
overthrow capitalism. An appeal was made to international coordination and 
cooperation between (national) terrorist groups5.  
 
Initially, the group used arson as a means of coercion. It also visited a Palestinian 
training camp6. This was followed by its armed struggle in Germany, which 
involved armed bank robberies and bomb attacks. In 1972 the ‘first generation’ of 
RAF terrorists was captured and tried in Stammheim. They were able to 
communicate through their lawyer and used coordinated hunger strikes to protest 
against their solitary confinement in prison. Despite receiving forced nourishment, 
one of the RAF members, Holger Meins, succumbed to the effects of the hunger 
strike.   
 
A survey carried out in July 1971 by the Institut Allensbach showed that 20% of 
Germans under the age of 30 felt some degree of sympathy for the actions of the 
RAF, which, incidentally, had not yet been very violent until that point. Following a 
series of heavy bomb attacks in 1972 (the ‘May offensive’) in which a number of 
people were killed, including printers in an attack on the Springerpers, sympathy 
soon evaporated. The information on the circumstances in which RAF members 
were being detained, however, led to many left-wing youngsters taking the side of 
the prisoners who were said to suffer from ‘Isolationsfolter’. The phenomenon of 
‘sympathisers’ became an issue once more. 
 
A new generation of RAF members was organising kidnappings aimed at getting 
the first generation out. They were successful initially: when prisoners were 
released in 1975, the release of hostage Peter Lorenz followed. In later kidnappings 
                                              
4  Sources are specified for additions by the WODC, for other sources , please refer to the working documents. 
5  Working document 1 refers to Laqueur (1998). 
6  The historical overview of the RAF period is collated based on Internet sources in particular: wikipedia, baader-
meinhof.com and geschichtsverein_koengen.de.  
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(such as in Stockholm in 1975), however, the government would no longer make 
any concessions. Apparently, following their release, the released terrorists had 
become active for the RAF immediately again. 
In 1976 Ulrike Meinhof was found dead in her cell. The official report that she had 
hanged herself with towels was doubted by many and gave rise to a number of 
conspiracy theories on her death. Outside prison younger RAF members started to 
commit assassinations, of which the one in 1977 on Siegfried Buback, head Public 
Prosecutor focusing on RAF, was one of the most well known. 
 
The autumn of 1977 became known as the ‘German autumn’. Chairman of the 
employers’ organisation  Schleier was kidnapped to force the release of the first 
generation of RAF prisoners. Almost at the same time a German airplane was 
hijacked by Palestinians, who also demanded the release of Baader c.s., as well as a 
number of Palestinians in Turkish prisons. The hijack ended in Mogadishu, where 
the plane was stormed by the specialist GSG9 unit which had been set up for this 
purpose (see below), whereby the hijackers were killed and passengers were 
released virtually unharmed. The next day, Baader, Ensslin and Jan-Carl Raspe 
committed suicide in their cells, after which Schleier was ‘executed’ by his 
kidnappers. The collective suicide inspired new complot theories: it seemed hard 
to believe that Baader had been able to smuggle a gun inside. At the time, the 
official explanation by the German government raised doubt in the Netherlands 
too7. Former RAF prisoners who were later released did confirm that the leaders of 
the first generation had indeed committed suicide.  
 
Attacks claimed by groups calling themselves RAF were carried out as late as the 
nineteen eighties and early nineties. The latest murders claimed by RAF, 
particularly the murder of the Treuhand8 director, inspired discussions on the ‘RAF 
phantom’9. Its last violent act was an attack on a prison under construction in 
1993. Nobody was hurt in the attack, but it did cause 50 million Euros worth of 
damage. In 1998 press agency Reuters received an 8-page statement in which the 
last RAF members declared the ‘urban guerrilla’ history.  
Documents from the former GDR showed that the RAF had been supported by the 
Ministry of State Security and that a number of former RAF members had been 
given asylum there (working document 1).  
 
Extremist rightwing terrorism in Germany surfaced in the second half of the 
nineteen seventies. It involved mostly small groups of neo-Nazis who tried to set 
up training camps in military style. In 1980 a bomb attack was carried out in 
Munich during the Oktoberfest, killing 13. More recently, young men with a 
tendency towards violence are being recruited, mostly in the Eastern parts of 
Germany, but elsewhere too, who are violent towards ethnical minorities, and 
other groups including Jews, left-wing activists, the handicapped and the 
homeless. In 2003 a group was dismantled which had aimed to attack Jewish 
targets. While the members had received only minimal training and organisation, 
                                              
7  See: Deelen (2005). 
8  The ‘Treuhandanstalt’ was founded by the German government to organise the privatisation of state companies in the 
former GDR. 
9  In the television show Brennpunkt in 1992, journalists Gerhard Wisnewski, Wolfgang Landgraeber and Ekkehard Sieker 
argued that ´the third generation’ of RAF never existed and that the murders of which it was being accursed had been 
staged by secret services. 
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the Beieren High court sentenced them to long prison sentences (up to seven 
years). According to Albrecht there is a considerable overlap between extreme 
rightwing groups and organised crime, football hooliganism and ordinary violence 
(working document 1)10. 
 
A third factor named in connection with German experiences with terrorism is 
‘imported’ terrorism,’ particularly the Kurdish PKK. Germany houses many 
immigrants with a Kurdish background, including supporters of the PKK. The PKK 
has been guilty of blackmailing Kurds in Germany and of carrying out attacks on 
Turkish businesses and consulates. In 1993 the organisation was banned in 
Germany. After a rename to KADEK, it is now known as KONGRA-GEL. While the 
organisation now claims it wishes to be a political party, German intelligence 
services still regard its potential for violence as substantial.  
 
After 11 September 2001, transnational religion-inspired terrorism became the 
focal point in politics and police forces. According to Albrecht (working document 
1) this led to a ‘substantial review of the terrorist landscape as set out in official 
documents’. One of the points for discussion, as early as the nineteen nineties, was 
whether or not opportunities for asylum had helped foreign terrorists find a safe 
haven in Germany.  
 
Counterterrorism in the nineteen seventies 
 
Hunt for ‘sympathisers’ 
The RAF refused to join the ‘long march through the institutions’, as favoured by  
1960’s student leader Rudi Dutschke. For the government the threat such an 
approach presented, however, was reason to implement strict measures. In 1972 
the ‘Extremists Decree’ was adopted, which entailed, amongst other things, that 
many officials were tested for their democratic convictions. The resulting 
prohibition to pursue their profession also inspired criticism from the Netherlands. 
The extended powers to stop or arrest people were criticised for mainly targeting 
youngsters with ‘deviant’ looks (such as long hair)11. 
According to Albrecht (working document 1), the emphasis in the counterterrorism 
strategy has always been on the criminal approach, with the idea of ‘sympathy’ 
being approached from the same context. According to the author, there were no 
far-reaching counterterrorism strategies. The discussion on ‘sympathisers’ emerged 
when author Heinrich Böll was accused of having RAF sympathies when he 
published his book ‘Die verlorene Ehre der Katharina Blum’ in 197412.  
According to Albrecht the approach of the nineteen seventies, which narrowed the 
gap between legislative and executive powers, was characterised by a ‘politicising 
of criminal law’, focused on the question how the RAF hard core could be 
separated from its sympathising environment.  
 
Process legislation  
The German Penal Code was amended to exclude from the legal process certain 
lawyers of RAF members regarded as ‘sympathisers’. The act was sometimes 
                                              
10  See also: Adang, O., Rapport Football Hooliganism Doc 8553, EU 1999.  
11  It is not yet clear if these measures are based on a well-defined idea on the radicalisation process, or an ‘intervention 
theory’. 
12  See Böll (1974). 
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referred to as the ‘Lex BM’ (after ‘Baader-Meinhof’) and came into force on 1 
January 197513. It comprised a number of acts, including provisions  to allow court 
sessions, even if they were not attended by the suspects due to their own doing, for 
example because they were on hunger strike. The use of a single lawyer by more 
than one suspect was forbidden to prevent the lawyer from acting as ‘liaison’ 
between the suspects, who were not allowed to be in contact. Critics regarded the 
measures as an unacceptable violation of suspects’ rights14.  
 
Establishment of special assistance units 
Besides the RAF attacks, Germany was also confronted with Palestinian terrorism. 
In 1972 the Olympic Games were held in Munich, and it was here that the 
Palestinian ‘Black September’ group held the Israeli athletics team hostage. Until 
that point the German government had been very reticent about setting up elite 
units for army and police: memories of the Second World War and the Nazi regime 
were still very fresh. This attitude was also reflected in the ‘low profile’ security at 
the Olympic village. Palestinian terrorists were able to penetrate the village and 
take the Israeli team hostage. When the hostage takers were about to flee in 
helicopters, the police commenced a fire fight, with the worst possible outcome: in 
addition to the terrorists, all athletes taken hostage were killed. After the events a 
national special unit was set up, which for reasons of historical sensitivities 
reported to the Bundesgrenzschutz rather than the army. Grenzschutsgruppe 9 
(GSG9) was given a hero status in the BRD when it librated the airplane in 
Mogadishu in 1977 which had been hijacked by Palestinians15.  
 
Lessons learnt from the RAF period 
In an  interview in 1995, Hans-Jürgen Wischnewski, a high-placed counterterrorism 
official in Germany and leader during the liberation of the hijacked plane in 
Mogadishu in 1977, discussed the lessons that could be drawn from these episodes 
for German history set out above16. Wischnewski states that the events of 1977 
contained key lessons for countries that were dealing with terrorism at the time, 
including Japan and the United States (which had just experienced the ‘Oklahoma 
bombing’). In 1977 a crisis team was set up that spanned a broad political spectre, 
with loyal cooperation from the Christian democrats, who were in the opposition 
at the time. He also emphasised the importance of analysing the backgrounds of 
the terrorist movement, whereby it was particularly important to stay alert in 
respect of groups facing a serious degree of alienation. It was up to the government 
to ensure that its legitimacy or that of the security services was not doubted 
amongst the (democratic) population. Radical developments should be detected at 
the earliest stage possible. In addition, the availability of special units was 
considered very important, with Wischnewski referring to the German GSG9. 
 
Wischnewsk’s advice to get an understanding of the backgrounds of radicals was 
picked up by the German government in its actions targeting Islamic 
radicalisation. After all, Germany was directly involved in this, as the 11 September 
                                              
13  The so-called ‘Anti-Terror-Paketgesetz’ was adopted in the Bundestag on 20 December 1974 www.geschichtsverein-
koengen.de/Terrorismus.htm. 
14  Taken from www.baader-meinhof.com, the website created by Richard Huffman, son of an American member of the 
bomb disposal squad in West Berlin in the early nineteen seventies, who became fascinated by the group. There are 
many other sources, including the site referred to in the previous footnote. 
15  www.terrorism101.org/counter/germany. 
16  New Perspectives Quarterly, summer 1995 ‘Lessons from German Counterterrorism. www.npq.org. 
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2001 attacks had been carried out by a cell headed by Mohammed Atta, who had 
been based in Hamburg. As we will discuss below (par. 3.10), Germany, too, has 
drawn up new legislation for its fight against the terrorism of the 21st century. 
However, the German government has also attempted to stimulate the discussion 
about the backgrounds of radicalisation, for example by commissioning a 
collection of articles written by legal specialists, Islam experts and social scientists, 
entitled ‘Feindbilder und Radikalisierungsprozesse’17.  
It is not clear exactly to what degree the side-effects and controversies of the RAF 
period form the basis for this, although it is clear that the German government 
tries to document and evaluate the measures it has taken. Actual results are not yet 
available, as far as known18.  
German counterterrorism policy since 2001 is set out in the three ‘packages’ of 
measures and legislation dealt with in working document 1.  
 
According to official statements, counterterrorism policy was assigned five 
objectives after 2001:  
– The destruction of terrorist structures by putting terrorists and terrorist groups 
under severe pressure by means of investigations, 
– Prevention of terrorism from developing by controlling extremism through 
banning radical organisations and putting immigration and borders under 
strict control, 
– Enhancing international cooperation and data exchange on suspect 
immigrants and terrorists, 
– Protection of the public and the sensitive infrastructure through permanent 
monitoring and threat analyses and by providing intensive security measures, 
– Removing the causes of terrorism by contributing to missions aimed at 
creating international peace and stability. 
 
The policy was reflected mostly in new legislation, which comprises not only 
amendments to the law but which has also been combined with fund allocation 
and taking organisational measures. Three ‘counterterrorism packages’ are 
distinguished. 
 
The first package of amendments is aimed particularly at stepping up immigrant 
control of people travelling from Arab countries, inspired by the German 
connection in the New York attacks, which had been prepared in part from 
Hamburg. Measures in the field of aliens policy and creating databases to look for 
potential terrorists were taken to promote risk containment. The first package also 
announced strengthening of the army and the purchase of special weapons to fight 
terrorism. It was adopted shortly after 11 September.  
 
The second package of amendments is also known as ‘Gezets zur Bekämpfung des 
internationalen Terrorismus’. It aims particularly at fighting international terrorism 
and comprises a series of amendments to existing acts, aimed mostly at improving 
                                              
17  See: http://www.bmi.bund.de/nn_122688/Internet/Content/Broschueren/2005/Feindbilder__und__ 
Radikalisierungsprozesse.html. 
18  http://www.bmi.bund.de/cln_012/nn_174236/Internet/Content/Broschueren/2004/Nach__dem__11__ 
September__2001__Massnahmen__Id__95066__de.html. 
 http://www.bmi.bund.de/cln_028/nn_165104/Internet/Content/Themen/Terrorismus/DatenundFakten/Evaluierung__Terr
orismusbek_C3_A4mpfungsgesetz.html. 
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cooperation between the various investigation and security services. The act was 
introduced on 1 January 2002. The measures from the first two packages were 
stepped up and included in the third package 2005. The latter’s key aims are the 
enhancement of preventive powers for the Bundeskriminalamt and the set-up of 
databases with even more information. The elections disrupted the discussion of 
the package, but the author of working document 1 on Germany does expect the 
new government to continue its treatment. 
 
 
2.2 France 
 
France has been dealing with terrorist attacks since the early nineteen seventies, 
both in its mainland and on French targets abroad19.  
Between 1986 and 1996 there were 23 bomb attacks attributed to Islamic 
movements. After 9/11 no new attacks have occurred in France and networks 
preparing for attacks, for example on the Eiffel Tower (1994), the Stade the France 
(world championships football, 1998), the Christmas fair in Strasbourg (2000) and 
the American embassy in Paris (2001) were dismantled.  
The counterterrorism system now in place is the result of a long-term and indirect 
process. According to the authors of the working document on France (working 
document 2) it is not a constant or coherent process. French counterterrorism 
policy is not based on a thorough analysis of the terrorist threat, but developed in 
a pragmatic manner in response to the various attacks that had taken place over 
the years. According to working document 2 the French authorities developed a 
strategy relying on preventive arrests to put potential terrorists under constant 
pressure.  
The tradition to distinguish between ‘common’ and political crimes, to which 
special rules apply, dates back to before the Second World War20. Symbol for this 
exceptional situation was the ‘Cour the Sûreté the l’Etat’ (CSE, Court for State 
Security), founded in 1963 in response to the Algerian war of independence. The 
CSE included military input and operated entirely outside the normal legal system 
as a separate legal institution. The CSE was abolished in 1982 as a relic symbolising 
‘old times’, following its tackling of Breton nationalism in which certain activities 
were found not to be permitted. The government no longer wanted these special 
courts, as they seemed doomed to be inefficient and eventually always lapsed into 
irregularities. This did have a disadvantage, namely that knowledge on violent 
political actions and groups was now distributed across a number of judges. 
Special Assize courts (jury courts) were founded for espionage affairs, which was 
also assigned cases involving terrorism by the Act of 1986. This episode has 
determined the further development of the French counterterrorism system. The 
anti-terrorism Act of 1986, made when violent actions on French territory 
intensified, is considered a key milestone in recent history. This Act forms the 
cornerstone of French legal counterterrorism.  
                                              
19  Fifty attacks were carried out between 1977 and 1987 under the flag of the extremist leftwing organisation Action 
Directe. In 1981 most members gave up their ‘armed battle’ after an amnesty scheme by the French government. Groups 
in Paris and Lyon were  unwilling to give up yet. In the nineteen eighties the Paris branch of Action Directe was 
associated with the German RAF. The branch in Lyon started carrying out anti-Semitic attacks. (Also see Moxon-
Browne, 1988). 
20  According to the report ‘from the third republic’. The third republic lasted from 1871 to World War II.  
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Since then the French counterterrorism system has been characterised by a 
centralised and specialised legal process, its emphasis on ‘human intelligence’, a 
firm legal and political framework for antiterrorist operations, the use of 
investigating judges with powers of attorney for investigation, surveillance, 
detention and interrogation, the relationship between legal and intelligence 
organisations and the emphasis on effective cooperation between the 
organisations involved and which has developed over the course of many years. 
Important was also that in the nineteen eighties realisation grew that the 
counterterrorism system should be part of the normal legal system rather than 
something completely separate. After all, this would mean that political shifts 
could completely eradicate them, as was the case for the CSE in 1981. 
While Prime minister Chirac declared in 1986 that ‘terrorism is a form of war’, in 
practice a legal and police strategy fighting terrorism was developed while ‘acts of 
war’ were avoided where possible21. Focal point of the strategy was to deny any 
form of legitimacy to the revolutionary and nationalistic struggle and to approach 
it, particularly from a procedural point of view rather than from the content, within 
the definition of terrorism. Terrorism was conceptualised as being limited to small 
groups actually committing the violence, which presented an opportunity to start 
discussions in a pragmatic way with the broader political movements associated 
with terrorist groups22.  
The question is to what extent such a pragmatic approach is viable now the world 
is facing transnational and religion-inspired terrorism. It became a hotly debated 
topic after 11 September 2001. After all, France had now also become a possible 
target of international Islamic terrorism. Nevertheless, 9/11 is said to be a ‘non 
event’ for French counterterrorism policy, in the sense that the strategy has not 
really been adapted following the attack, as this had already been done in the 
nineteen eighties.  
 
The Act of 1986 redefined the system of counter terrorist efforts in France. Not 
wanting to return to the old State security court (CSE), the French government was 
given means to fight terrorism which were ‘exceptional’ according to the 
researchers. They also refer to the fact that part of the population is concerned 
about the (lack of) respect for the constitutional state. The Act of 1986 concerned 
in particular the addition of subjective elements (terrorist motivation) to ‘common’ 
crimes. In addition, situations regarding arrest and pre-trial detention were 
extended to include terror cases while a central organisation for the prosecution of 
terrorism was set up as part of the Public Prosecutor’s Office (ministère publique).  
All subsequent adaptations of the policy, reflected in new legislation, served to 
reinforce or expand the basic set-up first created in 1986. Recent developments 
could suggest a return to the days of the CSE. The new system was tried and tested 
when around 1990 the Algerian civil war was transposed to France. The emergence 
of  the armed Islamic group GIA, a splinter group of the FIS (Islamic Salvation 
Front) which had been forced into illegitimacy following the military coup carried 
out after the elections which had been won by the FIS. The group united all radical 
Islamists and was supported by similar groups in other Middle East countries. It 
also brought the movement into contact with Islamic militants already present in 
                                              
21  This explains the French criticism of the US attack on Iraq.  
22  Bigo c.s. refer to British and Spanish examples of negotiations by the government with political parties linked to terrorist 
organisations. 
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Europe. France was a special target for these groups, not only for its colonial past, 
but particularly due to its alleged unofficial support of the military junta.  
The nineteen nineties saw a range of elaborate operations against Islamists in 
France. GIA responded with the hijack of an aeroplane at Christmas 1994. When 
French commandos attacked at Marseille airport, all hijackers were killed. This was 
followed by the dismantling of networks of Islamists in different French cities, but 
the intelligence services failed to discover the existence of some networks, which 
then commenced a counterattack. This was the start to a wave of Islamic attacks 
which started with the attack on the St. Michel metro station on 25 July 1995 which 
came as a surprise to the French government (the working document comprises an 
overview of the attacks carried out). According to working document 2 this wave of 
attacks was not so much ‘Islamic’ terrorism but part of the long and complicated 
history of the relationship between France and Algeria. Unlike the nineteen 
eighties, the French government did succeed this time in picking up the offenders 
shortly after the attacks and to dismantle their networks (working document 2).  
 
In 1996 French counterterrorism legislation was further reinforced with the 
inclusion of the notion of ‘conspiracy’ (see par. 3.10.2 on new penalisations in 
legislation). This went a long way towards the return to the ‘situation of exception’ 
and the French researchers voice their concerns about the sliding scale of 
prosecuting crimes that have not (yet) taken place. French legislation in the 
nineteen nineties may be regarded as the forerunner of today’s ideas on how to 
fight terrorism, which took a firm hold after 2001 in other countries, too. Part of the 
approach comprises the use of extensive arrests to put networks under pressure 
and to sow fear. The idea is that interrogations of those under arrest can yield 
useful information. In response to criticism voiced, the government argues that the 
appointment of investigating judges with extensive powers is to be preferred over 
the exceptional situations created in the United States under the Patriot Act. 
Nevertheless, some are concerned that “…The emphasis on security could in the 
short term affect legitimacy in the long term”. The French counterterrorism policy 
is presented as highly efficient, but., according to critics, this has come at the cost 
of some basic freedoms23.  
An important difference with earlier years was that the attacks in the mid nineteen 
nineties were regarded as a problem that had developed within France itself. The 
backgrounds to the French involvement in the Algerian problem were neglected. 
The notion of a multinational Islamist ‘movement’ not restricted to any specific 
region was also first accepted in the nineteen nineties. This also dispelled to the 
background previous  ideas that terrorism was to be eradicated by dismantling one 
or several networks. People have become somewhat more modest in this respect, 
according to working document 2. 
The events of September 2001 have motivated the French in their approach to 
terrorism and the idea that they were right to take this approach. The French 
model is taken as an example for other countries. The development of the model 
no longer takes place in response to terrorist actions, but follows its own logic in 
the European and international ‘security movement’, with a preventive and 
proactive aim. Working document 2 signals a difference between the French and 
the American approach: the idea that terrorism can be eradicated by means of a 
                                              
23  The author of working document 2, Didier Bigo, carried out a number of critical studies with others,  for example in the 
ELISE project, and wrote on French policy (www.libertysecurity.org). 
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‘war on terror’24 is not accepted here. Instead, damage inflicted by this 
phenomenon that is here to stay with us for many years must be minimised.   
A new period started with the introduction of a new terrorist act which was still 
being discussed in parliament at the time working document 2 was being written. 
This Act has a strong focus on surveillance by means of information and 
communication technology, while the French system previously leaned heavily on 
human intelligence.  
A ‘white book’  (livre blanc) is also in the process of being drawn up, setting out 
the French approach based on the work of six working groups25.  
As regards Islam, France is taking a two-track approach: promoting the 
organisation of Islam in France and fighting radical Islamism. Globalised Islamism 
has been designated as the key strategic threat after 2001. This approach is shared 
by most governments on the European and international stage, which has led to a 
policy of adaptation and extension of legislation and reinforcement of 
international cooperation (‘adaptation and cooperation imperatives’) which feature 
strongly in the European recommendations. These have been implemented in full 
by France.  
 
As regards studies on counterterrorism, working document 2 simply reports that 
the study into the efficacy, efficiency and lawfulness of counterterrorism policy is 
the responsibility of the ´ministers in the executive branch that have a role in 
combating terrorism´. This is regarded a management aspect rather than an 
independent investigation or evaluation aspect. 
 
 
2.3 Italy 
 
Terrorism in Italy is divided into left (‘red terrorism’) and right (‘black terrorism’) 
subversive organisations, which both developed in an environment of social, 
political and institutional crisis (working document 3). Right-wing movements 
were inspired by neo-fascist ideology and it is assumed that there were mutual ties 
with the SID secret service and a political freemasons’ lodge (P2). A number of 
massacres were carried out. Left-wing terrorism was inspired by communism and 
developed from student and workers movements, who refused to accept 
government authority and claimed to stand up for the interests of the less 
fortunate. Examples are the Red Brigades (Brigate Rosse, BR). Both camps aimed to 
inspire tension amongst the population and thus undermine government. 
 
In the nineteen seventies an armed conflict existed between the left-wing and the 
right-wing groups. The birth of Italian terrorism has often been related to the 
foundation of the BR in 1971, but a first series of bomb attacks took place as early 
as 1969, with one attack killing 17 and wounding 88 in Milan. It is a period that 
remains dark until today. According to sources specified in the working document, 
all parties, i.e. both left-wing and right-wing subversive groups, maintained unclear 
ties with the secret services.  
Terrorist violence penetrated society and public opinion. Right-wing groups aimed 
at attacking places where large numbers of people gathered, such as trains and, in 
                                              
24  Recently, discussions in the United States have referred to the ‘long war’, an analogy with the ‘cold war’ against 
communism. See for example. Carafano and Rosenzweig (2005). 
25  This ‘livre blanc’ has since been published, but the English version was still unavailable during the writing of this report. 
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one case, a demonstration of workers. The left-wing groups focused mostly on 
symbolical figures, which culminated in 1978 in the kidnap of Christian-democratic 
leader Aldo Moro26. According to some sources this was the darkest period in the 
history of the Italian Republic (which was founded after WOII). Characteristic for 
the nineteen seventies was the use of symbols (the BR star) and slogans such as the 
fascist battle cry ‘boia chi molla’27.  
The ended of this episode was marked by a bomb attack on the Bologna railway 
station, killing 80. The attack  had been committed by the ‘black’ terrorists of the 
‘armed revolutionary cores’ (NAR) and it signalled the disintegration of the right-
wing terrorist movement. According to working document 3, the electoral success 
of the neofascist party also contributed to this development.  
 
The emergence of Italian terrorism in the nineteen seventies led to a refinement of 
legislation, which had been found inadequate. New measures were introduced 
urgently, whereby punishment of terrorists was considered an important tool. For 
this purpose, new offences were included in the penal code, sentences were 
stepped up and the period for which a person could be detained in preventive 
custody was extended. Powers for observation, wire-tapping, etc. were expanded. 
In 1980 Section 270bis was introduced, which contained the first ever express 
referral to terrorism in legislation (see par. 3.10.1).  
 
In the nineteen eighties terrorist groups became weaker under the influence of the 
economic boost and reduced emphasis on ideological differences. The ‘second 
generation’ of terrorists was less motivated and the BR fell apart into a number of 
factions, of which the PCC (Partito Comunista Combattente) emerged as the most 
important one.  
In response to the division amongst terrorists, counterterrorism efforts shifted 
towards stimulating cooperation by disloyal terrorists with investigation services. 
In 1982 the ‘pentiti’ act was introduced, aimed at organised crime as well as 
terrorism. This allowed people who were distancing themselves from their terrorist 
pasts to qualify for a reduction of their sentence, particularly if they were prepared 
to collaborate with the justice department to inform on their former comrades. 
 
After the collapse of communism in Easter Europe, the contradiction between ‘left 
and right’ lost most of its relevance, according to working document 3. The 
ideological movements scattered into numerous tiny groups with their own 
ideologies, no longer bound by national borders. Globalisation became the key 
word for these new groups, both left-wing and right-wing. International extreme 
rightwing movements (such as ‘ skinheads’ and ‘neo-Nazis’) also surfaced in Italy. 
To the left are groups of ‘other globalists’ who sometimes adopt subversive forms, 
such as the ‘black blocks’, and there is the PCC, a descendant of the Red Brigades. 
Other than the ‘subversive’ black blocks, the PCC rather fits the description of a 
terrorist group. In 2002 it claimed a political murder (on top official prof. Marco 
Biagi).  
An ambiguous attitude towards globalisation is common. On the one hand 
globalisation is denoted as the enemy for its capitalistic models and the cultural 
                                              
26  Popular Aldo Moro pleaded for a ‘historic compromise’ with the communists, as set out in working document 3.  
27  Which translates as “Who recoils is a piece of shit”. 
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uniformity it implies. On the other hand, globalisation facilitates groups in 
disseminating ideas, for example via the Internet. 
 
In 1990 the policy on counterterrorism in Italy, which up to that point had been 
about repression (nineteen seventies) and stimulating ‘pentiti’28 (nineteen 
eighties), shifted towards the prevention of attacks. International cooperation 
became more important too. Especially after the attacks of 11 September 2001 in 
the United States a range of measures was taken. These are discussed in Chapter 3, 
focusing on the various policy fields. 
 
 
2.4 Spain 
 
The history of the Spanish efforts in the field of counterterrorism is dictated by its 
experiences with Euskadi Ta Sakatuna (ETA, Basque country and Freedom).  
This organisation developed as an ideological alternative to the PNV (Partido 
Nacionalista Vasco, Basque Nationalist Party) which was found to be too moderate 
in its resistance against the dictatorship of General Francisco Franco, which lasted 
until 1975. Founded in 1959 by young nationalists, ETA aimed to ensure the 
conservation of the Basque language and ethnicity and an autonomous Basque 
state in the Basque areas in the northeast of Spain and the southwest of France. 
From 1965 it adopted a Marxist Leninist political course, with many diversions over 
the years.  
Gradually its actions shifted from destroying Spanish symbols to assassinating 
people associated with the suppression by Spain. By far the most important and 
famous attack by ETA was the murder in 1973 of Admiral Carrero Blanco, the 
appointed successor of Franco. The attack was a response to the execution of 
Basque nationalists and was massively supported by the opposition in exile 
abroad. According to the Spanish researchers, the attack was seen by many as a 
contribution towards the establishment of democracy in Spain. In general., ETA 
received considerable support during the Franco dictatorship, which extended 
outside the Basque population. When the dictator was overthrown, ETA radicalised 
further, and support amongst the population gradually subsided. 
 
Over the years, the Batasuna party associated with ETA (previously known as 
Euskal Herritarrok and Herri Batasuna) received 10 to 20 % of the votes in Spanish 
Basque country. The status of the party is a controversial issue in Spain. While the 
Spanish courts, like many others, found that the party is merely the political arm of 
ETA, the party itself has always denied this. In 2003 the party was banned as 
terrorist organisation and placed on the list of terrorist organisations by the United 
States and the EU29. The party was refounded as Aukera Guztiak but again banned 
as a continuation of Batasuna under a different name. Again a new party was 
founded, the Basque Communist Party30. Despite these bans and re-foundations, 
the party won 12 percent of the votes in the elections for the Basque parliament.  
                                              
28  According to Albini (2001), quoted in working document 5, this policy was effective not only against the mafia but also 
the Red Brigades, who were significantly subdued by government policy, according to the author 
29  See also:working document 4. p. 46 on the Spanish Act on Political Parties. 
30  A study has commenced to see if the Basque Communist Party must be regarded as a continuation of Batasuna and 
should therefore also be banned. However, ETA has since called a permanent truce and the government may consider 
allowing the associated political party under a different name. (See NRC ‘Joy and anger over ETA truce’, 23 April 2006). 
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ETA is accused of maintaining connections with other terrorist organisations 
(particularly the IRA) and regimes (Cuba, Libya) and recently was said to have 
connections with organised crime. In particular, ETA is thought to be involved in 
drugs trade to finance its activities. Reference is made to barter trade with ETA 
exchanging drugs for weapons and explosives with  the Neapolitan Camorra. 
 
As regards the development of counterterrorism measures in Spain, working 
document 4 casually refers to death squads set up by the government as early as 
the nineteen eighties (GAL). After these started to operate on French territory the 
French government decided to take a firmer stand against ETA, which for a long 
time had been regarded as a group of political refugees. Since then various high-
ranking ETA officials have been arrested in France and sentenced there or 
extraditted to Spain, sometimes following accelerated procedures.  
 
On 22 March 2006 ETA announced a ‘permanent truce’. 
 
As pointed out before, the subject of terrorism has always been dominated by the 
ETA in Spain. Meanwhile, cells of radical jihadists have emerged in Spain, as 
became clear instantly in the attacks in Madrid of 11 March 2004, killing 189 and 
injuring 1460. Following these attacks police activities targeting Islamic terrorists in 
the country were intensified. These activities also revealed groups acquiring funds 
for foreign Islamic groups. 
Since ‘Madrid’, a more proactive approach has been in place in Spain while 
substantial additional funds have been set aside for the prevention and combating 
of terrorist attacks as well as for the support of victims these attacks cause in the 
country.  
 
 
2.5 United Kingdom 
 
In a study on British experiences with terrorism Wilkinson showed that successive 
British governments have always regarded internal violence mostly as a colonial 
problem, controlled by the British army. The fact that terrorism, a guerrilla war or 
violent insurrections would occur in the homeland was deemed unthinkable for 
quite some time31.  
In a number of countries where the British handed over power peacefully to 
independence movements, violence broke out prior to the transfer. The political 
problems associated with this, says Wilkinson, were caused by issues in the past, 
rather than British politics, although mistakes were certainly made. Clashes often 
occurred between various ethnical groups (take for example Palestine, or Cyprus, 
Aden, and Rhodesia). In the case of some organisations, such as the ones in 
Palestine (Haganah, Irgun, Stern), Cyprus (EOKA), Aden (FLOSY), terrorism played 
a significant role.  
Wilkinson refers of the use of terrorism as one of many weapons available to these 
groups (‘the terrorist weapon’, p. 3) and states that not only the United Kingdom, 
but other colonial powers too (including France) were faced with violent groups. 
                                              
31  See: Wilkinson (1981).  
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The British army developed a wealth of practical knowledge on guerrilla warfare 
and urban terrorism in these complicated situations overseas.  
The successes of some movements inspired other ‘anti-colonial terrorism’ along 
this model, also in the West. According to Wilkinson, the IRA was an example32.  
The history of the Northern Irish conflict goes back a lot further33 with some Irish 
republicans claiming that the British ‘occupation’ of the island and the fight for 
freedom goes back 800 years. A more official account pinpoints its root in 1688, 
when Dutch King William beat Catholic King James who had fled to Ireland near 
the Boyne, a battle which is commemorated to this day by protestant unionists 
walking the Orange marches in July. The ‘Troubles’ peaked in 1969, when the Royal 
Ulster Constabulary responded  violently to protests by Catholics demanding more 
civil rights, which led to an escalation of violence. The old Irish Republican Army 
(IRA) which had forced the British into negotiations in the early twentieth century 
with the use of violence, remained too passive in the eyes of some of its members, 
which resulted in the foundation of the Provisional IRA as a splinter group of the 
official IRA. Since then, the IRA is usually referred to as the Provisionals (‘provos’). 
In response, the British introduced laws which enabled the detention of suspect 
IRA supporters without trial to be able to suppress the protests. Protests against 
these measures led to a downright crisis in 1972. 13 civilians were killed by the 
army during a protest march (‘bloody Sunday’), after which the IRA’s popularity 
grew. The Northern Irish parliament was dissolved and Northern Ireland was 
governed from London. Various very violent episodes followed until 1998, when 
the Good Friday agreement was signed between the republican (catholic) and 
loyalist (Protestants) parties. The IRA has not committed any attacks since then, 
although there was some violence involving republican and unionist splinter 
groups.  
 
The Irish conflict awoke the British from their dream that the end of the colonial 
era would equal the end of terrorism. The ‘troubles’ soon led to the use of the 
army, the first time that the army was involved in a domestic conflict in over a 
hundred years. The Royal Ulster Constabulary was unable to contain the situation. 
The army was walking a tight rope between acting too forcefully and too leniently. 
The British knew from experience that overreaction always played the hand of 
terrorists (based in part on their experiences in Northern Ireland in the early 
nineteen seventies). As the conflict unfolded, the British army started to use more 
and more subtle methods34.  
 
Counterterrorism in the United Kingdom 
 
Most of the counterterrorism measures currently in place in the United Kingdom 
were developed in the period following September 2001. British experience with 
terrorism goes back further and – as set out above – always related to its colonial 
past. Experiences with terrorism in the country itself  were found before 1969, as 
was revealed quite recently in documents published by intelligence service MI5. 
Shortly after the Second World war both Irish and Zionist terrorist groups, who had 
been active before the war, attempted to set up cells in London targeting British  
                                              
32  See: Wilkinson (1981). 
33  The brief summary of the Troubles in this paragraph was taken from the relevant file from The Guardian.  
34  Wilkinson (1981). 
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Box:   Lessons for the current situation? 
In a congress paper Richard Bulkeley of the University of Calgary made an attempt to 
describe the lessons to be drawn from the British experience gained post 9/11*. The author 
wants to use these lessons in the Unites States, and argues that lessons that apply to Great 
Britain will also apply there as the two countries share great similarities. Bulkeley also 
draws parallels between the IRA in its heydays (‘arguably the world champion of terrorism’, 
p. 2) and Al Qaeda. This happens, for example, based on the argument that it is possible to 
compare ´republicanism´ with the religion of Islamists as regards the power of faith in its 
supporters. In terms of organisation (network with rather loose cells) and type of 
supporters (most with average education, special tasks are reserved for the higher 
educated supporters) there are also similarities. Even leaving these aside, Bulkeley states 
that the lessons learnt from British experiences in Northern Ireland can be regarded as 
‘general principles of counter-terrorism’. The means the British used in their battle with IRA 
included intelligence, Special Forces and influencing the media. 
 
According to Bulkeley the following lessons may be drawn: 
– According to Bulkeley, intelligence plays an important role in planning actions against 
terrorism. (Further) damaging relationships with communities that could support 
terrorists must be avoided. While technological means are also used, human 
intelligence plays the key role in gathering intelligence. Suspects were sometimes put 
under pressure to work as informers for the British. An important side-effect of 
recruiting informers in the IRA was that the organisation was forced to set up an 
internal security department to trace and remove informers (‘touts’). The distrust 
versus potential informers affected the cohesion within the community in which the 
terrorists operated. The mistakes that were made, such as false confessions obtained 
through torture, also contributed to a climate of distrust and put the population’s 
support to the organisation under pressure. Bulkeley emphasises the demoralising 
effect of the presence of informers and addresses this point in great detail.  
– Even more important is perhaps the gathering of low level intelligence, which makes it 
harder for terrorists to move within their environment. From the nineteen seventies the 
British started to collect detailed door-to-door data on residential areas. They started 
to develop an understanding of the enemy. Checkpoints (used frequently in the 
nineteen seventies, also referred to as Vehicle Check Points or VCPs) also served to 
gather ‘low level’ intelligence.  
These measures, however, also put the local population under pressure. The computer 
registration of vehicle registration numbers (Vengeful) took some of the pressure off 
as it reduced the need to stop so many cars. 
 
* See: Bulkeley (2001). 
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– Bulkeley (2001) saw the use of the regular army as problematic: soldiers acted mostly 
as target for the gunmen and could easily hurt or kill innocent bystanders. In the aim 
to capture the hearts and minds of a population, this is a serious disadvantage. The 
viewpoints of the republican Northern-Irish in particular radicalised. The presence of 
armed British soldiers rather legitimised the IRA’s claim that Northern Ireland was 
British occupied territory. According to Bulkeley, the regular army is not a very suitable 
instrument to fight terrorism.  
– The use of the Special Air Service. The SAS had an almost legendary reputation in 
British culture. According to the author, the actual number of units deployed did not 
warrant the psychological effect on the Northern Irish conflict. Yet the IRA suspected 
SAS involvement in every failed mission. According to Bulkeley, however, SAS’ main 
contribution was its competency training on observation skills for example. Other 
countries have learned from this deployment of Special Forces. Incidentally, the 
legendary and at the same time secretive reputation of the SAS also meant that the 
accusation that the SAS also acted outside the law as assassination squad was given 
some credibility in the Northern Irish public opinion, emphasising the importance of 
the battle for people’s hearts and minds.  
– In comparison with other conflicts in which the British army was involved, the 
proximity of the battle in Northern Irish meant the British press followed it much more 
closely. The possible impact this had on public opinion made the British realise the 
necessity of the, up to a certain extent, monitoring of information on the conflict. Since 
the democracy ruled out direct censorship, more subtle means were used to promote 
favourable media attention for the British. One of these methods was assisting 
journalists in gathering news. On the other hand, negative information in the British 
press was regarded as a signal that public opinion was turning against the battle, a 
signal that needed to be taken into consideration.  
– In addition to the more subtle influences, use was also made of more direct 
propaganda, whereby stories to influence the outcome of the conflict were circulated. 
The report mentions how the loot of armed robberies by the IRA was always 
exaggerated, which could lead to internal investigations within the IRA. The resulting 
punishments harmed the IRA image, says the author. Public opinion was influenced by 
the ‘criminalisation’ of the IRA, the result of prosecuting the acts as ordinary crimes 
rather than lending them a special status as ‘terrorists’ crimes. 
The conclusions Bulkeley draws for the Unites States are the following: reinstate human 
intelligence which has been neglected in the Unites States and improve low level 
intelligence by gaining knowledge and an understanding of the situation of the people 
involved (as in the Middle East).  
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ministers35. No literature has yet been found on any articulate counterterrorism 
politics from that period. 
 
Following the Northern Irish Troubles, British terrorism control units had 
accumulated a wealth of expertise and experience. In the interviews which the 
WODC had within the framework of this survey with representatives from the 
British Home Office, the Ministry of the Interior and the Ministry of Justice, the 
representatives of the various departments were unanimous in their opinion that 
these experiences would prove of little use in tackling jihadi terrorism in the 
United Kingdom, which had placed itself in the spotlight with its London attacks in 
July 2005.  
 
The Troubles inspired the first counterterrorism measures and the accumulation of 
a wealth of experience in their application. The first Prevention of Terrorism Act 
(Northern Ireland) was gradually developed from 1974 to 1989 and specifically 
targeted the situation in Northern Ireland. The Act provided for issues such as 
emergency powers for police and the ban of paramilitary organisations, 
criminalizing membership and/or (financial) support of these organisations.  
A measure unique to the United Kingdom was the introduction of courts without 
jury, the Diplock courts. These were set up in 1972 based on the report by a 
commission chaired by Lord Diplock, when it appeared that jury members in 
Northern Ireland were intimidated by paramilitary groups. After the Good Friday 
agreement it was announced that the Diplock courts were to be abolished. A recent 
report of independent reviewer Lord Carlile (see below in this paragraph), however, 
suggests that they should be kept for now as the situation in Northern Ireland 
justifies this as dissident paramilitary organisations are still active. Incidentally, the 
report claims that they are becoming increasingly involved in organised crime. 
Nevertheless, Lord Carlile has pleaded in favour of recalling the measures in the 
foreseeable future36. 
 
Since 2001 the British counterterrorism measures, as in other countries, have been 
considerably reinforced. The attacks on the London underground in July 2005 have 
made the creation of a counterterrorism policy and legislation a priority. The many 
documents published by the British government, most of which can be 
downloaded from the websites of the Home Office or other institutions, however, 
do not refer to the experiences with combating terrorism in Northern Ireland, save 
when the article itself concerns Northern Ireland.  
 
British counterterrorism strategy after 2001  
 
The British counterterrorism strategy is based on the so-called ‘4 Ps’: Prevention, 
Pursuit, Protection, and Preparedness, as laid down in the Home Office Five Year 
Strategic Plan 2004-2008, published in July 200437.  
                                              
35  The Guardian, May 22, 2003, Terrorists plotted death of Bevin. 
36  Report on the operation in 2005 of Part VII of the Terrorism Act 2000, Lord Carlile of Berriew. 
37  This information was taken from the Website of the Home Office security.homeoffice.gov.uk. The five-year plan, 
however, includes a fifth ‘P’: Public Information. it is not clear why this has been removed. See: Home Office (2004). 
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Prevention: dealing with the causes in the UK or abroad 
This includes contributing to solving international conflicts which continue to feed 
terrorist organisations’ recruitment. Prevention also means ensuring that all 
civilians feel at home in society. 
 
Pursuit: prosecuting terrorist organisations 
This includes a better understanding of what terrorist organisations are capable of 
and their intentions and in disrupting their freedom to move within the UK and 
abroad. This also includes terrorist financing and developing legislation. 
 
Protection: protection of the United Kingdom and of critical infrastructure 
The protection of special-risk areas must be improved. The efforts are geared 
towards cooperation with key sectors and locations forming a particular risk. This 
includes the protection of the Critical National Infrastructure (CNI, see par. 3.6.1). 
 
Preparedness: arranging for sound response and recovery 
All schemes in place for unforeseen events are thoroughly reviewed by the 
government. A series of programmes has been used to ensure that the country is 
adequately prepared in the event of terrorist attacks, including the release of 
chemical, biological or radioactive substances.  
 
These four fields have been set out in four separate ‘discussion papers’ for 
discussion in parliament. The first paper comprises a threat analysis, the second 
elaborates on the governments strategy (the four ‘P’s’), the third goes into 
prevention and prosecution and the fourth goes into preparing for calamities and 
the protection of critical locations and infrastructure38. 
 
Considerable efforts have been made in the field of legislation. The key acts are 
summarised below (see also par. 3.10). 
 
Terrorism Act 2000 (TACT) 
Under this act certain terrorist groups are banned which makes it illegal for 
members of the groups to operate in the United Kingdom (25 international groups; 
14 from Northern Ireland). The powers for the police to stop (‘stop and search’) 
and detain persons in police custody have been expanded. In addition, new 
penalisation schemes have been drawn up, such as the incitement of terrorist 
crimes and teaching and taking terrorist training. Powers included exclusively for 
Northern Ireland are reviewed every year following an evaluation by the 
independent reviewer, Lord Carlile (see below).  
 
Anti-Terrorism, Crime and Security Act 2001 (ATCSA) 
This Act aims mostly at countering the financing of terrorism and includes 
measures in the field of streamlining immigration procedures, securing the 
infrastructure and expanding the powers of the police. Originally, Section 4 of the 
Act listed the powers to detain foreign terror suspects without charge. However, 
these were found to be discriminating in December 2004 by the Law Lords39 and 
                                              
38  These four discussion papers were taken off the Home Office Website in the summer of 2005. Part of the content is 
discussed in the section on the policy fields and legislation in Chapter 3. 
39  Lords of Appeal, court of last resort or highest court in the United Kingdom, comprising legally trained members of the 
House of Lords.  
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subsequently withdrawn. The Control Orders (see paragraph 3.12) were developed 
to replace these revoked powers.  
 
Prevention of Terrorism Act 2005 (under parliamentary discussion) 
This Act arranges mostly the control orders and a longer term of preventive 
detention.  
 
Regulation of investigatory powers act 2005 (RIPA) 
This Act covers the technological options the growth of the Internet and the use of 
encryption offer. The Act provides a basis to investigation techniques which 
(might) affect privacy. (intrusive investigative techniques).  
 
The independent reviewer. An interesting phenomenon in English terrorism 
legislation is the ‘independent reviewer’, Lord Carlile of Berriew. Lord Carlile has 
been appointed as single evaluator of acts due for review. He reports on new laws, 
for example on the degree to which they violate civil rights and freedoms in 
general or specifically the European Convention for the Protection of Human 
Rights and Fundamental Freedoms. Lord Carlile’s study is about meeting with 
(usually rather many) representatives from relevant organisation and civilians, 
which are reported in detail in the appendices to his reports. Lord Carlile has great 
authority, which relies in part on his political position: as a Liberal Democrat he is 
thought to stand more or less ‘above the parties’40.  
 
 
2.6 United States 
 
The term terrorism has been used in the United States since the early 20th century, 
when anarchists were violently resisting the government, for example with a bomb 
attack on New York’s financial district in 1920. The first attempts by the 
investigation services to gather information on individuals and groups involved in 
activities targeting the government date back to this period. In 1947 the Direction 
of Central Intelligence was set up, the immediate forerunner of today’s CIA. It 
started to focus on foreign intelligence, while the FBI aimed at domestic anti-
American activities. At the time there was aversion against the use of intelligence 
work against American civilians.  
In the nineteen fifties some violent activities took place by Puerto Rican 
nationalists, who attempted, for example, to kill President Truman. It was in this 
period that realisation dawned that the increased capacities of television 
broadcasting, as well as increased attention to major events contributed to a 
growing scope of terrorist activities. After all, these activities are aimed at invoking 
fear (in opponents) or bringing across a message (in potential sympathisers).  
 
'Modern' terrorism is associated with aeroplane hijackings by Palestinians in the 
early nineteen seventies. Following the attack on the Israeli athletes at the Munich 
Olympic Games, a Cabinet Commission to Combat Terrorism was set up in the 
United Sates. For the first time realisation grew that international terrorists could 
hit the United States. Under President Carter the cabinet commission was 
dissolved while the coordination of antiterrorist policy was grouped under the 
                                              
40  This was commented in an interview with an employee from the Home Office.  
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National Security Council. The first typologies of terrorist activities were drawn up 
in the mid nineteen seventies, one of which was accepted officially over a period of 
some 30 yeas and was drawn up by the National Consultation Committee for 
standards and targets of criminal law. Incidentally, today’s jihad  terrorism does 
not seem to fit any of the typologies used at the time, according to the author of 
working document 541.  
 
In the government period under President  Reagan (1980-1988) combating 
terrorism was given great priority, particularly in view of its associations with the 
former Soviet Union. Despite the many initiatives, little changed during that period 
in the policy of the most important services involved: CIA and FBI. After the Soviet 
Union fell apart and Libya recognised its accountability for ‘Lockerbie’, 
government-supported terrorism seemed to fall. In the nineteen nineties the topic 
lost priority. Terrorism coordinator of the State Department started to focus more 
on peaceful coexistence and the creation of cooperation on a world level.  
 
In the mid nineteen nineties the United States was confronted with a new form of 
domestic terrorism. The bombing of a government building in Oklahoma by 
Timothy McVeigh proved an expression of a larger undercurrent of right-wing 
white racists, who use violence to question the authority of the federal government 
locally, particularly in the field of possession of firearms. Under the Clinton 
presidency the first Islamist attack on US soil was committed on the WTC 
(February 1993). Shortly afterwards conspiracies were unveiled to commit attacks 
on other places in New York that had symbolic value or with a key interest in the 
infrastructure, such as tunnels and bridges. 
The danger of a chemical attack was once again brought to everyone’s attention 
when Sarin gas was used in an attack on the Tokyo underground in 1995. 
The National Security Council was re-established as coordinating body for 
combating terrorism. From the NSC the Counterterrorism Security Group (CSG) 
was set up, which comprised top-ranking officials from the various agencies 
involved. The director of the CSG was given considerable powers and advised on 
the budgets for combating terrorism. President Clinton also initiated extensive 
adaptations to legislation on terrorism. While most of these changes were not 
implemented until the US Patriot Act that became effective after the September 
2001 attacks, terrorism was once again on top of the agenda.  
Jihadi terrorism expressed itself as had never been seen before: a rather loose 
multinational network, which (in any case formally) was not supported by any 
sponsors, so that the old diplomatic measures could no longer be used. In the 
American perception, the jihadists, including al Qaeda, did not seem to have any 
clear political targets. While the importance of combating terrorism was 
recognised, both the Clinton and Bush governments were criticised for proving 
unable to control the danger posed by Bin Laden c.s.. Naftali and others argued 
that not much priority had actually been given to combating terrorism42.  
After the September 2001 attacks, combating terrorism in the United States was 
given highest priority. In 2003 two documents were published that set out the 
                                              
41  The most common typology (of which there were many according to Petrosino, see working document 5, p. 7-8) 1. Non-
political terrorism, 2. Quasi terrorism, such as hostage taking by criminals, 3. Limited political terrorism, not targeted at 
overthrowing governments, 4. State terrorism, 5. Political  terrorism, creating fear for political purposes, 6. Narco-
terrorism: connection between terrorism and organised drug crime. 
42  See: Crenshaw (2005). 
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policy. The National Strategy for Homeland Security43 focused mainly on combating 
terrorism in the US. The National Strategy for Combating Terrorism described how 
threats needed to be identified and dealt with before they reached the United 
States. The emphasis was on preventing attacks with weapons of mass destruction.  
The latter document presents four key points of the strategy:  
– Defeat: attacking leadership, the infrastructure and hiding places of terrorist 
organisations 
– Deny: ensuring that terrorists receive no support from or save haven in any 
country (particularly through effectuation of Resolution 1373 of the Security 
Council and the 12 antiterrorism treaties.) 
– Diminish: removing underlying conditions used by terrorists by focusing the 
international community on risk areas 
– Defend: protect civilians and interests of the United States by identifying 
threats and neutralising them as they appear. Reinforcing defence. 
  
Investigation into counterterrorism 
At the University of Maryland the Center of Excellence for Behavioral and Social 
Research on Terrorism and Counterterrorism is supported by the Department of 
Homeland Security and other institutions. Other institutions, such as Rand 
Corporation, carry out studies on behalf of the government. Nevertheless, most 
research funding goes to studies in the field of technological innovations. 
For ‘monitoring’ purposes the State Department publishes the authoritative report 
‘Patterns of Global Terrorism’ every year. In the field of evaluation of 
counterterrorism efforts, little is yet available, even in the United States.  
                                              
43  The notion of Homeland Security recently received more attention than ‘National Security’. Dobbs (2001) explains how 
the two terms are not synonymous. Homeland Security refers mostly to the own territory and own population, while 
National Security clearly has an international dimension.  
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3 Description of counterterrorism policies in 
countries investigated 
 
 
3.1 Policy aimed at the prevention of radicalisation and recruitment 
 
Dutch government documents define radicalisation as a process in which people 
are increasingly prepared to accept the ultimate consequences of their views 
regarding the change of the existing system and putting it into action, which 
generates an uncompromising attitude towards those who think differently44. The 
phenomenon of radicalisation of young Muslims in particular (and the role the 
Internet plays in this) is recognised in all countries investigated. Some reports 
devote attention to the more general interpretation of the problem. A clear 
definition is often absent. The United Kingdom in particular seems to devote great 
policy attention to radicalisation, as does the Netherlands,  
 
3.1.1 General approach to radicalisation and views of the concept 
 
Germany 
According to working document 1, it is assumed in Germany that radicalisation of 
mostly Muslims takes place in mosques, via the Internet and in prisons. According 
to Albrecht (working document 1), however, there is no study to substantiate these 
assumptions45.  
Germany recognises the danger of the emergence of ‘parallel societies’ that are the 
result of poor integration, in which radicalisation can perhaps develop more 
easily46. 
 
France 
The working document mentions differences between investigation and security 
services with respect to the approach to radicalisation amongst Muslims. In the 
eyes of the authors of the working document on France, the Renseignements 
Generaux and the DTS intelligence service follow a ‘straightforward’ approach 
which implies that the most devout Muslims are probably also the most radical, 
while the antiterrorism unit UCLAT (see par 3.3.1) states that the people 
formulating the ideas are not necessarily the people carrying out the actions. 
 
United Kingdom  
The discussion papers to parliament (also refer to par. 2.5) state that with regard to 
‘prevention’, the factors that lead to radicalisation of young Muslims and the 
appeal they experience from terrorist networks, need to be understood better. 
According to the discussion papers, these underlying factors should not be ignored 
(discussion paper  3, also see par. 2.5) in setting up a credible counterterrorism 
strategy.  
 
                                              
44  Memorandum  ‘radicalisering en radicalisme’, Kamerstukken II, 2004-2005, 29754, nr 26; AIVD (2005) From Dawa tot 
Jihad. 
45  The articles compiled in the ‘Feindbilder und Radikalisierungsprozesse’ (www.bmi.bund.de) attempt to address this 
point, but turn out the have a rather abstract character.  
46  For the Netherlands, see AIVD (2004) Van Dawa tot Jihad.  
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The Home Office operates a ‘general theory’ on the radicalisation process, based 
on which attempts are made to draw conclusions regarding interventions that 
would be useful in combating the process. Based on experience, the starting point 
is that there is no such thing as a ‘radicalisation career’ that would apply to all or 
even most cases of radicalising Muslim youths. Three types of factors are being 
distinguished that influence the process of radicalisation:  
– structural factors, such as social-economic inequality;  
– motivational factors, for example the notion that foreign policy inspires attacks 
on Muslims or that Muslims are affected disproportionally by certain measures 
(such as the ‘stop and search’); as well as notions such as  ‘the need for a new 
Caliphate’; 
– environmental factors, including mosques and prisons where people get in 
touch with radicals and recruiters, although it is now recognized that most 
recent cases involved non-localised networks, i.e. ‘virtual’ networks established 
via the Internet). 
 
These factors are addressed by a range of measures. 
For example, the Foreign Office operates in the international arena to help solve 
international sources of tension. A programme of the British Council (‘Connecting 
Futures’ in the UK and the Middle East) and support of the peace process in 
Israel/Palestine are regarded as examples.  
In addition, efforts are made to marginalize extremists within their community. 
The development of legislation against inciting hatred on religious grounds and 
against discrimination by authorities and service providers are also mentioned. 
‘The process of radicalisation and recruitment should be better understood and 
focal points in this process should be tackled. The government recognises that 
policies directed at the current generation of terrorists can affect the perceptions of 
young people exposed to terrorists’ propaganda’47.  
 
The British government has appointed seven working groups to develop ideas on 
combating radicalisation and extremism and promoting integration. The groups 
focused on the following issues: radicalisation, youngsters, local initiatives, women, 
Imams, Islamic education, and community security. In September 2005 a number 
of proposals were made by these working groups as a contribution to the 
counterterrorism policy. One of the proposals was the set-up of a National 
Advisory Council of Imams and Mosques. In addition, a national forum against 
extremism and Islamophobia was proposed. A ‘road show’ of influential and 
popular religious experts would need to set out the concept of ‘Islam in the west’ 
and condemn extremism. 
 
Concerns for the relationships with the Muslim communities have been 
extensively documented  in reports such as ‘Terrorism and Community Relations’48 
and the confidential report Young Muslims and Extremism, which was leaked 
through the Times (also see par. 2.5).  
 
                                              
47  Discussion paper 3, February 2005.  
48  Home Affairs Committee (HAC, 2005). 
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An attempt is being made to implement these insights into the various policy 
fields. For example, a strategy has been developed for the harbour police, focusing 
on four key aspects:  
1 Critical assessment of information and intelligence used by officials to select 
people for inspection 
2 A review of diversity training aimed at dealing with minorities, which is 
followed by the harbour police 
3 ‘Islamic awareness briefing’ and other training for officers in the harbours 
4 Promoting the involvement of the community in activities to enhance the 
awareness of diversity in officials. 
 
United States 
The extent of the actual approach to radicalisation  in the United States is 
determined by the American Constitution. The ‘first amendment’ emphasises the 
freedom of speech. Unlike in a number of European countries, persons voicing 
racist comments cannot be dealt with. The support of Jihad either in writing or in 
speech is difficult to tackle directly. Registration of people involved in intelligence 
services databases is possible, however.  
Nevertheless, the Bush government has proclaimed a war on ideas that needs to be 
won. 
According to working document 5 the government targets mostly Muslim 
communities in the Middle East and elsewhere, and  to a lesser degree the Muslim 
community in the United States itself. Important in this is that most members of 
the American Muslim community are in a relatively affluent position compared 
with, for example, most Muslims the Middle East and Africa (and in West-
European countries), where unemployment is high and integration poor49.  
 
3.1.2 Foundation of Islamic counsels  
 
Germany 
Working document 1 comments that the Islamic Council, which has been in 
existence for some time, plays neither a formal, nor an informal role in the 
prevention of radicalisation. The Council was, however, invited to share its 
comments on new legislation in this field.  
 
France 
France has an Islamic council (Conseil Français du Culte Musulman, CFCM), 
which liaises with regional Muslim councils. The council was founded in response 
to the need to promote a well-organised ‘moderate’ Islam, and to combat 
Islamism. For this purpose a dialogue was initiated with the Muslim community, 
which resulted in the foundation of the council, aimed at minimising the political 
scope for extremism. The Muslim council is involved in a broad range of issues 
that concern Muslims, including political relations, the construction of mosques, 
control of halal meat, Imam training and the education of spiritual councillors in 
the army and prisons. The latter is particularly important because many of the 
terrorists involved in bomb attacks were shown to have been recruited in prison.  
                                              
49  Petrosino (working document 5) reports that 66% of Muslims in the United States have an annual income of $60,000 or 
more (note 65). The connection made between unemployment and lack of perspectives on the one hand and the 
emergence of extremist ideologies and terrorist movements in the other, is a subject outside the scope of this report, 
that deserves another study. 
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The general objective is to promote the independence of the French Muslim 
communities from foreign governments (such as Saudi Arabia, Algeria and 
Morocco). All key Muslim organisations sit on the council and it is recognised as 
representing the entire Muslim community. The French government distances 
itself from Huntington’s idea of the ‘clash of civilisations’ and aims to make a clear 
distinction between Islam and extremists, according to Bigo (working document 2).  
Important in connection with the fight against radicalisation is the ‘Laïcité’, 
secularism which attaches great importance to the separation of church and state. 
While the ban on wearing visible signs of religion (the ‘headscarves act’) is mostly a 
‘republican issue’ according to working document 2, it has complicated relations 
with the Muslim community while it feeds extremists in their propaganda against 
the French government. Measures aimed at integration, such as the foundation of 
the Muslim council, are being implemented alongside repressive measures, which 
are aimed mostly at localising networks and ensuring that intentions to carry out 
attacks cannot be realised. Due to measures like these, social and religious Islamic 
issues after 2001 have been linked to (the combat against) terrorism. The working 
document on France is critical about linking the ‘fight against radicalisation and 
terrorism’ with a range of political and policy issues that have to do with the 
Muslim community, such as  integration, social frustration, problems with identity, 
etcetera. This link is sometimes made to ‘sell’ the policy to the public, the French 
researchers say, something they believe makes this connection even more 
dangerous as it ignores the complexity of the issue.  
 
Italy 
An Islamic Council was set up in Italy to promote a moderate Islam. This measure 
is regarded as ‘complementary’ to other CT legislation. The council is under 
protection (‘aegis’) of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs and comprises experienced 
and authoritative people from the Muslim community. It is an advisory body 
aimed at entering an open dialogue with the community. Given the presence of a 
growing Muslim community it is deemed important to establish interdependency 
between policies in the fields of security, social and civil rights and integration, 
aimed at increased social cohesion. The aim is to involve the Muslim community 
in the democratic constitutional state. 
 
Spain  
The Spanish Islamic Commission was set up by the Spanish government as early  
as 1992 to represent the Muslim community which counted some 1 million people. 
The commission has a legal basis. The Spanish Muslims are registered in the 
Registry of Religious Entities for this purpose. 
Two federations are represented in the Islamic commission, namely the Union of 
Spanish Islamic communities and the Spanish Federation of Islamic Entities 
(FEERI). Both federations comprise numerous groups. The Islamic commission 
plays a role in a number of key areas, such as  the status of imams, the legal status 
of Islamic marriages, spiritual support in public institutes and education in Islam 
in public schools.  
Mosques and other places where Muslims gather but who do not participate in the 
Islamic Commission, are put under pressure by the police to ensure they register. 
If they fail to do so, they may be closed.  
The Islamic Council deliberately focuses on playing a role in prevention 
radicalisation within the Muslim community. For example, a Fatwa was 
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pronounced that terrorism creates a false image of Islam. According to the Quran it 
will lead to a disruption of the relationships with non-Muslims in the countries 
where Muslims are a minority. The governments and press were requested to refer 
from using the terms ‘Islam’ and ‘Islamic’ in combination with the term ‘terrorism’ 
in the same sentence. The Commission has thus intended to place the terrorists 
outside Islam. 
 
United Kingdom 
A National Advisory Council of Imams and Mosques has been set up in the United 
Kingdom. Its aim is to prevent mosques from being used for radicalisation, 
reducing dependence on imams from abroad, enhancing cohesion in communities 
and promoting the leadership qualities of imams.  
 
3.1.3 Monitoring the impact of counterterrorism policy on Muslim 
communities  
 
United Kingdom 
The possible impact of the counterterrorism policy on the Muslim communities is 
attracting interest, as appeared from the interviews with the Home Office (see par 
1.2.1). What needs to be avoided is that the policy is interpreted as being 
discriminatory. This plays a role particularly in high-profile interference actions 
such the ‘stop and search’ actions by the police. These have been criticised by 
Muslim organisations for mainly targeting Muslims. For this reason, it was decided 
to collect data on stop-and-search activities, to obtain an insight into the 
percentages of stop-and-search activities in respect of population groups. These 
Community Impact Assessments are carried out by the police itself50. Confidential  
reports about the sentiments in the Muslim community in respect of government 
measures are issued monthly.  
  
Concerns for the relationships with the Muslim community appears from an April 
2004  report which was leaked through The Times in July 2005, entitled ‘Young 
Muslims and Extremism’, and associated letters and other documents, analysing 
radicalisation amongst Muslim youths and announcing further studies. Strong 
emphasis is also laid on improving contacts with  the community. In 2005 a 
number of working groups were set up to put this into action, which yielded 
dozens of policy recommendations. The emphasis in these recommendations is on 
reinforcing the powers of the Muslim community itself to fight extremism. The 
Home Office was happy to receive the recommendations in November 2005. The 
outcome of the recommendations cannot be verified as yet.  
 
In a memorandum to the Parliament of June 200451 the Home Office announced 
that cooperation is being sought with the Muslim community, which has an 
important role to play in the fight against terrorism. Important in this is the 
Muslim Contact Unit liaising with the Metropolitan Police Special Branch. By 
developing good contacts with people from the community it aims to fight 
                                              
50  These must be regarded in the tradition of ‘impact assessments’ in various fields, such as ‘regulatory impact 
assessments’ which must show if the introduction of certain regulations would impact on the inequality between 
population groups (‘race and inequality’). 
51  http://www.publications.parliament.uk/pa/cm200304/cmselect/cmhaff/886/886we02.htm download 16-1-06. 
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extremism (for example people involved in mosques where radicals attempt to roll 
out activities). Consultations with the British Muslim Board are also taking place.  
 
Within this framework meetings were arranged with representatives of the Muslim 
community which discussed the discussion memorandum of the Home Office, 
entitled ‘Counter-terrorism Powers: Reconciling Security and Liberty in an Open 
Society’ of February 2004.  
 
Minority communities are considered partners who need to be involved and 
communicated with. Concerns have arisen over the use of some powers assigned 
to the police within the framework of counterterrorism, such as  the ‘stop and 
search’ measures affecting people and vehicles. The reasonable use of these 
powers is monitored by the ‘Stop and Search Action Team’ (SSAT), which receives 
its information from the community. 
The relevance of maintaining good relations with the immigrant communities in 
fighting terrorism is highlighted in the report ‘Terrorism and Community 
Relations’ by the Home Affairs Committee of the House of Commons dated April 
2005.  
 
Spain  
‘Working on mutual understanding’ is an issue in Spanish policy. Besides 
government information and information to prevent terrorism, there are initiatives 
to disseminate knowledge on  topics related to Islam, promoted by the 
government. The Spanish Open University (UNED) has set up a course on Islamic 
history and culture in cooperation with one of the Spanish Muslim Umbrella 
organisations (FEERI) and with the ‘World Islamic Call Society’. Incidentally, the 
working document does not indicate how these activities aim to fight  
radicalisation. It is said that the UNED has an important social influence. 
 
3.1.4 Abolition of privileges for religious reasons 
 
Germany: abolition of the ‘religion privilege’. Until recently, extremist groups could 
escape this ban by presenting themselves as purely religious or ideological 
organisations (‘Association Act’, English translation author working document 1). 
 
3.1.5 Combating radicalisation in Muslim countries 
 
United States 
The American viewpoint is based on the idea that extremism and radicalisation 
can grow in the poor conditions in which many Muslims are living, particularly in 
the Middle East. The theory behind the American approach to radicalisation is that 
humanitarian aid will help improve conditions on site, diminishing the breeding 
ground for radicalisation. Employment deprives jihadi groups from their reservoir 
of young unemployed from which they can recruit their people. Education 
contributes to keeping racist and hateful notions at bay. Within the framework of 
programmes such as the Middle East Partnership Initiative, Millennium Challenge 
Account and Trade for African Development and Enterprise and the Andean 
Regional Initiative, millions of dollars have been invested accordingly. According to 
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working document 5 critics have argued that many of the terrorists now known are 
anything but poor52.  
World Muslim Outreach is a classified programme which the United States uses to 
try to stem the emergence of radicalism and anti-Americanism in the Islamic world 
by promoting a moderate Islam. According to an article in US News this is done by 
sponsoring radio and TV programmes, Islamic education and political think tanks. 
Critics have questioned the compatibility of these initiatives with the separation of 
church and state53.  
 
 
3.2 Policy aimed at informing the general public 
 
Germany, France, Italy 
The working documents drawn up for this project and for these countries contain 
no information on an explicit policy in the field of informing the public on 
terrorism. The researchers visited the Websites of the Ministries of Foreign Affairs 
of the countries in question.  
The German Ministry of Foreign Affairs (www.bmi.bund.de) contains a page with 
instructions to the population on how to act in the event of ‘außergewöhnlichen 
Gefahren- und Schadenslagen’, including environmental and industrial disasters, 
as well as the dangers of international terrorism.  
The security pages of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of France (http:// 
www.interieur.gouv.fr/rubriques/b/b1_votre_secu) nor the site of the Ministry in 
Italy (www.interno.it) contain separate sections with advice and information to the 
public on terrorism.  
 
Spain  
According to the working document on Spain not much is being done here on 
informing the general public on counterterrorism policy, in the sense of explaining 
the considerations underlying the policy. The Ministry of Foreign Affairs has a 
Website where civilians are asked to cooperate in the fight against ‘terrorism and 
organised crime’. The Guardia Civil also has a Website, with ‘ten commandments’ 
for the cooperation between civilians and the government in fighting terrorism. 
The emphasis lies particularly on the importance of reporting to the authorities 
any activities that could be terrorism-related.  
Working document 4 lists over ten Websites of organisations of victims of 
terrorism. The organisations are assigned important roles in dealing with actual 
crises.  
 
United Kingdom 
The policy is that information to the general public is given ‘…without providing a 
running commentary on our assessment of threat useful to terrorists themselves 
and or needlessly alarming people with unspecified threats.’  
A leaflet was distributed door to door entitled ‘Preparing for emergencies’. A 
Website of the same name was set up for information to the public 
(www.pfe.gov.uk).  
 
                                              
52  Working document 5 refers to Constantino (2005).  
53  Kaplan (2005). Also see Washington Post 17 April 2005: US Outreach to Islamic World gets slow start. 
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In the event of calamities a News Coordination Centre (NCC) will be set up to 
provide information to the public, interested parties and the media. The 
information must be ‘clear, consistent, timely and accurate’. A communication 
protocol lays down arrangements with representatives of all key media.  
The National Media Emergency Forum has been discussing communication issues 
since 1996 with representatives of the media and the government, local authorities 
and other public sector services. 
 
Literature refers to attempts by the government in the Northern Irish ‘Troubles’ to 
get some grip on media information on the British government and the 
paramilitary opponents and how they acted54. It is not clear to what extent explicit 
lessons have been learnt from these experiences that could be applied to the 
current situation.  
 
The guidelines for crisis management (see also par. 3.6) also include that the media 
need to play a clear role in emergency plans.  
 
United States  
In the United States informing the general public serves several objects. First and 
foremost, the information aims to encourage civilians to take steps to promote 
their own security. Secondly, a ‘force multiplying’ effect is expected, with civilians 
helping the government signalling suspect people or events.  
The Homeland Security Advisory System, which distinguishes five threat levels, 
does not aim primarily at the general public but mostly at the government and 
national and local authorities. However, it pops up instantly when visiting the 
website www.dhs.gov of the Department of Homeland Security (DHS). A problem 
that occurs in the United States according to working document 5 is that there are 
different alerting systems. In addition to the DHS alarm system, there are systems 
for separate states and large cities, such as  New York. These systems sometimes 
issue conflicting warnings. Another possible problem is that alarms given are based 
on information which is not instantly recognisable as serious or a hoax. On the one 
hand the government may not be taken seriously if threats always pass unrealised, 
on the other hand terrorists could use the systems to create a high level of fear 
amongst the population.  
In addition to alerting the population, the government is making efforts to inform 
specific segments of the population and businesses. Travel advice issued by the 
Ministry of Foreign Affairs, too, is sometimes based on information on terrorist 
threats.  
 
 
                                              
54  Part of the literature on the Northern Ireland conflict is rather politicised, in the sense that the authors (seem to) take 
sides in the conflict. For an overview of the media war, the following may be of interest: Coogan (1996) Chapter 11, The 
Media War.  
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3.3 Policy aimed at institutional developments and set-up of coordination 
centres 
 
New institutions have been set up in most countries that aim to coordinate the 
efforts in the field of counterterrorism. 
 
Germany 
Various initiatives have been implemented in Germany  to come to a better 
coordination and exchange between investigation services in the federal states. 
Attention in this is also targeted at the different information systems that have 
trouble communicating. The principle that the police and domestic security 
remains the responsibility of the federal states is not a point for discussion, 
however.  
In Germany the cooperation between the services is very much aimed at 
information sharing (see also par. 3.4.1). 
 
France 
The French legal system is characterised by a clear centralisation of the 
infrastructure for terrorism cases. Coordination has been assigned to the Paris 
court, which has absolute control over the (legal) fight against terrorism. Within 
the Paris court a division has been set up comprising public prosecutors and 
investigation judges55, the so-called 14th ‘antiterrorism’ Division of the Paris 
Prosecution Offices, also known as SCLAT (central service). This division focuses 
solely on terrorism cases. The Ministry of Justice comprises a Bureau de la lutte 
contre la criminalité organisé, le terrorism et le blanchiment which prepares policy 
routes. Not only the legal system combating terrorism has been centralised, the 
police system has been centralised too. The emphasis in the latter lies on integral 
operational coordination combating terrorism. At the political level the Conseil de 
Sécurité Intérieur (CSI) was founded in 1986, in which the ministers of Justice, 
Foreign Affairs, the Interior, Overseas Territories and Defence are represented and 
is coordinated by the Prime Minister. The council incorporates a coordinating 
official liaison committee (CILAT), in which the security services are also 
represented. One of the services represented in CILAT is the UCLAT (Unité de 
Coordination de la Lutte Anti-Terroriste). This unit represents the link between the 
police and the intelligence service within the framework of the fight against 
terrorism. The UCLAT commission combines three elements: intelligence work, 
prevention of attacks and repression. UCLAT distributes information across the 
relevant parties and also liaises with a number of European countries, including 
Germany, Italy, Spain, the United Kingdom, Belgium and the Netherlands.  
In order to keep efforts under control and easy to supervise, the ‘Vigipirate’ plan 
was developed, a blueprint for the state machinery to take control of national and 
public security, involving all police and army units. The Vigipirate plan has been in 
constant operation since 1991, although measures have always been adjusted to 
suit topical developments. A review was held place in 2003 when parts were 
considered outdated. 
 
                                              
55  Comparable to the Dutch investigating judge. 
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Italy  
The Act of 2005 (no. 155) provides, amongst other things, for the set-up of a 
counterterrorism  unit by the Ministry of Foreign Affairs. This unit is to have a 
‘multi-agency’ character and therefore comprises experts from a range of services.  
 
Spain 
In Spain, a United Commando (CEMU) for the investigation services Policia and 
Guardia Civil was set up, which operates at the same level as a directorate-general. 
The tasks of this commando are to:  
– set up special units for the coordination of the fight against terrorism and 
organised crime, investigation and intelligence work, police interventions and 
bomb disposal activities, 
– set up and maintain shared databases for the two investigation services 
– promote the set-up of cooperation efforts in technical and forensic policing, 
– support a public centre for security research for investigation services, 
– promote fast access to police services, 
– promote international cooperation, 
– promote any other targets defined by the CEMU. 
 
In addition, a National Centre for Antiterrorist Coordination (CNCA) was set up by 
a Minister Council decree dated May 2004. This body operates under CEMU and 
comprises members of the police, the Guardia Civil and the CNI (National 
Intelligence Centre). The CNCA has no operational tasks, but is involved 
particularly in receiving, processing and analysing the flow of strategic information 
received. Based on the information reports are made and used for the analysis of 
the terrorist threat for Spain on a permanent basis.  
The National Intelligence Centre referred to above was given a legal foundation in 
200256. At the regional level the fight against terrorism is coordinated by the Junta 
the Seguridad, in which both the autonomous  regions and the central government 
are represented. 
 
United States 
The United States saw the establishment of the Department of Homeland 
Security57. Since the nineteen forties the United States has been dealing with poor 
cooperation and inadequate information exchange between the different services 
involved in counterterrorism (particularly the CIA and the FBI). Following the 
plane hijack and hostage taking of the Israeli athletes in Munich the National 
Security Council (NSC) was reinforced in the nineteen seventies to coordinate all 
counterterrorism efforts. It was to remain the central institute for a long time, even 
if the FBI (domestic terrorism) and the State Department (foreign terrorism) had 
considerable influence. Under Clinton a special Counterterrorism Security Group 
(CSG) was founded within the NSC, seating high officials of all the main 
institutions involved. The CSG director was given the title of ‘National Coordinator’ 
                                              
56  The previous intelligence service CESID had been discontinued as part of an operation to remove a number of facilities 
that were in violation of the Constitution (working document 4). 
57  The term ‘homeland security’ has a slightly different meaning from ‘national security’, which refers to global threats to 
American citizens and interests. The National Strategy for Homeland Security defines Homeland Security as "a 
concerted national effort to prevent terrorist attacks within the United States, reduce America's vulnerability to terrorism, 
and minimize the damage and recover from attacks that do occur." Homeland security includes federal, state, and local 
governments, the private sector and individual citizens. 
http://www.armscontrolcenter.org/terrorism/homeland%20security/. 
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and an important advisory vote. Under Bush the name changed  to ‘NSC Principals 
Committee on Counterterrorism and National Preparedness’.  
After 11 September 2001 a Homeland Security Council was set up as an advisory 
body to the president. Shortly afterwards the Department of Homeland Security 
was set up, to cover all services dealing with ‘homeland security’. The mission of 
the DHS is aimed mostly at the prevention of terrorist attacks, reducing the 
vulnerability to, and minimising the damage caused by, attacks. It meant the 
biggest reorganisation of government in history, grouping 22 institutions and 
180,000 people in a single organisation.  
In the United States many billons of dollars are spent on discretionary funds for 
states and local governments within the framework of Homeland Security. 
 
In a testimony to the Senate Committee, the Director of the Rand Corporation for 
Homeland Security criticised the project on a number of points58. For example, 
Homeland Security has not been clearly defined, nor is it clear if it is to include 
major environmental disasters. He also pointed at a lack of performance indicators 
and the inability to indicate which measures are effective and which are not.  
Working document 5 for the United States also points at organisational problems 
that occurred in individual agencies, particularly the FBI. Specific changes have 
been introduced in the command structure at the Ministry of Defence.  
 
Working document 5 also addresses the first evaluation of the new coordination 
structures in the United States. After the events of 9/11, a number of management 
irregularities came to light across a range of fields,  including aviation, intelligence 
and the culture and bureaucracy of the CIA and the FBI. Many steps have been 
taken to fight the threat of terrorism. All of this has led to an enormous challenge 
in the field of coordination. What must be avoided is that work is being repeated, 
while at the same time some fields receive too little attention and resources are 
used inappropriately. Moreover, it is becoming increasingly harder to establish the 
effect of all of these efforts. Meanwhile, a RAND study has shown that the 
interaction within the various counterterrorism authorities is complex and that 
responsibilities are not always clearly allocated. Authorities are asked to cooperate 
while they do not share traditions. The abolition of the former tight separation 
between domestic and foreign efforts in combating terrorism yields specific 
problems. Various services covered by the DHS cooperate poorly and sometimes 
clash with each other  (particularly Customs and the Immigration Services)59.  
 
 
3.4 Intelligence activities 
 
As the United States report describes, the government started to collect 
information on individuals and groups possibly looking to undermine this 
government from the first attacks (in the United States by anarchists in the early 
twentieth century). The idea of  domestic intelligence services was born, although 
there was resistance (also in the United States) against the use of intelligence work 
focusing on American nationals60.  
 
                                              
58  Working document 5 refers to Wermouth (2005). 
59  The first reports in the field of coordination (discussed by Talhelm in the Boston Globe) are sobering, says Petrosino, 
author of working document 5. Nevertheless, the State Department for example reported that coordination efforts were 
going well before 9/11. According to the author, what needs to be done is critically examining these types of reports. 
60  In the Netherlands the ‘revolutionary threat’ also played an important role in the establishment of the predecessors of 
the AIVD (Engelen, 1995). 
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3.4.1 Extension of powers of investigation and intelligence services 
 
Germany  
Intelligence services in Germany aim at people who undermine the ‘spirit of 
mutual cultural understanding’, which also includes non-violent radicals. Its view 
is that this form of prevention must also be implemented outside Germany.  
New powers have been created to be able to demand  financial institutions, 
telephone agencies and aviation companies to disclose information on individuals, 
which they have accumulated on account of their work. These powers are 
considered part of the policing duties. Domestic activities of secret services are a 
controversial subject in Germany in light of the Nazi-period in its history. A strict 
distinction has therefore been made between ‘police’ powers to gather 
information, and the powers of the intelligence service which are aimed more at 
structures.  
The Bundeskriminalamt Act (BKA) has been amended to enable the federal agency 
to gather information from any authority in Germany to fill gaps in investigations, 
even if local  federal state authorities have already done so. The BKA has thus been 
upgraded to a ‘central bureau’ for intelligence.  
Another amendment (68.3 Social Code) provides for the use of even the most 
privacy-sensitive data for ‘dragnet research’ (Rasterfahndung), to identify potential 
terrorists61 based on profiling and information reduction techniques (datamining). 
The dragnet research also relies on the use of the central register of aliens, which 
was first legally founded in 1994 (Ausländerzentralregister). A controversial aspect 
is that it specifies the religion of the individuals registered herein, although 
individuals to be included in the register are not obliged to answer this question. 
This register poses a problem from a constitutional point of view as it makes for a 
distinction between foreign and German nationals in the investigation, according 
to working document 1. A point to be considered is that asylum procedures often 
contain highly sensitive information in relation to the country  of origin.  An 
objection submitted in 1995 was rejected, however.  
The second counterterrorism package (see par. 2.1) which provides for regulations, 
has inspired serious criticism from both data protection experts and constitutional 
specialists. A problem found in all data coupling and dragnet research powers, is 
that a wealth of data is generated that is almost impossible to analyse.  
 
The third German package of antiterrorism legislation was put together after the 
London attacks in July 2005. This package includes new preventive powers for the 
BKA, also under pressure of the then opposition in parliament. It also provides for 
the further development of databases for combating terrorism (particularly longer 
terms for retention of communication data), the introduction of biometric 
passports and the further development of the exchange of information between the 
various authorities. This package came under serious criticism from ‘green’ and 
SPD experts, not only for the assumed violation of privacy, but also because it 
raises the question if the financial investment is justified considering the increase 
in security to be realised.  
 
                                              
61  Incidentally, this method was already used in the nineteen seventies to identify apartments and other locations used by 
RAF members. 
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France  
French counterterrorism used to rely heavily on human intelligence. Recently a 
shift took place from information gathered by informers and agents of the 
intelligence services to information collected using technical means (the working 
document does not provide any details). 
 
Italy 
Italy monitors places where Islamists gather (‘hot spots’), such as particular 
mosques. The aim is to nip the emergence of Islamic cells in the bud. 
 
Spain  
With regard to intelligence services a government commission for Intelligence 
Affairs was set up in Spain (by Act of 2002). It aims to coordinate the intelligence 
services activities and to ensure a single ‘intelligence community’ in the country. 
Besides the central CNI the various investigation services each have their own  
intelligence services. The government commission comprises ministers and 
secretaries of state. Their task is to determine the annual targets for the CNI, as 
well as evaluation of the activities and their coordination. 
 
3.4.2 Centralisation and intelligence sharing 
 
Attempts to improve the information exchange are undertaken in a European 
context (Action Plan Combating Terrorism) between the services of the Member 
States (police, justice, customs and intelligence and security services) mutually and 
with the four EU services involved:  
– Europol  
– Eurojust  
– European Agency for the Management of Operational Cooperation at the 
External Borders of the Member states of the European Union 
– SitCen (Situation Center, a new bureau that prepares analyses based on 
information).  
 
The bodies are cooperating on strategic information, resulting in threat analyses, 
initially on radicalisation and recruitment. A report on this has since been 
published. As regards operational information Europol recently reported that the 
analysis file it keeps is being used in 21 studies in various Member States. Eurojust 
has reported that the while the information flows are increasing, they do not meet 
the requirements set by the Council Decision of 19 December 2002. This would be 
looked into under the UK presidency. 
With regard to access to databases a study was carried out at the end of 2005 into 
the progress made with regard to six types of information contained in databases. 
As far as known, no report has yet been published. 
 
Germany 
A ‘Gemeinsames Terrorismusabwehrzentrum’ (GTAZ) was set up in December 
2004, a collaboration between Bundeskriminalamt (BKA, National Criminal 
Investigation Department) and Bundesverfassungsschutz (BverfSch, intelligence 
and security service). The centre was set up as security responsibilities were very 
much decentralised, which could lead to confusion amongst the various services, 
and frustrate police efforts in the fight against terrorism. It is common knowledge 
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that police and security services do not always cooperate well, the result of a 
certain degree of competition between the two. The aim was to improve the 
coordination between the various services rather than set up ‘almighty’ new 
structures.  
The GTAZ aims to ensure a very rapid exchange of information and provide 
targeted threat analyses which should lead to agreement on operational measures.  
The GTAZ tasks include: 
– Daily briefings, involving representatives of all relevant services, 
– Frequent threat analyses, tailored to scenario reviews and answering 
operational questions, 
– Operational exchange of information, 
– Case evaluations, aimed at specific aspects such as  false IDs and weapons and 
munitions,  
– Structural analyses aimed at longer-term aspects, such as  training camps and 
travel movements by terrorists, 
– Getting an insight into the potential of Islamist terrorists, 
– Gathering other sources, for example by using experts on Islam 
– Tasks that relate to the Aliens Act: search for grounds to remove suspect 
persons from the country. 
 
The GTAZ will be expanded in 2006 to include international experts in special 
projects. According to the working document the first results of the centre are 
favourable. More studies are carried out and extremists are monitored more 
closely.  
 
The head of the BKA recently suggested that the information systems of the police 
and the intelligence services are to be combined under the GTAZ umbrella. 
According to the working document by German colleagues this raises the question 
if this does not equal the full abolishment of the distinction between information 
gathered by the police and the intelligence services. 
 
France 
France created the CRI (Conseil du Renseignement Intérieur, Council for Interior 
Information) which aims to ensure an optimal relay of information between the 
various services. The working document drafted by the French researchers 
describes how the exchange of information between intelligence and investigation 
services faces obstacles that are the result of cultural differences. The investigation 
services are said not to be able to deal with information whose origins are 
unknown.  
 
United Kingdom 
The cooperation between the British intelligence services is set out in the 
document entitled ‘National Intelligence Machinery’62. The United Kingdom has 
three intelligence and security services known as ‘the Agencies’: The Secret 
Intelligence Service (better known as MI6), the Security Service (MI5) and the 
Government Communications Headquarters, plus the Defence Intelligence Staff 
(DIS) and the Joint Terrorism Analysis Centre (JTAC).  
                                              
62  See Cabinet Office: National Intelligence Machinery (www.mi5.gov.uk/output/Page151.html). 
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The JTAC is a multi-agency unit, set up in 2003 for the coordination of intelligence 
work on terrorism. It employs people from all agencies referred to above. The 
purpose of JTAC is the integration of information on the activities, intentions and 
capacities of terrorists posing a threat to the United Kingdom and befriended 
countries across the world. The effectiveness of the work carried out by  the JTAC 
is being monitored by an Oversight Board chaired by the Cabinet Office.  
 
United States 
Intelligence services in the United States came under serious criticism after 9/11, 
after it became clear that both the FBI and the CIA had information on some of the 
hijackers, but had failed to share this information. Since then various initiatives 
have been taken to improve the combination and exchange of information across 
the various authorities involved. This started with the establishment by the 
president of the Terrorism Threat Integration Center (TTIC), aimed at linking all 
information gathered by the various authorities in threat analyses. A national 
database of terrorism suspects was to be set up. The TTIC was given unconditional 
access to all information available to the government. Moreover, TTIC was to 
supervise the counterterrorism efforts of the authorities involved.  
 
In 2004 the  TTIC was replaced by the National Counterterrorism Center (NCTC). 
NCTC’s task is: “integrating and analysing all intelligence pertaining to terrorism 
and counterterrorism (CT) and to conduct strategic operational planning by 
integrating all instruments of national power”63. A key task of the NCTC is the 
integration of the ‘watch lists’ containing individuals suspected of terrorism, 
including the TIPOFF list of the State Department, which contains information on 
more than 100,000 individuals collected by US consulates across the world. The 
National Counterterrorism Center in the United States aims to prevent attacks by 
taking a team approach to ‘thinking as a terrorist’, an exercise that is referred to as  
‘red teaming’. A database of attacks worldwide is also kept64. 
 
According to working document 5 written by American researcher Petrosino,  the 
integration of intelligence work will continue to present a key challenge for the 
United States. Several large authorities are working on intelligence on terrorism, 
such as the National Security Center, the Director of Central Intelligence (DCI), the 
DHS, FBI, CIA, the State Department and the Ministry of Defence. In addition, 
there are intelligence services in national authorities and at the federal, regional 
and urban level. The advantage recognised is that information from a wide range 
of sources can be brought together to present the very best ‘product’. However, 
centralisation of information also comprises the danger of creating conflicting 
information and such abundance of information that analysis becomes 
problematic, according to working document 5.  
 
 
                                              
63  See www.nctc.gov (download 3 April ’06). 
64  See http://wits.nctc.gov. 
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3.5 International cooperation 
 
3.5.1 The UN and terrorism 
 
There are now 12 UN treaties on terrorism. From the nineteen nineties the Clinton 
government started to increase pressure to ensure all international treaties were 
signed before the year 2000. This recently applied to resolution 1373, which 
specifies that terrorists are denied a ‘safe haven’ anywhere and no longer receive 
government support. For this purpose, the UN and the EU are listing terrorists and 
terrorist organisations (also see par. 3.8). These resolutions are supported by the 
countries involved in this study.  
The UN includes a Counterterrorism Committee (CTC), which was set up shortly 
after the September 2001 attacks. Its task is to monitor developments in the field of 
terrorism.  
 
3.5.2 G8  
 
Within the G8 connection there is a Counterterrorism Action Group, which 
includes involvement from all countries targeted by this report, save for Spain, 
which is not a member of G865. This group aims at supporting risk countries in 
combating terrorism and the distribution or proliferation of weapons of mass 
destruction. The Global Partnership Against the Spread of Weapons and Materials 
of Mass Destruction was drawn up for this purpose in 2002. It also involves other 
countries, including the Netherlands.  
Working document 3 also refers to a ‘Roma group’ within the framework of the G8, 
which aims at developing security procedures for international organisations.  
 
3.5.3 EU  
The EU adopted a framework decree in 2002 on the fight against terrorism. A large 
number of measures were taken, and the Member States have committed to 
implement these in their national legislation within the context of their national 
traditions. There is a European strategy and a European Plan of Action for Fighting 
Terrorism, which was updated after the 2004 attacks in Madrid, and which sets out 
in detail numerous actions in the field of prevention, protection of critical 
infrastructure, combating terrorism funding, information exchange, investigation 
and prosecution, as well as crisis management and disaster control. Other 
framework decrees were also established for the European arrest warrant (EAW), 
the set-up of Eurojust and a ‘joint action’ on tracing means that can be used in 
terrorist acts combating money laundering.  
The Act the EAW was to introduce in Germany was found unlawful by the 
Constitutional Court in July. (see also chapter 3.10.1 on legislation.)  
Working document 2 (Bigo, France) reports on the development of European 
collaboration on terrorism that dates back many years (1971, called the Bern Club). 
Before 11 September there had been a number of important successes in the fight 
against the GSPC66 (cooperation between Belgium, Germany, Italy, Spain, UK and 
France) and the ETA (France and Spain).  
                                              
65  The G8 started in 1975 as G6. Canada (1976) and Russia (1998) joined later. The G8 currently comprises the United 
States, Canada, Great Britain, France, Germany, Italy, Japan and Russia. The group may be extended to include China, 
India and possibly Brazil (Wikipedia). 
66  Group Salafiste pour la Prédication et le Combat. 
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After the 2001 events, the EU appointed a coordinator for counterterrorism. Dutch 
former state secretary for the Interior and Kingdom Relations, Gijs de Vries, took 
the post in March 2004.  
 
3.5.5 Council of Europe  
 
The Council of Europe has initiated a treaty, the Convention for the Prevention of 
Terrorism, which was signed by all Member States. The Council of Europe 
commissioned a number of publications for the working groups working on 
terrorism-related topics, such as  inciting terrorism and crown witness schemes67. 
 
3.5.6 Organisation for Security and Cooperation in Europe (OSCE) 
 
All countries studied are involved in the OSCE. For counterterrorism issues, the 
OVSE is involved in, amongst other things, initiatives focused on police training 
and border control. Moreover, the OSCE operates a broad security scope, which 
includes social, economic and political conditions subject to which terrorist 
organisations could receive support68.  
 
3.5.7 Euromed 
 
Working document 4 refers to a conference of European and Mediterranean 
countries (including the Palestinian Authority and Israel) and a number of 
countries with an observatory role. A ‘Code of Behaviour on Counterterrorism’ was 
adopted, which condemns terrorism in all its forms. 
 
3.5.8 Asia-Europe Meeting (ASEM) 
 
ASEM is an informal process of dialogue and cooperation which was first founded 
in 1996. It comprises all EU Member States, the European Commission and 
thirteen Asian countries (Brunei, Burma/Myanmar, China, Cambodia, Indonesia, 
Japan, South Korea, Malaysia, Laos, the Philippines, Singapore, Thailand and 
Vietnam), all participants in the process69. 
It discusses political, economic and cultural subjects, with the aim of reinforcing 
relationships between the regions. 
From a political point of view, importance is attached to a multilateral approach to 
problems in the field of international security, such as  terrorism.  
 
3.5.9 NATO 
 
Italy is in charge of the technical support to ‘third countries’ in securing airports in 
the ‘western Balkan’. It also participates in the operation Active Endeavor against 
terrorist influences in the Mediterranean.  
 
                                              
67  Council of Europe, “Apology du terrorism and “incitement to terrorism”, Council of Europe Publishing, 2004; The 
protection of witnesses and collaborators of justice, Council of Europe Publishing, 2005. 
68  See also:: www.osce.org. 
69  See also: www.asem6.fi/what_is_asem/asem_in_brief/en_GB/asem_in_brief/. 
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3.5.10 Joint UK/US contact group on Homeland Security 
 
This contact group was founded in June 2003 by the then Home Secretary David 
Blunkett together with Tom Ridge, the Minister of Homeland Security of the 
United States. The contact group aims to share expertise and ‘good practice’ on 
communal security issues such as  border protection, transport security and 
promoting scientific and technological progress for targets relevant to the group. In 
2004 the group signed the ‘UK/US science and technology agreement on Co-
operation in Science and Technology for Critical Infrastructure Protection and 
Other Homeland/Civil Security Matters’. This document provides for the 
development, testing and evaluation of technologies for the observation of terrorist 
activity.  
 
3.5.11 Initiatives by the United States 
 
The Anti-Terrorism Assistance programme of the American State Department, 
which was first founded some time ago, was expanded after 11 September 2001. 
This programme is used to support states in the prevention of terrorism and 
attacks on American interests. Hundreds of millions of dollars have been invested 
for this purpose, mostly in African countries.  
 
The United States also stepped up cooperation with Saudi Arabia. While the 
government is an ally of the United States in the fight against terrorism, there is 
support amongst the population for al Qaeda and similar groups. The Islamist 
ideology is propagated by Islam schools (and Websites).  
Bilateral collaborations have also been set up with a number of other countries, 
including Pakistan and South American countries.  
The FBI has an International Training and Assistance Unit, which organises, 
amongst other things, seminars for high officials from a range of countries. 
 
 
3.6 Policy aimed at securing critical infrastructure 
 
3.6.1 Determination of critical infrastructure 
 
Germany 
After 11/9 the German BKA (Bundeskriminalamt) was asked to give its advice on 
securing critical infrastructure and to submit relevant information and threat 
analyses to the organisations and authorities involved.  
The BBK (Bundesamt für Bevölkerungsschutz un Katastrophenhilfe) was set up on 
1 May 2004 and is responsible for developing crisis and emergency plans. In case 
of the collapse of critical infrastructure the THW (Bundesanstalt Technisches 
Hilfswerk) can be called in. The document ‘Schutz Kritischer Infrastrukturen – 
Basisschutzkonzept’ was published in November discussing cooperation with 
businesses (www.bmi.bund.de). 
 
Italy 
In Italy a decision was taken after 11 September 2001 to step up the security of 
‘strategic targets’, such as water supplies, electrical systems and the chemical 
industry.  
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Spain 
The working document states that the security of critical infrastructure is usually 
left to private security firms, with the use of camera monitoring. If a terrorist threat 
has been identified, a ‘permanent’ monitoring system is put into action in which 
members of the police, Guardia Civil and private security services are called in.  
Spanish high-speed trains are checked according to the same procedures as those 
used in airports. This is not the case for other trains.  
 
United Kingdom 
The policy on the protection of civilians and interests was set out in the third of 
the four ‘discussion papers’ on counterterrorism policy (see also par. 2.5). The 
basic idea is to make the United Kingdom a ‘harder target’ for terrorists. This 
means, in particular, that it should become more difficult for terrorists to enter the 
United Kingdom and to function there. In addition, it is important to protect 
critical infrastructure more effectively. Critical infrastructure is understood to 
comprise services and industries vital to every-day life. 
 
Securing the continuity of society in times of crisis is regarded as a fundamental 
task of the British government. The services and systems required for this 
continuity are referred to as the Critical National Infrastructure (CNI). The CNI 
comprises the resources, services and systems that support the economic, political 
and social life. The importance of these systems is such that their failure could lead 
to large-scale loss of human life, substantial damage to the national economy and 
therefore very considerable social costs.  
 
The Critical National Infrastructure in the United Kingdom comprises the 
following ten sectors: communication, emergency services, power supply, financial 
industry, food supply, government and public services, health, public security, 
transport and water supply.  
In 1999 a National Infrastructure Security Coordination Centre was set up, with the 
aim to make threat analyses, to outreach, to respond to calamities and to promote 
relevant research.  
 
According to information on the Home Office website, the aim is to ensure 
cooperation with businesses in protecting their critical infrastructure. In a broader 
sense, the aim is to secure the continuation of businesses in times of crisis. Central 
in this activity is the creation of a single ‘desk’ which companies can contact for 
information and advice. In addition, great importance is attached to stimulating 
credibility and trust by realising consultation between industry and representatives 
from local and regional governments70. 
 
United States 
In the United States the Department of Homeland Security (DHS) is working with 
leaders from the industrial world to protect businesses that are deemed important 
for national security. Risk analyses are carried out and specific security strategies 
are developed for which DHS provides technical support.  
                                              
70  http://security.homeoffice.gov.uk/working-with-partners/business/. 
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Separate initiatives have been implemented for the chemical industry. Under a 
separate Act (the Chemical Safety Information, Site Security and Fuels Regulatory 
Relief Act) the Ministry of Justice monitors the implementation of previously 
arranged facilities to prevent accidents involving the release of dangerous 
substances such that they are also effective during a terrorist attack.  
 
Incidentally, an audit from 2002 by the Government Accountability Office (GAO71) 
showed that these intentions were in fact still awaiting implementation. A start has 
been made, however, on the development of a special risk assessment instrument 
for the chemical industry and a training programme for managers.  
 
3.6.2 Aviation 
 
Germany 
Staff at airports and companies are checked more thoroughly, using information 
from security services (including information accumulated by the former DDR 
intelligence service Stasi). The ‘second counterterrorism package’ defines the 
sensitive areas and institutes that qualify for intensive screening of staff (these 
areas are not actually named in the working document). 
The Act on aviation control provides for, amongst other things, shooting down 
hijacked passenger airlines if there is no other option. This is a highly controversial 
issue in Germany.  
 
United Kingdom 
Since 9/11,  Royal Air Force fighter jets have been on stand-by to shoot down any 
hijacked passenger plane if necessary72. 
 
United States 
A range of measures was implemented following 9/11 to improve civil aviation 
security which had so obviously failed. Most important was the set up of the 
Transportation Security Administration (TSA). Previously, airport security had been 
carried out by private businesses with high staff turnover rates. Security is now the 
sole task of TSA, which has led to considerable improvements, also in the eyes of 
the public, even if customs control still fails at times and some outdated airport 
equipment is still awaiting replacement. According to working document 5 TSA is 
bothered by the extensive bureaucracy inherent in such an organisation, affecting 
its flexibility. A number of airports have been granted approval to work with ‘TSA-
certified contractors’. Other airports have also been given this option, but have not 
used it for fear of legal procedures in the event of an attack for which the privatised 
security could somehow be held accountable.  
Measures to frustrate plane hijacking have also been taken onboard airliners. 
These measures include reinforcement of cockpit doors, training in the use of 
weapons by crew and air marshals travelling on flights. Staff member screening has 
also been stepped up. 
                                              
71  This abbreviation was used previously for General Accounting Office. 
72  Unlike in Germany, this measure has not led to any upheaval in the United Kingdom. 
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The danger of attacks using rocket launchers fired from the shoulder, readily 
available on the black market, has been recognised and has inspired studies into 
defence systems for scheduled flights. They were found not to be cost effective, 
however. Vulnerability analyses are carried out for all key airports in the United 
States. Internationally, proliferation of these weapons is being dealt with. 
 
The fine-tuning of the electronic matching of passengers to their baggage was first 
started before 9/11, when suicide attacks were not yet considered an option.  
The CAPPS (Computer Assisted Passenger Prescreening System) is used to create 
an algorithm to track those passengers that form a potential danger. The addition 
of biometrical and other personal data to the CAPPS databases is being considered.  
 
3.6.3 Shipping 
 
United States 
The Container Security Initiative (CSI) plays a big role in shipping security. It 
comprises the monitoring of containers shipped to the United States before 
departure if there is reason to do so. For ships travelling to the United States, the 
Operation Safe Commerce demands that they specify what they will be shipping 
before loading commences, to allow plenty of time for inspection. NII (Non 
Intrusive Inspection) technology is used to increase the chances of finding 
explosives or weapons of mass destruction. 
 
3.6.4 Cyberspace 
 
Germany 
The BSI (Bundesamt für Sicherheit in der Informationstechnik) has been working 
on securing the ICT sector since 1998. 
 
United States 
DHS has set up the National Cyber Security Division (NCSD) to reduce 
vulnerability of computer systems to terrorist attacks. The NCSD has taken a range 
of initiatives, amongst others to secure government computer systems against 
viruses and ‘internet worms’. 
 
3.6.5 Nuclear materials 
 
In the United States academic nuclear reactors in particular are considered a high-
risk factor as their security is much weaker than the security of power plant 
reactors. Little progress has yet been made in improving security of these reactors, 
due to, amongst other things, lack of funding. The United Kingdom has also 
recognised this problem73. 
 
 
                                              
73  Glees and Pope (2205) also mention the danger of students from certain countries. 
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3.7 Policy aimed at crisis management: preparing for an attack  
 
3.7.1 Institutional facilities 
 
France 
For intervention in any serious crisis a specialist arrest team is available, the GIGN 
(Intervention group of the National Gendarmerie) which is known for, for example, 
liberating a hijacked plane in 1994. There is also the RAID (Research, Assistance, 
Intervention, Dissuasion) which played a significant role in restraining Action 
Direct in the nineteen eighties. There is also a special intervention unit of 
parachutists. 
 
Spain 
After the March 2004  attacks the Delegate Government Commission for Crisis 
Situations was set up, comprising the Prime Minister, vice Prime Minister and the 
ministers for Foreign Affairs, the Interior and Defence, the state secretary for 
security, the director for CNI (national intelligence centre) and the director of the 
cabinet of the Prime Minister. 
The three-division department of Infrastructure and Follow-up in Crisis situations 
is responsible for giving advice on urgent measures to be taken in a fitting and 
immediate response to a crisis. An organisational chart has been included in 
working document 4.  
  
United Kingdom 
Terrorist crimes are dealt with at the national level. The Home Office decides on 
supporting local authorities. The Ministry may convene the Government’s Crisis 
Committee, headed by a high-ranking official or a minister, to coordinate a crisis 
response.  
Regional and local responses are considered crucial. A single national framework 
has been created under the Civil Contingencies Act 2004. The Civil Contingencies 
Secretariat of the Cabinet Office is responsible for assisting in and supervising 
crisis planning via the UK Resilience website (www.ukresilience.info). The so-called 
Regional Resilience forums draw up crisis plans for situations that transcend a 
local response.  
Other institutional facilities in the field of crisis management are the National Mass 
Fatalities Working Group and the Regional Resilience Teams. The task of the family 
assistance centres is providing support to the family of victims and survivors. 
 
A CBRN Resilience programme was set up in 2001, with the aim of combining 
expertise in the field of chemical, biological, radiological and nuclear terrorism 
from government and partner institutions, in order to ensure a fast and effective 
response to a terrorist attack in which CBRN materials are released. 
 
Under the British approach the media must be expressly involved in the crisis 
plans.  
 
United States 
Commissioned by the president, a National Incident Management System (NIMS) 
has been set up. This system is aimed at making all authorities involved 
‘interoperable’ in an incident, whether this is a terrorist attack or a natural disaster. 
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3.7.2 Drills 
 
Italy 
Drills are held at the local level, testing the cooperation between the various 
government authorities and the fire brigade to protect the population. These drills 
reveal any weak points in the system, which can then be addressed. 
 
United Kingdom 
The Counterterrorism drill programme is aimed at testing and improving skills. An 
international drill was held with the United States and Canada, entitled Atlantic 
Blue. It practiced response procedures in case of a catastrophic incident involving 
chemical and/or biologic materials, both in a foreign situation and in London74.  
 
United States 
A range of measures has been implemented in the United States to be able to 
control the effects of a major terrorist attack. Simulation training sessions were 
already held under the Clinton government. A major drill was organised following 
the 9/11 events, simulating an attack with weapons of mass destruction in a 
number of major cities. Canadian government authorities were also involved in 
this. It goes without saying that the army also organises drills. 
First responders, the people who are the first on the scene of a disaster or attack, 
such as police, firefighters and ambulance staff, are trained in considerable 
numbers. Community Emergency Response Teams (CERT) training is given at 400 
locations across the United States. 28 ‘urban search and rescue teams’ have been 
set up to be used in incidents involving weapons of mass destruction.  
The biggest concern is the notion that terrorists could have biological weapons. 
Attempts have been made in the past to poison drinking water and shortly after 11 
September politicians received letters contaminated with Anthrax, the bacterium 
that causes the disease Anthrax. The budget for defence against bio terrorism has 
been increased considerably and public healthcare authorities are making extra 
efforts to fight the spread of diseases by terrorists. Strategic stocks of certain 
medication have been expanded and five hundred thousand soldiers have been 
vaccinated against smallpox. Under the BioShield project 5.6 billion dollar has 
been invested in developing new vaccines and other means to fight the effects of 
attacks involving NCBR weapons.  
Regulations on and institutional facilities for food safety have also been reinforced. 
 
3.7.3 Victim aid 
 
Assistance schemes for victims and their families have been set up in various 
countries that have been confronted with major attacks.  
 
France 
Since the Act of 1990 victims of terrorist attacks have the status of ‘civil war 
victims’. 
 
                                              
74  An evaluation report was announced to appear by the end of 2005, but its publication is still awaited in April 2006.  
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Italy 
A special Act has been adopted that specifies assistance to victims and their 
families. The underlying idea is that this signals to the population that the 
government backs its residents in case of an attack. 
 
Spain 
Arrangements have been made for compensating victims of terrorism. Spain also 
has a range of pension schemes and other arrangements for victims and surviving 
relatives (set out in the appendix to the working document). 
The working document lists more than ten Websites for organisations of victims of 
terrorism. These organisations are assigned an important role in dealing with 
actual crises. Spain has a special medal of honour for people killed or wounded in 
the fight against terrorism. 
 
United States  
After the attacks of 11 September 2001 an ‘emergency response package’ totalling 
40 billion dollar was reserved in the United States for families in the areas hit. 
Special legislation ensured the process was sped up. In addition, a special fund was 
set up for the New York fire brigade, which became topic of discussion as it has 
not yet been fully spent. The government wants the money back, while the FDNY 
argues that it is needed for support in the longer term.  
 
 
3.8 Policy aimed at fighting terrorist finance 
 
3.8.1 Penalisation of funding terrorism  
 
Fighting terrorist funding is a key instrument in the general fight against terrorism. 
After all, terrorism costs money. It is argued that if the flow of funds can be 
stopped, terrorism will also subside. Fighting terrorist funding can take a place on 
many fronts. An important measure is the freezing of terrorist and terrorist 
organisations’ funds and restrictions to make financial or economic means 
available to, or to carry out financial services to or for these individuals or 
organisations. This stipulation is one of the measures announced in Resolution 
1373 of the UN Security Council of September 2001, which obliges nations to 
actively prevent and fight the funding of terrorist acts. The funding of terrorism has 
been penalised in many countries, often in combination with money laundering 
measures75. In some countries (including Germany) terrorist funding is covered by 
the stipulation of 'support of a terrorist organisation'. 
 
In order to make the measures in Resolution 1373 concrete, the Council of Europe 
published a list at the end of 2001 with the names of individuals whose assets 
needed to be frozen and who were no longer permitted to do business. The 
Netherlands uses both this list and the list for the execution of Resolution 1267 
(1999), which provides for financial sanctions against the Taliban, Osama Bin 
                                              
75  As criminal sources of funding, terrorist finance and money laundering are usually referred to in combination. Difference 
between the two, however, are important in being able to fight them. The source of the funds for terrorist finance is not 
necessarily criminal, although the purpose of the funds is. The source of the funds used in money laundering the source 
is always criminal (See also: Raaijmakers, 2005).  
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Laden, al-Qaeda and people and organisations associated with them76. Clearly, 
inclusion on such list has far-reaching implications. The list executing Resolution 
1373 (referred to in EU as the EU sanction list) is known to be compiled based on 
unanimous decisions by the EU Member States. They base  themselves on 
information from databases or otherwise from which it appears that competent 
authorities have taken a decision with regard to the persons, groups or entities 
referred to, which can be the start of an investigation or the continuation of 
criminal proceedings involving a terrorist act, an attempt to commit such an act, or 
the participation in, or facilitation of, such an act, based on evidence or serious 
and credible indications, or a conviction for such offences. Individuals, groups and 
entities which the Security Council of the United States have linked to terrorism 
and against whom it has ordered these sanctions, may be placed on the list. For 
the application of this paragraph ‘competent authorities’ are understood to be a 
judicial authority or, if judicial authorities do not have jurisdiction in the field 
covered by this stipulation, comparable authorities authorised in that field77. 
It is not quite clear how the list is kept up to date within the various Member 
States. Until recently, Mohammed B., who murdered Theo van Gogh, was not on 
the list, despite having been prosecuted and convicted for a terrorist act by a 
competent authority, namely the courts. However, it recently became clear that the 
assets of the convicted members of the Hofstadgroep were frozen as of April 
200678. Whether or not this means they are now also included on the list used for 
the implementation of Resolution 1373 is not  yet clear79.  
In addition to freezing assets, financial institutions and the obligations imposed on 
them play a large role in fighting terrorist funding. A number of countries have 
introduced the obligation to inform the authorities about suspect accounts held by 
organisations, and of any particularly complex or unusual transactions that do not 
serve any economic purpose80. 
 
Internationally the fight against terrorist funding is headed by the FATF (Financial 
Action Task Force).  
 
Germany 
In Germany banks and other financial institutions, as well as individuals and 
institutes, are under an obligation to report certain transactions or suspect matters 
under the Geldwäschegesetz (GwG). The German government may restrict 
transactions or activities in the field of foreign trade and payments with the aim of 
providing protection against certain risks (for example state security). 
 
France 
French legislation provides for penalisation for failure to substantiate a more 
expensive lifestyle than is reasonably possible based on reported and verifiable 
                                              
76  See also: Bulterman (2005). 
77  Common viewpoint of the Council of 27 December 2001 regarding the application of specific measures to fight 
terrorism. 
78  http://www.volkskrant.nl/binnenland/article288456.ece/Banktegoeden_leden_Hofstadgroep_bevroren 20/4/2006. 
79  Lawyers have argued that the refusal of a bank account to members of the Hofstadgroep requires a very broad 
interpretation of Resolution 1373, which they say is aimed at blocking large international flows of money from 
organisations like Al Qaida. They argue that it is used as punishment in this case. The probation and aftercare services 
argued that the measure will have a side effect, namely that the integration of convicted individuals who have served 
their sentence is going to be problematic. See also: Volkskrant 21 April 2006 ‘Bevriezing tegoeden leden Hofstadgroep 
‘onwettig’’.  
80  In the Netherlands: article 17 of the Third Laundering Guideline. 
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income data, while in regular contact with persons suspected of, or convicted of 
terrorist crimes. By law of January 2006 (Loi nº2006-64 du 23 janvier 2006) the 
sentence for violating this stipulation has been raised from 2 to 3 years.  
 
United Kingdom 
Measures have been taken in the United Kingdom to cut off, where possible, 
international terrorist-related flows of money. International regulations in this 
respect taken by, amongst others, the UN, G8 and the EU were implemented in the 
British Counterterrorism Finance (CTF) policy. It seeks cooperation with industry, 
particularly the financial institutions81.  
An obligation applies in the United Kingdom to report any information on any 
person if it is suspected that the other person has committed a terrorist crime. This 
obligation applies not only to civilians, but to financial institutions also. 
The possession of any goods in circumstances that inspire reasonable suspicion 
that the possession has a terrorism-related purpose is punishable. No proof is 
required to demonstrate that the person in possession of the relevant object has 
certain (in this case terrorist) intentions. 
 
United States 
In 1996 ‘Terrorism Laws’ were adopted which formed the basis for a list of ‘Foreign 
Terrorist Organisations’ (FTOs). Under the laws FTO assets can be frozen and 
financial or other material support to these organisations may be classed as crime. 
Under ‘Executive Order 13224’ president Bush expanded the scope of this order. 
Meanwhile, a number of charities have been closed down following operation of 
this order. The aim is to destroy the formal and informal financial structures of 
terrorist organisations. 
A point for attention for the United States is the ‘hawala’ informal banking system, 
which deals with large sums of money based on trust. The hawala  banking system 
leaves no paper or digital trail and is legally used in countries where people have 
virtually no access to banks. It can also be used by criminals and terrorists, 
however. The United States have therefore decided that Hawalas must be 
registered and must observe the rules on money laundering and terrorism funding. 
 
3.8.2 Organisational measures against the financing of terrorism 
 
A number of countries have opted for centralisation of the fight against terrorist 
finance by setting up a body for this purpose. 
 
In Germany the ‘Bundesanstalt für Finanzdienstleistungsaufsicht’ (BaFin) and the 
‘Zentralstelle für Verdachtsanzeigen’ (FIU) are responsible for combating terrorist 
finance, investigating suspect cases. A new stipulation contained in the 
‘Kreditwesengesetz’ paved the way for the introduction of a data system which 
provides BaFin with electronic access to all information regarding accounts held 
with banks. The new system also enables the immediate freezing of financial assets 
of individuals and organisations, as set out in specific stipulations. 
 
In France a special division was set up within the Ministry van Finance, entitled 
FINTER (‘cellule contre le financement du terrorism’). TRACFIN (‘traitement du 
                                              
81  House of Commons Hansard: Statement on Terrorist Finance, November 2005. 
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renseignement et action contre les circuits financiers clandestins’) is another 
department aimed at tracing flows of money of terrorist organisations. Banks and 
other financial institutions are obliged to report to TRACFIN any transactions 
which they (might) suspect are involved in or could be used for terrorist activities.  
 
The working document on Italy reports the set up of ‘Comitato di sicurezza 
finanziaria’ (CSF). This committee aims to: 
a protect the financial system against terrorism, 
b collect information aimed at freezing accounts of organisations affiliated with 
terrorism 
c develop regulations to reinforce the fight against terrorist finance and 
contribute to EU lists on terrorist organisations, whereby the problem of 
individuals and organisations with names that appear on the list, but who have 
nothing to do with terrorism, should be solved 
d maintain close relations with similar institutes in other countries.  
The underlying idea is that the financing of terrorism is an international 
phenomenon, which should therefore also be fought through internationally 
coordinated actions. Several institutions are coordinated from the ‘Comitato’ 
which are involved in fighting terrorist finance. 
 
In Spain the fight against terrorist finance is arranged under the act of 2003 on the 
‘prevention and freezing of terrorist assets. Special powers have been created to 
visualise and stop terrorist flows of money and identify the individuals responsible. 
These powers have been assigned to the ‘Commission for Supervision of Activities 
for terrorist finance’. The international lists of individuals and organisations 
associated with terrorism are also used. The emphasis is on the prevention of 
terrorism rather than the punishment of the parties involved in the financing 
terrorist organisations. Both the police and the Guardia Civil comprise special 
units to fight terrorist finance. 
 
In an international context the United States aim to promote cooperation in 
fighting terrorist finance. Special importance is attached to resolutions 1373 and 
1390 of the Security Council, which obliges the Member States to take action 
against terrorist finance. At a bilateral level collaboration takes place with various 
countries, who receive technical and training support. A number of international 
cooperation unions for the fight against terrorist finance exist, such as  the Egmont 
group (a cooperation of 61 financial institutions) and the ‘Financial Action Task 
Force’ (FATF), set up to fight money laundering.  
 
 
3.9 Aliens law 
 
To be able to deal with aliens suspected of terrorism, criminal measures may be 
combined with measures based on aliens law. In recent years a number of 
counterterrorism measures under aliens law have been added, at least in the 
Netherlands. In the Netherlands the Immigration and Naturalisation Service 
(IND) is authorised to withdraw residence permits if the permit holder poses a risk 
to public order and /or national security. The General Intelligence and Security 
Service (AIVD) decides on the basis of official reports whether or not the permit 
holder poses such a threat. In addition to withdrawing the permit, there are a 
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number of other measures available under aliens law: an advice to refuse 
admission, removal from the Netherlands, an order declaring a person an 
undesirable alien and identification, or refusal to grant and/or withdraw Dutch 
citizenship already granted. In other EU Member States, too, measures under 
aliens law may be used in antiterrorism policy. 
 
3.9.1 Measures taken under Aliens law  
 
Withdrawal of double nationality 
 
Some countries where double nationality is permitted, such as in Greece, allow 
withdrawal of nationality if this is in the interest of national security (working 
document 7). In Italy the Italian nationality of a person with double nationality 
may be withdrawn only if the person enters into military service of a foreign 
power, against the express wishes of the Italian authorities, or when the person 
takes up arms against Italy. 
Double nationality is permitted in Spain, but the authorities are unable to 
withdraw Spanish nationality when a citizen poses a threat  to national security.  
 
Deportation 
 
Deportation is another measure related to the withdrawal of state citizenship that 
can be taken away with regard to an alien who harms or may harm the security 
interests of a state. 
 
Germany 
In Germany the Ministry of Foreign Affairs is responsible for the removal of 
criminal and radical foreign nationals. If they cannot return to their countries of 
origin, they are deported to ‘third countries’. New immigration laws curb 
protection from deportation of foreign nationals. Stipulations on granting 
residence permits and the grounds based on which people may be deported have 
also been defined further. 
 
France 
Under French law every foreign national convicted for a terrorist offence may be 
expelled from French territory, forever or for a maximum of ten years. Operations 
by the police and the Renseignements Generaux (RG) have led to the arrest of 
hundreds of people who appeared on the lists of the counterterrorism services. 
Others who had been known to the intelligence services for some time have since 
been deported. Deportation of extremists from French territory is regarded an 
important tool in destabilising radical networks. The working document does not 
specifically address legislation and regulations in this field, however. Like most 
other EU countries, including the Netherlands, France has signed the Prüm treaty, 
a  continuation from the Schengen treaty82.  
 
                                              
82  The author of the working document on France, Didier Bigo, wrote a critical report with others on the ‘Management of 
Threats’ involved in that convention (CD-Rom ELISE project, European Liberty and Security See also: 
www.libertysecurity.org).  
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Italy 
Under Italian law, too, it is possible to deport non-Italian nationals, based on three 
circumstances. First of all, deportation of a foreign national may be ordered by the 
Minister of Foreign Affairs if this foreign national poses a threat to the public order 
or state security, or when there are sound reasons to believe that terrorist activities 
and organisations may be facilitated by the continuing presence of the foreign 
national. Under this act the deportation of hate-spewing imams has become 
possible. Some concrete cases are mentioned, particularly Imams from 
Carmagnola and Turin. According to the Italian working document this approach 
faces one problem, namely that it is effective in the short run only. Such 
deportations comprise a return ban to Italy for a minimum of five years, but 
usually ten. Deportations of this kind are usually carried out if there is information 
that shows that an individual poses a threat to national security, but when this 
information is not enough to serve as proof in a legal process. Appeals against 
these deportations may be made to the administrative court. If necessary, a further 
appeal against this decision is also possible. An appeal against this form of 
deportation does not have a suspensive effect and the deportation order is 
enforceable immediately. Act 155/2005 states that if the information on which the 
deportation order is based originates from a covert operation or is a state secret, it 
may be withheld for two years. The consequence is that appeal cases are 
suspended during that period. Based on this act deportation orders pertaining to 
public order and security, or terrorist activities, may be enforceable immediately.  
A second ground based on which deportation may take place, is when a foreign 
national does not meet the conditions subject to which residence in Italy is 
permitted (for example if the visa has expired or the subject has been  working 
illegally). Thirdly, deportation of a foreign national may take place if he or she 
usually lives partly or entirely from the proceeds of crime, acts in a manner that 
affects or endangers the moral or physical well-being of youngsters, public health 
or public security, or belongs to a mafia-like organisation. Since 2 August 2005 a 
foreign national may also be deported if he or she, in a group or alone, is carrying 
out criminal offences with the aim of toppling the democratic legal order of the 
state. The latter two forms of deportation referred to are carried out by the prefect 
(police commissioner). Appeals against a deportation order issued by the prefect 
may be made to the district court only. Such appeal does not have a suspensive 
effect. Foreigners cooperating with the Italian justice department in fighting 
terrorism may be granted a special residence permit under the act of 2005. 
 
Spain 
A non -Spanish national may be deported if he has taken part in activities that are 
harmful to the external state security or foreign relations, or in activities that 
violate public order. The Spanish law provides for a specified list of these activities. 
Based on this, the accused may be deported through an accelerated procedure. 
This procedure substantially reduces the duration of the process and determines 
that no appeal has a suspensive effect. The only way to postpone an accelerated 
deportation, is by applying for asylum. Consideration of the application for asylum 
may be refused if it is regarded as unfounded by the authorities or if there are 
suspicions that the application has been submitted solely to delay the procedure. 
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3.9.2 Registration of Aliens 
 
Many EU countries and a number of countries outside the EU (Norway and 
Iceland) use the Schengen Information System (SIS), a databank with personal 
details. The system is used by countries to register arrest warrants, individuals who 
have been denied access to a country and must therefore be deported and 
individuals on whom information must be collected for state security reasons. This 
enables the exchange of information between countries. 
There are also national initiatives that relate to the registration of foreign citizens. 
In Germany in particular databases are kept with information on foreign nationals. 
There is a central database, for example, with data on all residential immigrants 
(everyone in long-term residence) with information on status and criminal record, 
among other aspects. The data protection authorities have since allowed police 
and intelligence services access to these databases. In the second German 
antiterrorism package the powers are extended further. ‘Spontaneous’ information 
on religion must be included in the database. The database is accessible for 
dragnet and other studies by intelligence services. Aviation authorities have 
unlimited access to the database for staff screening purposes. Working document 1 
also indicates that the second German antiterrorism package (also ‘Act combating 
international terrorism’) is aimed particularly at changes to asylum and aliens 
legislation. Specific legal asylum and aliens measures in the second package: 
– The alien authorities (Migration and Refugee Service and local authorities) 
must spontaneously provide the ‘Verfassungsschutz’ (the national security 
service) with information on radical activities of people known to them, 
– Biometric characteristics on aliens passports, 
– More fingerprints are taken of aliens than ever before (initially only of asylum 
seekers and refugees of civil wars, now also if they are returned to a ‘third 
country’, if residence is refused on suspicion of radicalism and if they originate 
from countries to which repatriation is not easy, or if there is a suspicion that 
the subject has also applied for asylum in other EU countries),  
– Speech analysis is applied to determine the country /region where the refugee 
is coming from, 
– Certain nationalities and categories of aliens are earmarked for further studies 
in connection with radical activities. Relevant data may be stored without 
unrestrictedly, 
– The second package comprises the EU measures of 20 September 2001 and 
resolution 1373 of the Security Council which have also been implemented in 
national legislation. The latter resolution aims at restricting the freedom of 
movement of terrorists by stepping up border control, improving the fight 
against identity fraud, improving information exchange between services and 
preventing the abuse of the refugee status. Finally, the European EURODAC83 
rules have been included in the new German legislation. Other policy fields are 
also covered by this act84.  
In Germany information on potential immigrants is routinely gathered from the 
‘Verfassungsschutz’, with the aim to keep out people who have already been in 
contact with known radicals. Federal states decide on this research themselves. 
                                              
83  Eurodac is a European databank for the storage of fingerprints. See: European Commission, 2004.  
84  According to Albrecht, author of working document 1 on Germany, the Act has come under heavy criticism from privacy 
protection institutes and constitutional experts. 
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In Spain people are working with databases to be able to keep a closer eye on the 
inflow and outflow of aliens in the country. This is a result of the implementation 
of the Schengen agreements of the EU. So far, however, there is little insight in the 
number of illegal immigrants in Spain.  
 
After the attacks of 11 September 2001 in the United States it became clear that it 
was possible to remain in the country illegally after expiry of a student or other 
temporary visa. Entry controls into the United States have been tightened and 
holders of temporary visas are monitored more closely. Visas have become more 
fraud-proof and most applicants are questioned before their visa is issued. 
Information about visa holders is shared between the various government services. 
The Visa Outlook programme has been reinforced and the Transit Without Visa 
(TWOV) programme suspended. People who appear on any of the lists of potential 
terrorists will be refused a visa.  
Various measures have been created for the many students in particular who enter 
the United States every year, to ensure that there are no terrorists amongst them 
trying to get into the country. Within this framework, the Student and Exchange 
Visitor Information System was set up, which operates alongside the Foreign 
Terrorist Tracking Task Force set up by the FBI.  
Within the framework of the VISIT programme (Visitor and Immigrant Status 
Indication Technology) the biometrical and biographical data for all incoming 
travellers are recorded in a database. In 2005 experiments were carried out with 
RFID (Radio Frequency Identification). The use of a ‘tag’ could be the answer to 
creating a more accurate correlation between incoming and outgoing travellers. 
In order to be able to remove foreign terrorists from the country, the ATRC (Alien 
Terrorist Removal Courts) were founded in 1996. Based on classified information 
people could be deported from the United States, although the parties involved 
were able to defend themselves. The ATRC, however, never worked. The INS 
(Immigration and Naturalization Service) deported aliens based on secret 
information through immigration courts, without informing the accused or his or 
her solicitor. These and other measures have raised questions on some 
antiterrorism measures and their compatibility with human rights. To an even 
greater extent this also applies to the registration duty for residents of countries 
associated with terrorism, introduced in September 2002. Individuals found to 
have committed a crime (mostly violations of immigration laws) were detained, 
sometimes under dire circumstances. 
Yet all the measures which the United States takes to close the borders cannot 
prevent that many cross the borders from Canada and Mexico, including perhaps 
people with terrorist motives. A ‘Smart Border Declaration’ has been signed with 
Canada, aimed at creating tighter border control and the addition of another 1000 
customs officials. A similar agreement was signed with Mexico. 
 
Refusing access to a country is used in some countries, including Sweden and 
Poland, in the antiterrorism policy (working document 7). A visa or a declaration to 
enter may be refused if there is reasonable doubt that the foreign national is 
involved in terrorist activities, participates in such activities, or heads a terrorist 
organisation or is a member. Foreign nationals may also be refused access if their 
presence is unwanted in light of them posing a threat to national security or public 
order.  
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3.10 Measures concerning criminal law 
 
3.10.1 Definition of terrorist crimes 
 
EU countries have agreed to classify certain serious and punishable acts as terrorist 
crimes, as set out below. According to working document 3, the importance of 
aligning criminal legislation in Europe is demonstrated by the fact that before the 
framework decree on combating terrorism of 13 June 2002 was adopted only 7 
Member States had specific legislation in the field of counterterrorism, namely 
France, Germany, Italy, Portugal, Greece, Spain and the United Kingdom. In the 
other countries crimes with terrorist intent were committed, prosecuted and tried 
based on common criminal law, without additional provisions.  
The EU framework decree on combating terrorism of 13 June 2002 required the 
inclusion in national criminal legislation of a number of terrorist crimes defined. 
Eight punishable acts set out in the framework decree must be classified as 
terrorist crimes if committed with a terrorist aim. This terrorist aim is defined as 
seriously intimidating a population, unduly compelling a Government or 
international organisation to perform or abstain from performing any acts, 
or  seriously destabilising or destroying the fundamental political, constitutional, 
economic or social structures of a country or an international organisation, 
The eight punishable acts are:  
a attacks upon a person's life which may cause death; 
b attacks upon the physical integrity of a person; 
c kidnapping or hostage taking; 
d causing extensive destruction to a Government or public facility, a transport 
system, an infrastructure facility, including an information system, a fixed 
platform located on the continental shelf, a public place or private property 
likely to endanger human life or result in major economic loss; 
e seizure of aircraft, ships or other means of public or goods transport; 
f manufacture, possession acquisition, transport, supply or use of weapons, 
explosives or of nuclear, biological or chemical weapons as well as research 
into, and development of, biological and chemical weapons; 
g release of dangerous substances, or causing fires, floods or explosions the 
effect of which is to endanger human life; 
h interfering with or disrupting the supply of water, power or any other 
fundamental natural resource the effect of which is to endanger human life. 
 
A ninth crime relates to threatening to commit any of the eight crimes set out 
above.85  
 
Below we have set out how the definition of terrorism has been included in the 
national legislation of the five EU countries investigated. Germany, France, Italy, 
Spain and the United Kingdom are known to have implemented the EU framework 
                                              
85  The EU network of independent experts in the field of legal principles has voiced its concerns on the ease with which 
the definition of terrorism from the EU framework decree of 13 June 2002 was adopted by the EU Member States. 
According to the network, an accurate definition is required and control mechanisms must be included in legislation to 
be able to protect fundamental freedoms in this matter. See Euractive.com (www.euractiv.com/Article?tcmuri=tcm:29-
136674-16&type=LinksDossier). 
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decree of 13 June 2002 regarding the fight against terrorism and that the relevant 
legislation has become effective.86 
 
Germany 
The official definition of terrorist crimes is contained in Section 129a and b of the 
Penal Code. The definition is based on the definition provided in the EU 
framework decree on combating terrorism. Section 129a stipulates a broad 
approach to terrorist offences, which comprises, amongst other things, 
recruitment, training, preparatory acts and financing. Section 129b serves as an 
addition to criminal law sections on the membership of any terrorist association 
(targeting murder, genocide or any other crimes aimed at the freedom of or the 
endangering of the public) such that membership of foreign associations is also 
banned.  
In the debate on Section 129a the concept of ‘supporting’ terrorist organisations 
received a great deal of attention. The initial idea was ‘to campaign’ for penalising 
terrorist organisations. This goes back to the hunt of ‘RAF sympathisers’ from the 
nineteen seventies, but was defined by critics as too vague and broad. The notion 
has now been restricted to ‘recruitment’ (werben). According to working document 
1 this still fits the requirements of the EU framework decree. 
 
France 
The Counterterrorism Act of 1986 defines terrorism as ‘a legal violation committed 
by an individual or a group of individuals, aimed at seriously disrupting public 
order through intimidation and terror’. Under this act a terrorist offence comprises 
an objective and a subjective element. The objective element is expressed in a list 
of 39 offences described in the penal code. The subjective element is expressed in 
the offender’s aim. The offence described in the list is classed as terrorist, when the 
punishable offences "are in relation with a personal or collective venture which aim 
is to cause a serious disturbance to public order by means of intimidation or terror". 
The fact that the aim of the offender is the key element in the definition of an 
offence as being terrorist, is criticised by some in France as being too broadly 
interpretable, according to working document 2.  
 
Italy 
Italian legislation refers to ‘subversion’ (Section 270 Criminal Code) and ‘terrorism’ 
(Section 270 Criminal Code). Under Section 270 Criminal Code subversion is 
defined in the report on Italy as  
a The violent establishment of a dictatorship of one class over all other classes, 
b The violent suppression of any social class,  
c The violent destruction of the economic and social system of the state, 
d The violent destruction of the political and legal system.  
 
The starting point for the definition of  terrorism dates back to 1980 and comprises 
a ban on ‘organisations that are committed to terrorism, including international 
terrorism, or the undermining of the democratic order’. Section 270 bis Criminal  
                                              
86  EU (2005). 
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Code focuses specifically on terrorist movements in Italy in the nineteen seventies. 
In 1987 the High Court provided some definition of ‘terrorism’, which was: ‘actions 
aimed at trust in the established order, not aimed at people, but at everything 
these people represent’.  
The article was amended in 2001 to include violence against international 
organisations. The term ‘terrorism’, however, was not defined explicitly. 
On 31 July 2005 a definition was adopted that reflects elements from the first part 
of the  EU definition, in which terrorist motivation is emphasised, but not the list 
of crimes set out in the second part. All crimes that meet the first conditions are 
taken to be terrorist, more precisely: 
– crimes that cause serious damage to any country (and therefore in other 
countries too) or to an international organisation,  
– and that aim to intimidate the population, or to force authorities to act or 
refrain from acting, or to destroy the fundamental structures of the country or 
the international organisation. 
 
Spain 
The Spanish Criminal Code classes terrorist offences as crimes against the public 
order. The term ‘public order’ is not defined further in the criminal code, but the 
‘generally accepted’ definition of this concept is the normal functioning of public 
and private institutes, internal peace, free development of fundamental rights and 
freedoms. 
Spanish law defines objective elements, for example arson and destruction, which 
are considered terrorist offences only in combination with other elements. These 
other elements entail that the perpetrator must be a member of, act on behalf of, 
or work with armed groups, or organisations of groups which aim to disrupt the 
constitutional order or public security.  
Important in this is that the ‘membership’ of an armed group or terrorist 
organisation (such as  set out above) requires a ‘direct relationship’. An armed 
group comprises, amongst other things, hierarchy and discipline. Weapons and 
other tools are provided by the organisation. 
Spanish law also comprises a section that stipulates that crimes that are not 
described specifically as (terrorist) crimes in the Criminal Code, but which do 
share the same elements and purposes, are punishable as terrorist crimes. 
 
United Kingdom 
The reviewer for counterterrorism policy, Lord Carlile of Berriew (see par. 2.5) has 
submitted a proposal for a definition of terrorist crimes. Meanwhile, people in 
parliament have argued in favour of inclusion of a definition in British legislation 
modelled after the one implemented by the UN and EU. Under the old Prevention 
of Terrorism Act of 1989 terrorism was defined as ‘using violence for political 
purposes, including the use of violence in order to induce fear in the public or part 
of the police’. Under the Terrorism Act 2000 the definition was extended to include 
actions that do  not necessarily involve violence, but which can have very serious 
consequences for public security, such as  sabotaging the water supply or nuclear 
plants  (Explanatory Notes to Terrorism Act 2000).  
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3.10.2 New penalisation and extension of penalisation measures in place 
 
Penalisation of terrorist crimes 
 
Most EU countries have made terrorist crimes explicitly punishable in their 
national legislation. National differences do occur, however. Some countries have 
made specific terrorist crimes punishable in their legislation, while others have 
incorporated a full range of acts related to the battle against terrorism (United 
Kingdom). The report by Aksu a.o. (see working document 6) describes only the 
most remarkable stipulations.  
 
The Terrorist Crimes Act has been in operation in the Netherlands since August 
2004. One of the Act’s stipulations concerns the penalisation of participation in an 
organisation that aims to commit terrorist crimes (Section 140a of the Criminal 
Code).  
Participation in such an organisation is a punishable offence in other EU countries, 
too. This includes the United Kingdom where the offence does not in fact concern 
the participation in an organisation with a terrorist aim, but rather the support or 
promotion of the activities of an illegal organisation. Terrorist organisations are 
illegal in the United Kingdom. It is also a punishable offence in the United 
Kingdom to carry an object or item of clothing or to make these visible, that 
inspire reasonable suspicion of participation in, or support of, an illegal (terrorist) 
organisation. Another stipulation in British legislation concerns the penalisation of 
attending public meetings of three or more persons, if it is known that the meeting 
aims to promote the activities of an illegal (terrorist) organisation or to provide 
support. It is conceivable that such criminal provision will be introduced in the 
Netherlands as soon as the bill ‘NGO treaty and ban on foreign organisations in 
violation of public order’ becomes effective87. 
 
Both Italy and France have imposed penalties on various forms of assisting 
terrorists.  Unlike Italy, however, France demands intent. Dutch law also stipulates 
penalisation of assisting terrorists (Section 189 of the Dutch Criminal Code). While 
this stipulation is not specifically aimed at terrorist crimes, the specification of this 
stipulation is currently being fleshed out. Germany is also working on stipulations 
to make a stay in training camps punishable by law (as is the case in the 
Netherlands88). Incidentally, according to working document 1, section 39a 
(terrorist criminal organisation) may also be understood to include the 
organisation of training sessions. 
One of the countries studied is known to have made the provision of training 
explicitly punishable. Under Italian criminal law a trainer may be liable to 
punishment if the persons trained aim to commit terrorist attacks. Under the EU 
treaty of May 2005 the EU countries are obliged to penalise the training of 
terrorists89. 
In the United Kingdom such a criminal provision has been proposed under the 
Terrorism Bill 2005: if the trainer knows or suspects that the training is to be used 
for terrorist purposes, he or she is punishable. In addition, a person who does not 
                                              
87  Bill 28764 proposes extensive options to ban terrorist organisations. 
88  Dutch parliament, see Kamerstukken II 2005/06, 29 754, no 60. 
89  Dutch parliament, see Kamerstukken II 2005/06, 29 754, no 60. 
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actually participate  in the training, but who is present on the training site, is also 
punishable.  
Finally, it is considered remarkable (working document 6) that civilians in the 
United Kingdom have the obligation to report all information they have if they 
suspect that another person is guilty of a terrorist crime. If they fail to do so, they 
are liable to prosecution.  
 
Penalisation ‘inciting terrorism’ and ‘glorification of terrorism’ 
 
The ‘inciting terrorism’, but particularly the ‘glorification of terrorism’ are two 
stipulations that have been receiving a great deal of attention lately. The 
stipulation ‘glorification of terrorism’ (also called ‘apology’) is not just subject of 
discussion in the Netherlands, but in other EU Member States too. Recently the 
British House of Lords approved a new antiterrorism act that penalises the 
glorification of terrorism90. Although the conservative section of the House of Lords 
opposed the new antiterrorism law, it will become effective91 in the near future.  
Dutch parliament is discussing a draft bill aimed at penalising the glorification, 
extenuation, trivialisation and denial of very serious crimes and the restriction of 
practicing certain professions92.  
While most countries distinguish between inciting terrorism and glorification of 
terrorism, this distinction is often very vague. Some countries indicate for example 
that the glorification of terrorism is punishable under their national legislation 
where it concerns inciting terrorism. The glorification of terrorism has been 
penalised as a specific offence in a handful of countries only, including Spain. 
Under Spanish legislation ‘apologie du terrorism’ has been defined as: ‘praising or 
justifying, by means of the media or other method of distribution, crimes 
incorporated in the penal code, or of the people who have taken part in the 
execution of these offences, or of the execution of offences that cause damage, 
contempt for or humiliation of victims of terrorist acts or their relatives (…).’ The 
fact that only a few countries have such penalisation, is explained by the fact that 
this measure is regarded as an infringement of the freedom of speech93. If 
glorification of terrorism is not explicitly included as a specific offence in national 
legislation, it may be punished through general stipulations in some cases. After 
all, national legislation often comprises on the one hand penalisation in respect of 
the glorification of crime in general and on the other criminal provisions that relate 
to terrorist crimes. German law comprises a section, for example, that penalises 
‘the distribution, public showing of lively descriptions of cruel and inhumane acts 
against humanity in a manner that glorifies such violence, or that trivialises the 
damage of such violence or the emphasis of the cruel and inhumane aspects of 
such violence in a way that harms human dignity’94. For the same reason, inciting 
terrorism has been penalised in a large number of countries. Inciting terrorism as a 
                                              
90  22 March 2006. 
91  the Antiterrorism Act was approved by the British House of Lords, as the conservatives withheld their votes to prevent a 
long-term postponement of the law. They are hoping that the law will be amended following the evaluation in a year’s 
time. Source: Elsevier, 23 March 2006. 
92  The letter by the Minister of Justice and the Minister of the Interior and Kingdom Relations of December 2005 shows 
that different advice was received on the draft  bill to penalise the glorification of terrorist crimes and the ban on 
carrying out certain professions in the consultation rounds. This advice is currently being studied (Dutch parliament, see 
Kamerstukken II 2005/06, 29 754, no 60, page 13). 
93  Council of Europe (2004). 
94  Section 130a. 
 69 
specific offence is also punishable in a considerable number of countries. As far as 
known inciting terrorism seems liable to prosecution in all EU countries, either 
under general or under specific stipulations. 
 
British law incorporates a specific stipulation for inciting people from outside the 
territory to carry out terrorist crimes from one’s own territory. The person who 
incites others from his or her territory, may be sentenced to the same punishment 
that applies to the offence to which he incited the other person.  
 
Extension measures in respect of hatred spewing persons 
The Dutch bill which penalises the glorification of terrorism also contains a 
stipulation that restricts individuals’ professional options.95 The bill provides for 
the option to remove people who have committed certain crimes from their 
profession. Examples include insulting groups of people, inciting people to hatred, 
or violence or discrimination in carrying out an office or profession. With the 
measures being extended, the judge may impose an additional punishment from 
the first conviction, namely a ban on carrying out certain professional activities. 
According to a letter from Dutch ministers Donner and Remkes, examples include 
activities in the sense of spiritual influencing (such as education, religious services 
and youth care)96. 
In France, Spain and Germany individuals may be restricted in the choices they 
have as regards their profession. Individuals in these countries may be removed 
from their right to carry out any public post if they are part of a terrorist 
organisation or are associated with any such organisation.  
 
 
3.11 Measures in the field of criminal procedural law 
 
3.11.1 Extension of (special) powers of investigation 
 
A range of (special) methods of investigation exist. The report ‘Terrorism: Special 
investigation techniques’ of the Council of Europe reveals that the main special 
methods of investigation are used everywhere and that there are no specific 
differences between Member States. The report also states: ‘The Netherlands and 
Belgium can be considered countries using the full panoply of such techniques’ (page 
16).  
 
Requisition of personal data  
 
A special method of investigation which is under scrutiny in a number of 
countries, is the requisition of confidential information. In the Netherlands the 
Powers to Requisition Confidential Information Act (29 441) recently entered into 
force97. Under this act general competencies are added to Code of Criminal 
Procedure for the requisitioning of data. This means that third parties may be 
obliged to provide data in the interest of the investigation. If necessary, this may be 
obligatory. The powers in the law relate to: 
                                              
95  http://www.NCTb.nl/wat_is_terrorism/wet_en_regelgeving/Wetsvoorstel_Apologie.asp. 
96  Dutch parliament, see Kamerstukken II, 2004-2005 29754 no 5. 
97  Effective 1 January 2006 (Bulletin of Acts, Orders and Decrees 2005, 609). 
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– requisitioning so-called identifying data (including name, address, town, date 
of birth and gender, and administrative characteristics, such as  the number of 
the Airmiles pass, membership number of a sports club, or bank account 
numbers)98 
– the requisitioning of data other than identifying data (including information 
on services rendered, for example the type of videos rented, books borrowed 
from the library and for how long, or a person’s grocery bills for the past 
month using his customer account pass, with a specification of the groceries, if 
recorded by the supermarket) 
– the requisitioning of sensitive data (including data on a person’s religion or 
philosophy, race, political persuasion, health, sexual life or membership of a 
professional union), 
– the obligatory cooperation in decoding encrypted data. 
  
United Kingdom 
In the United Kingdom, too, public institutions may be obliged to provide 
information (including tax and medical information) at the request of police or 
intelligence services. However, the information may be only requisitioned if it is to 
be used in a criminal study (which may be at a later date). Unlike the Netherlands, 
requests for information in the United Kingdom do not need  to be based on 
suspicion. A bill is currently being discussed in the Netherlands which stipulates 
that a reasonable suspicion of a criminal offence is no longer required to be able to 
requisition information. Instead, indications that a terrorist attack is being 
prepared99 will suffice. The explanatory note describes indications as evidence 
contained in the information available that there are facts and circumstances that 
suggest that a terrorist crime would have been or will be committed. According to 
a letter by the Minister of Justice the question if the information will yield 
information will need to be reconsidered time and again based on factors such as 
reliability, concreteness and verifiability100.  
 
Germany  
The ‘Bundesamt für Verfassungsschutz’ is authorised to demand disclosure of 
information on institutions such as banks, post offices, telephone companies and 
airlines. In Germany telephone and Internet data must be stored for a year. In 
addition, the police and the public prosecutor are entitled to search the 
information systems of, for example, credit card companies, telephone businesses, 
social benefit organisations and housing corporations. This allows for the dragnet 
method to be used in the criminal investigation, to compare personal data from 
various files with the offender profile (also see par 3.4). According to the report this 
method is also used to intercept radical foreign nationals. Following the 
implementation of the second German antiterrorism package (see par. 2.1) medical 
and other personal data are added to files open to ‘dragnet research’.  
A side effect of the Rasterfahndung method is the occurrence of random hits: 
information may be found that wasn’t being sought, but that could be used in 
principle for commencing new procedures against new suspects. The German 
legislator has argued that new investigation studies may be commenced only for 
                                              
98  These examples are taken from Stevens, Koops and Wiemans (2004). 
99  For a discussion of the concepts of ‘reasonable suspicion’ and ‘indications’, see Corstens (2002). 
100  Dutch parliament, see Kamerstukken II, 30164 no 12. 
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crimes for which the relevant investigation method could have been used legally if 
the investigation was to have been carried out independently of the random hit.  
 
France 
French law allows for the collection of data from a large number of authorities. 
Investigation officials of the intelligence and counterterrorism services may 
requisition communication data from providers and internet shops. Within the 
framework of the prevention of terrorism, they also have access to  a large number 
of computerised data files such as the vehicle registration system, driving license 
system, national identity card system, passport management system, electronic 
management system, foreign nationals files and personal details for foreign 
nationals and asylum seekers who have been refused access to France. Moreover, 
electronic personal data can be used for people travelling to or from any 
destination outside the European Union. 
In France use is made of profiling techniques, which the authors say can result in 
‘discriminatory practices’. The measures are aimed particularly at foreigners who 
look ‘Arabic Islamic’, earmarked as a domestic enemy.  
France is working hard on an ICT card for the gathering of information, but further 
information would have to show which measures exactly are taken, as the working 
docuement is not very specific on this subject. A National Commission for 
Information and Freedoms (CNIL) has criticised the new legislation: the 
verification of the identity of individuals outside their knowledge is rejected,  
although it does conclude that the loss of privacy and freedom does relate to the 
increased security. According to the French authors, the datamining methods have 
proven to be less effective so far than had been expected and they believe that 
human intelligence yields better results. They fail to present sources to support 
their claim, however. 
 
Expansion of  other special powers of investigation 
 
In addition to the extended powers of the police and intelligence services to access 
personal details, other special methods of investigation have also been extended in 
some countries. Examples include the use of searches of premises, observation and 
the interception of (tele)communication. 
 
Under Dutch law options to collect information in exploratory studies have been 
extended. Examples include the options to search people without concrete 
suspicion of a punishable offence and the use of special powers of investigation, 
such as  systematic observation and telephone tapping. The use of these powers of 
investigation is proposed to be advanced from the stage of reasonable suspicion to 
the indication phase101. 
 
Germany 
Germany uses the so-called IMSI catcher (International Mobile Subscribe Identity) 
technology to trace people’s locations, Sim card or telephone number. This 
method is controversial, however, as it can lead to interference and malfunctioning 
affecting people not involved in the investigation.  
                                              
101  Bill to amend the Code of Criminal Procedure, the Criminal Code and a number of other acts to extend the options of 
investigation and prosecution of terrorist crimes. Dutch parliament, see Kamerstukken II, 30 164. 
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Working document 1 mentions a new investigation technique, i.e. ‘police 
observation’, whereby information is collected on suspects or people who have 
been in contact with suspects. By means of information collected during police 
checks, these individuals are localised where possible. This type of investigation 
may be applied for for a 12-month period.  
 
France 
Searches may now be carried out in the absence of the persons involved or their 
counsel. By Act of January 2006 (Loi nº2006-64 du 23 janvier 2006) observation by 
means of camera and video monitoring is permitted by the government, legal 
entities and shops on the condition that it covers only the business’ or buildings’ 
immediate vicinity or that the shop is a target in a terrorist attack. Recordings must 
be saved for at least one month and may be examined by the Police National and 
the Gendarmerie upon request. 
 
Italy 
Italian law provides for the storage of telephone contact data for 24 months. 
Individuals are obliged to show valid ID when buying a telephone or Sim card. 
Data on Internet communication must be stored for thirty months for investigation 
purposes. A note in the working document on this scheme refers to sources that 
suggest that this may be violating privacy legislation. Telephones of persons 
suspected of terrorism may be bugged. 
Saliva or hair samples may be taken for DNA identification of terror suspects. 
 
Spain  
Spanish law provides for the obligatory retention of telephone and Internet data 
for 12 months. This information may be used for both terrorist and criminal 
investigations. Arrangements have been made to safeguard personal details. 
 
United Kingdom  
As set out in the introduction to this paragraph, the report by the Council of 
Europe refers to the use of special methods of investigation in all countries. In 
addition, investigation services in the United Kingdom have the power to enter a 
house without authorisation from the resident, to search the premises and to 
confiscate goods for further investigation. 
 
United States: Patriot Act 
The Uniting and Strengthening America by Providing Appropriate Tools Required 
to Intercept and Obstruct Terrorism (USA-PATRIOT) Act, in short the Patriot Act, 
was drawn up in a matter of weeks following the events of 11 September.  It was 
introduced on 26 October 2001. The emphasis in an investigation is shifted from 
crimes already committed to proactive actions. This has made it much easier for 
the FBI to gain permission to bug certain individuals and to carry out searches and 
‘look-in operations’. It has also become possible to demand disclosure of personal 
data from institutes including hospitals, libraries and hotels. The flow of 
information between banks and the government on financial transactions has been 
expanded and transactions with ‘shell banks’ (banks that have no physical place of 
residence with offices and staff) are not permitted. 
The Patriot Act is an example of a policy that can lead to tensions between defence 
against terrorism on the one hand and the protection of civil liberties on the other. 
 73 
According to working document 5, part of the measures came under criticism as 
the Act violates civil freedoms and privacy, while it is not actually clear if it does 
promote national security.  
 
Other EU countries 
According to working document 7 Swedish law comprises an Act that stipulates 
that the judge may approve the interception of (tele)communication if it serves to 
investigate whether or not a foreign national or an organisation to which this 
national belongs, is planning terrorist offences.  
In Finland the police have no access to so-called call-associated data and phone 
tapping is not permitted for unveiling preparations for terrorist offences. The 
sentence imposed on the preparation of terrorist offences is too low for this. 
In Cyprus the interception of private communication is not permitted, as this is 
regarded a violation of the right to privacy. 
 
3.11.2 Extension of options for preventive detention 
 
The issue of preventive detention is characterised by considerable variation in the 
laws applicable, as each country has its own legal system with its own 
characteristics.  
 
Detention without concrete suspicion 
In the Netherlands it is not possible to arrest and detain people without concrete 
suspicion. Persons may only be stopped if there is a reasonable suspicion of guilt. 
Under Dutch legislation individuals may be detained for up to 10 days, even if 
there are no ‘serious objections’. By law, the inspection of pleadings and other 
documents may also be postponed. According to the government this is permitted 
under the stipulations of the ECHR, which refers to a ‘suspicion’ based on which a 
person may be detained102. In the Netherlands this must involve a suspect, i.e. a 
person in respect of whom based on facts or circumstances there is a reasonable 
suspicion of guilt of having committed a punishable offence (Section 27 subsection 
1 Code of Criminal Procedure).  
In the United Kingdom it is possible to stop and detain individuals without 
concrete indications. This means that no suspicion of guilt of any specifically 
punishable offence is required. In principle, detention without concrete suspicion 
is possible for a maximum of 48 hours. Upon expiry of this period, a court 
authorisation may enable a decision to extend detention without concrete 
suspicion by a maximum of 7 days (including the 48 hours of stop and arrest). This 
court authorisation relies on two conditions. First of all the court must be 
convinced that the extension is necessary to collect new evidence on the offence or 
to safeguard any existing evidence. The court must also be convinced that the 
investigation is progressing. The decision to extend detention after 48 hours is 
taken in a court session, in some cases in the absence of the suspect or his or her 
counsel. Under the law the suspect and his or her counsel may be refused access 
to the data based on which the request for extension is made. 
 
                                              
102  Dutch parliament, see Kamerstukken II, 30164 no 12, Extension Options to Investigate and Prosecute Terrorist Crimes 
Act. 
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Preventive detention 
Preventive detention in the Netherlands starts following the arrest. Custody for 
interrogation purposes is restricted to a maximum of 6 hours. Preventive detention 
comprises police custody and pre-trial detention. A suspect may be held in police 
custody for a maximum of 3 days (in urgent cases this may be extended by 3 days) 
and only based on a reasonable suspicion of guilt (as per Section 27 subsection 1 
of the Code of Criminal Procedure). The pre-trial detention, which follows the 
police custody, may take place if it is apparent from facts and circumstances that 
there are serious objections in respect of the suspect. While serious objections are 
still required for taking terror suspects into policy custody (first phase of the pre-
trial detention), this may be changed in the near future. The Bill Extension Options 
to Investigate and Prosecute Terrorist Crimes (Wet verruiming mogelijkheden tot 
opsporing en vervolging van terroristische misdrijven) suggests that in future a 
reasonable suspicion of guilt should be sufficient to take a person suspected of 
terrorism into custody.  
 
Germany 
Germany has no special stipulations for preventive detention without charge in 
terrorist cases. Section 129a, however, may serve as grounds to detain suspects 
preventively. Since the introduction of this section, the scope of the act has been 
expanded. Besides individuals in respect of whom there is a strong suspicion of 
murder (or genocide), persons who are accused of setting up or of being members 
of a terrorist group may be remanded in preventive detention. Persons who have  
been convicted or who are suspected of being members of a terrorist organisation, 
or if there is an immediate danger to the lives of others, may be subjected to 
restrictions regarding the communication with their lawyers and associates for a 
period of 30 days. 
As in the United Kingdom, the (previous) government in Germany proposed to 
legitimise detention of dangerous terrorists without proof for crimes committed 
previously. While this proposal has been withdrawn by the new government, it has 
been replaced by a proposal to make punishable certain indicators of ‘posing a 
danger’, including a visit to a terrorist training camp. Albrecht (working document 
1) states that there are three approaches in considering to take out dangerous 
persons (with preventive detention being one method): first of all introduce a 
method to establish the degree to which a person is dangerous, secondly draft 
sentences for acts that can be deemed an indication of posing a danger and third, 
reducing the onus of proof103.  
 
France 
Under the new law (Loi nº2006-64 du 23 janvier 2006) police custody of terrorist 
suspects is restricted to a maximum of 6 days if there is a serious risk of a terrorist 
act in France or abroad, or based on essential and urgent regulations resulting 
from international cooperation104. For suspects of other offences than terrorist 
offences, police custody is 4 days maximum. Terror suspects may be questioned 
for 6 days without a lawyer being present and are not informed of the right to 
remain silent. After 96 and 120 hours of detention respectively the suspect may ask 
                                              
103  The debate on this issue is also about the idea of a criminal law aimed at ‘enemies’ (Feindstraftrecht). This continues to 
be a point for debate, according to Albrecht (working document 1).  
104  Translation of ‘un risque sérieux the l’imminence d’une action terroriste and France ou à l’étranger ou que les nécessités 
the la coopération internationale le requièrent impérativement’. 
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to consult his lawyer. Even if this request is honoured, the counsel will not have 
access to the case file. In addition, under the law it is possible to refuse the suspect 
to inform others of the arrest for 4 days. After these 4 days a person must be 
informed of the detention at the request of the suspect.  
 
Spain 
The standard time limit of 72 hours may be extended by 48 hours if it concerns a 
person suspected of a terrorist crime (the preventive detention is therefore 
restricted to a maximum of 5 days). During this time the suspect may be isolated 
from the outside world, be kept incommunicado. If after this time the investigating 
judge decides to commence legal proceedings against the suspect, he will order 
preventive detention and the suspect is transferred from police custody to judicial 
custody. During this period the suspect may be shielded from the outside world for 
a maximum of another eight days. 
 
United Kingdom 
In the United Kingdom it is possible to detain a person without charge who has 
been arrested under a counterterrorism Act for 14 days as a preventive measure. In 
the Terrorism Act 2006 which first entered into force on 30 March, the maximum 
preventive detention without charge has been extended from 14 to 28 days, after a 
proposal by the government to allow this form of detention up to 3 months had 
been rejected by the House of Commons. This proposal was based in part on a 
document by the Metropolitan Police , which argued the need for detention of 
certain suspects without charge for a longer period105. 
 
3.11.3 Witnesses and crown witnesses 
 
Witnesses 
Since witnesses in serious cases, including terrorism cases, quite often feel 
intimidated, it is important that measures be taken to protect them. There are 
several ways to realise such witnesses protection. Before a case goes to trial in 
France it is possible to file records by reporting officers in terrorist cases ‘under a 
number’ rather than under their real name. During the court session, too, 
reporting officers are able to give a statement ‘under a number’106. For the 
protection of the rights of the suspect it has been determined that no conviction is 
permitted based solely on records drawn up ‘under number’, if the identity of the 
reporting officer(s) is (are) not revealed at the first request to the president of the 
relevant  
court. The examination of witnesses in complete anonymity and being asked 
questions by means of closed circuit television applies only if the witness would 
otherwise expose himself to serious risk. These measures apply to (very) serious 
offences only. 
 
                                              
105  The relevant document seems to have been removed from the Home Office website, but is still available on the Internet. 
See for example: http://www.spy.org.uk/spyblog/2005/11/andy_haymans_letter_trying_to.html. 
106  This appears from Loi nº2006-64 du 23 janvier 2006. 
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Various EU countries provide the option of a witness protection programme in 
terrorist cases. Programmes like these apply mostly to crown witnesses and Dutch 
legislation also provides for these. Recently it became known that two witnesses in 
a terrorist case were included in such a programme107. 
 
Crown witnesses 
Dutch law includes a crown witness scheme, or the Commitment act to witnesses 
in criminal cases Act108. Under this law, the Public Prosecutor and a suspect of a 
punishable office may make specific arrangements in order to obtain a witnesses 
statement in a criminal case against another suspect. In exchange for the witness 
statement, the suspect’s sentence is reduced. 
Crown witness schemes are in place in different EU countries. In most cases 
suspects are offered sentence reduction in exchange for their cooperation. Other 
options include suspension of all criminal proceedings, offering protection and a 
residence permit, temporary or otherwise. 
 
Germany  
German law comprises a crown witnesses scheme for specific offences: criminal 
and terrorist organisations, money laundering and drug trafficking. An evaluation 
brought to light that the scheme only has limited added value in the investigation 
of these offences. The scheme, however, was also criticised from a more principal 
point of view, whereby lawyers and part of the academic world argued that 
rewarding the cooperation of suspects in law enforcement and investigations is 
principally incorrect.  
Following a strong lobby, a general crown witness scheme is now being drawn up. 
Typically, the ‘deal’ must be made before a decision is taken whether or not 
proceedings against the suspect/crown witness are commenced.  
 
France  
Here too, individuals who have committed a terrorist crime qualify for a reduction 
of their sentence when they have helped stop a terrorist crime or have helped to 
prevent victims. In addition, they are expected to testify against any other 
offenders. In France a sentence may not be imposed in case of an attempt to 
commit a terrorist crime and the person  involved has helped prevent the terrorist 
crime and, in addition, is willing to testify against any co-perpetrators.  
 
Italy 
The Act on people cooperating with justice (‘legge sui pentiti’) regards persons that 
are part of a criminal organisation who in exchange for assisting the Justice 
Department may qualify for reduced sentences. As a terrorist may be regarded part 
of a criminal organisation, this act also applies to terrorists. In Italy foreigners who 
cooperate with the authorities may  obtain a temporary, or otherwise, residence 
permit. 
 
                                              
107  This concerns the Piranha case in which two people testified against suspected members of the alleged terrorist  
organisation ‘the Hofstadgroep’ (Volkskrant 30 March 2006 ‘Piranha getuigen duiken onder’). 
108  The Witnesses in Criminal Cases Guarantees Act became effective on 1 April 2006 officially (Bulletin of Acts, Orders and 
Decrees 2005, 254). It was preceded by the Temporary Instruction witnesses in criminal cases Guarantees which was 
based on the Act of 12 May 2005. 
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Spain 
A crown witness scheme is available under Spanish law. The Spanish courts are 
free to decide on the sentence reduction.  
 
In Luxemburg exemption from punishment may be granted when a person informs 
the authorities that a terrorist-related offence is being prepared or reveals the 
identity of a person involved in this scheme before an attempt is made  to commit 
a terrorist-related offence and before the acts have commenced. The same applies 
to individuals who are guilty of participation in a terrorist group and who inform 
the authorities of the existence of the group and reveal the names of the members, 
before an attempt is made to commit a terrorist offence and before the acts have 
commenced. 
 
3.11.4 Use of information from intelligence services in court 
 
A Dutch bill to amend the Code of Criminal Procedure arranging the interviewing 
of protected witnesses and a number of other issues. The Wet Beschermde 
Getuigen (protected witnesses, 29743) is being prepared. 
 
Various working documents refer explicitly to the ban on the use of intelligence if 
the source is not revealed. Working document 1 details how German intelligence 
services are justified in refusing staff to testify in criminal cases, but the 
information may not be used as evidence.  
 
Section 108 of the Terrorism Act 2000 in the United Kingdom arranges for the use 
of ‘hearsay evidence’ that is not allowed in ordinary criminal cases. Testimony in 
these cases must be given by high-ranking police officials (from the rank of 
superintendent upwards, which is comparable to the Dutch chief inspector). This 
section obviously aims to allow information coming from ‘intelligence’ in court. 
The reviewer Lord Carlile of Berriew (see par. 2.5) is of the opinion that while the 
quality of the information of the intelligence services is very high, he is very happy 
that this scheme has not yet been used and he therefore pleads for its 
withdrawal109.  
 
 
3.12 Administrative measures 
 
3.12.1 Restricting people in their options and liberties  
 
Restricting people in their options as regards their freedom of movement  
The Dutch Bill Administrative Measures National Security Act (wet bestuurlijke 
maatregelen nationale veiligheid) aims to present the government with tools in the 
interest of national security and to prevent and combat terrorism. These tools are 
available to take action against natural and legal persons if all criminal proceedings 
have been exhausted110. The key points of this bill comprise the following 
measures: persons who based on facts and circumstances can be associated with 
                                              
109  Lord Carlile, Report on the Operation in 2005 of Part VII of the Terrorism Act 2000. See: 
www.nio.gov.uk/report_on_the_operation_ in_2005_of_part_vii_of_the_terrorism_act_2000.pdf. 
110  Dutch parliament, see Kamerstukken II 2004/05, 29 754, no 5. 
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terrorist activities or their support, may be imposed any of a range of measures to 
restrict them in their freedom of movement. The measures may concern an area 
restriction (restriction to be near certain objects or certain parts of the 
Netherlands), a person restriction (restriction to be near certain persons) and an 
obligation to report (obligation to report periodically to the chief of police in the 
place of residence). In addition, the bill comprises stipulations that allow for the 
refusal or withdrawal of subsidies, permits or licences to administrative bodies if 
the application, the reception of the subsidy or the licensee may be associated with 
terrorist activities or their support based on facts and circumstances and there is a 
serious risk that the permit, subsidy or licence will be used for terrorist activities or 
their support111. 
 
An Act has become operational in the United Kingdom that allows administrative 
measures to be taken against individuals suspected of terrorism. The control orders 
replace a stipulation from the Anti-Terrorism, Crime and Security Bill 2000 enabling 
the detention of ‘foreign nationals’ suspected of terrorism and against whom there 
is insufficient criminal evidence and who cannot be deported for an undetermined 
period without charge or legal substantiation. The Law Lords deemed this 
stipulation to be in violation of the Human Rights Act, and it was repealed112. The 
Prevention of Terrorism Act 2005 defines control orders as: ‘an order against an 
individual that imposes obligations on him for purposes connected with protecting 
members of the public from a risk of terrorism’. Such measures (‘obligations’) may 
be imposed on individuals suspected of being involved in activities related to 
terrorism, regardless if it concerns a British national or a foreign national and 
whether the terrorist activity is national or international. As a person poses a more 
serious risk for national security, more drastic measures may be regarded 
necessary113.  
There are two types of control orders. First there are the control orders that 
infringe the right of freedom as described in Section 5 of the ECHR. These control 
orders are referred to as derogating control orders, as they require derogation from 
Section  5 of the ECHR. Derogation from this international-legal section is possible 
in the United Kingdom as it invokes Section 15 ECHR ‘derogation in the event of 
emergency’. The second form of control orders is defined as non-derogating control 
orders, as they do not require derogation from Section 5 of the ECHR. 
In general, control orders are imposed by the court following an application by the 
Minister of Foreign Affairs. Non-derogating control orders, however, may also be 
imposed directly in ‘emergency cases’ by the Minister of Foreign Affairs if he is of 
the opinion that there are ‘reasonable grounds’ to suspect a person of (previous) 
involvement in terrorism-related activities and when he considers these necessary 
to impose. These measures must be put to the court within seven days after 
imposing, however. Non-derogating control orders may be imposed for a 
maximum of twelve months, after which this period may be extended each time. 
Derogating control orders may be imposed for a maximum of six months and be 
extended once only. 
 
                                              
111  See: Council for the Judiciary (2005). 
112  House of Lords [2004] UKHL 56. 
113  First Report of the independent reviewer pursuant to section 14(3) of the prevention of terrorism act 2005. 
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To be able to impose a derogating control order, the following legal procedure is 
followed. The person involved does not necessarily need to be aware of such a 
procedure in the run-up to the imposition of a derogating control order. The 
minister submits the application for imposing such a measure with the court. The 
following sessions then take place: 
a preliminary hearing; during the hearing it is established whether or not there 
are grounds to impose a derogating control order. There are grounds to 
impose such a measure if there is sufficient evidence to show that the person 
involved is involved in terrorism-related activities. In addition, there must be 
reasonable grounds to assume that the measure is essential to protect the 
public against the risk of terrorism. Finally, there must be a certain degree of 
‘public emergency’, subject to which the infringement of the right to freedom 
is permitted.  
b full hearing; during this hearing the decision to impose a derogating control 
order is confirmed. The above requirements (preliminary hearing) for imposing 
a derogating control order are rigorously tested during this hearing, as the 
court must be convinced of the involvement of the relevant person in activities 
related to terrorism. 
 
While a distinction is made between the two forms of control orders based on 
whether or not such measures violate Section 5 ECHR, the independent reviewer, 
Lord Carlile of Berriew, indicates that the distinction is vague. Many of the 
measures that are referred to as non-derogating control orders, such as an eighteen-
hour curfew, are very much like house arrest, which is considered as a derogating 
control order.  
  
Control orders may be based on non-disclosed information that is not accessible to 
the persons involved and their lawyers. At the request of the Minister of Foreign 
Affairs, the court may decide that for reasons of national security it may be 
undesirable that the evidence is disclosed to the relevant person and his lawyer 
and for the same reason the court may also decide that the accused and his lawyer 
may not be present during the session. In such cases a so-called Special Advocate114 
is appointed. A Special Advocate is an independent lawyer trained for these cases 
who is permitted to attend the closed sessions held in camera. However, contacts 
between the party involved on the one hand and his lawyer and the Special 
Advocate on the other hand are highly restricted. Moreover, the Special Advocate is 
not permitted to divulge on the contents of the non-disclosed information.  
 
Professional restrictions 
As appeared in paragraph 3.10, France, Spain and Germany may impose 
professional restrictions on persons. Persons in these countries may be removed 
from the right to carry out certain public positions, if they are part of, or associated 
with any terrorist organisation. Researchers with foreign backgrounds in the 
United Kingdom are sometimes excluded if there are indications that they can be 
associated with terrorism115. In the Netherlands, too, a bill is being discussed 
covering professional restrictions116. 
                                              
114  See Lord Carlile of Berriew (2006) ‘First Report of the independent reviewer pursuant to section 14(3) of the Prevention 
of Terrorism Act 2005 and Amnesty International (2006) United Kingdom Human rights: a broken promise. 
115  Glees and Pope (2005). See also: The Guardian, July 19, 2005 Foreign scientists barred amid terror fears. 
116  Dutch parliament, see Kamerstukken II 2005/06, 29 754, no 60. 
 80 
 
 
 
 81 
4 Conclusions and discussion 
 
 
4.1 Restrictions of this study  
 
The commission for this study initially concerned drawing up a first inventory of 
measures taken in the field of radicalisation and combating terrorism and the 
considerations and assumptions involved. In addition, information was to be 
collected, where available, for the implementation and evaluation of the policy. 
The study covered five European countries (Germany, France, Italy, Spain, the 
United Kingdom) and the United States. 
  
The project description defined nine policy fields for possible introduction of 
measures aimed at radicalisation, extremism and terrorism. This selection was 
made in consultation with the supervisory committee and the NCTb. Despite this 
demarcation, the study scope was very broad indeed.  
Supervised by the WODC based on the project description (see appendix 1), this 
study was carried out with input from research institutions in the countries 
concerned. The WODC carried out its own research on the situation in the United 
Kingdom, interviewing people in the country itself. In some cases this produced a 
different type of information than the information collected through written and 
Internet sources, as was the case for other countries.  
 
Notwithstanding the careful data collection procedure, the inventory is not 
complete, i.e. it is not exhaustive. However, we are convinced that the key lines in 
the counterterrorism policy of the five EU countries and the United States are all 
covered at the time the data collection was concluded (in most cases 1 February 
2006).  
 
In addition, the Radboud University Nijmegen drew up an overview of legislation 
in place in Germany, France, Italy, Spain and United Kingdom, which the WODC 
fleshed out for the ‘other countries’ , based on a limited number of sources. The 
notion of ‘counterterrorism legislation’ is difficult to define. In some countries 
counterterrorism legislation are merely amendments to acts in a range of fields, 
whereby special conditions are created for existing offences and procedures within 
the framework of terrorism (and the fight against terror). Albrecht refers to ‘cross-
sectional legislative activities’ (working document 1). The Nijmegen team opted to 
work out a limited number of relevant issues, focusing particularly on criminal 
proceedings. This overview was completed with a number of additional measures 
taken from the – limited – WODC study into legislation in the ‘other’ EU 
countries. It appears that it is rather uncommon that arrangements made in these 
countries are absent in the five countries from the study by Aksu et al (working 
document 6)117. The subject of ‘legislation’ discussed in this study, as laid down in 
working documents 6 and 7, on which this report is partly based, cannot claim to 
be complete either. What can be argued, however, is that all essential aspects of 
said legislation themes are covered.  
 
                                              
117  The study is also restricted by the fact that legislation in the United States has not been included.  
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4.2 Lessons learnt  
 
All countries involved in this study have experienced terrorism. This is a point that 
has been dealt with in the working documents, with the aim to see if lessons could 
be drawn for today’s situation. The first priority in most countries is to tackle the 
emergence of Islamic radicalism alongside extreme rightwing movements and 
developments such as extreme animal liberation movements. The question is 
whether these experiences from the past are used to build on, or that an entirely 
different course is taken.  
The working documents nor chapter 2 provide an unambiguous answer to this. 
This can be explained in part by the fact that the restricted literature on which the 
working documents  relied for information on experiences in the nineteen 
seventies and eighties proved inadequate. On the other hand, it may be possible 
that previous experiences are rather ignored in the development of new policies, or 
that this connection is not often made explicit118. It is not the first time that 
administration experts and policy officials have come to the conclusion that 
governments’ learning capacities are not always very extensive119. 
It seems as if there are many lessons that may be learnt from the issues discussed. 
For example, the approach which the German government took in the nineteen 
seventies towards ‘sympathisers of terrorists’ deserves a further look. What are the 
agreements and what are the differences when comparing this approach with the 
risk of radicalisation of population groups as is currently being discussed? France 
used an amnesty scheme to largely paralyse Action Directe. What are the 
conditions subject to which these schemes can be effected or not? And is jihadi 
terrorism (‘multinational’, ‘religious’) so very different from previous acts of 
terrorism (aimed at ‘national’ and ‘political’ targets), as has been suggested? There 
also seems to be a continuing line between the experiences gained in 
‘Rasterfahndung’ (datamining) then and now, particularly in Germany.  
 
 
4.3 Discussion of the findings on the policy fields 
 
4.3.1 Prevention of radicalisation and recruitment 
 
All countries investigated in the study recognise the phenomenon of radicalisation 
of young Muslims in particular (and the role the Internet plays in this). Some 
reports focus on the more general interpretation of the problem. Besides the 
Netherlands, the United Kingdom in particular seems to be devoting a great deal of 
policy attention to radicalisation. A somewhat detailed concept in the United 
Kingdom distinguishes between structural, motivational and environmental 
factors. The various government services involved in the United Kingdom tru to 
take into consideration the impact any measure may have on relationships with 
the Muslim community. 
 
The actual point of interference in the process in the countries investigated in the 
study also distinguishes the countries’ approach to radicalisation. Some European 
                                              
118  Some staff at the London Home Office interviewed indicated the Northern Ireland experiences were not relevant at all to 
the current situation. 
119  See for example: Leeuw and Sonnichsen (1993). 
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countries, such as the United Kingdom and the Netherlands, clearly aim to prevent 
radicalisation, focusing on early interference in the process. According to the 
working document, the United States opts for a broad interpretation of its freedom 
of speech, focusing on preventing recruitment for terrorist acts. The United States 
and the United Kingdom have also developed an international approach to 
radicalisation, based on the assumption that improving poor living circumstances 
and solving local conflicts may help reduce the breeding ground for extremism.  
 
The measures taken are based on certain ‘work assumptions’ in respect of 
mechanisms that can be influenced  by measures combating radicalisation and 
terrorism, or to carry out an active ‘damage control policy’  respectively. Many 
countries are shown to be introducing measures that are very similar. Par. 3.1, for 
example, found that all countries have Islamic councils, and that the working 
documents suggest that these councils can play a role in the prevention of 
radicalisation of Muslims. It is worth looking deeper into these measures and the 
similarities and differences in the assumptions on which the measures are based. 
One angle is to see how ‘solid’ the so-called ‘disaffection hypotheses’ is. This 
argument finds that when a policy causes too much ‘disaffection’ in Muslims, this 
will only inspire radicalisation and violence, rather than reduce it. A relevant 
conclusion from this hypothesis could be that investing in Muslim communities 
creates social support.  
 
Data on the United Kingdom were gathered by the WODC itself. It included 
interviews with staff of the Home Office which showed that within the framework 
of the prevention of radicalisation an attempt was made to map out the impact of 
the counterterrorism policy ex ante by means of Community Impact Assessments. 
Impact assessments are not new and no more than a specific form of ‘effect 
evaluations’. The environmental effect report, which was first published in the 
Netherlands more than 20 years ago, is another form of impact assessment. Its 
application in this field is new, however. It was not found to be used in any other 
country. It is not impossible, however, that when delving deeper into the subject, 
more assessments will be found. After all, the working documents were drafted 
mostly based on written sources. It seems relevant to carry out a further study into 
the method and elaboration of community assessments. The focal point in this 
should be the conditions needed to avoid undesirable side effects resulting from 
the ‘disaffection’ policy, among Muslim minorities als well as other population 
groups.  
 
4.3.2 Information to the general public 
 
Large differences were found to exist in the field of information. But are these 
differences a reflection of different policy assumptions? In Germany the 
information to the public with regard to terrorism is rather low profile: possible 
attacks are discussed with other possible disasters. The United Kingdom has a 
special website with lots of information, asking the public to be expressly  vigilant 
and to inform the authorities in case of any unusual activities. As in the 
Netherlands leaflets were distributed in the United Kingdom with the information 
that was also contained in the Website. Other mass media statements were also 
used (‘commercials’). Together with the Netherlands the United Kingdom 
therefore seems to have the most advanced information policy of all the countries 
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studied. However, it is not inconceivable that there are other activities not covered 
in this study.  
 
A dilemma in the information policy is that while extensive information may 
promote support from the population, it may also help the terrorists themselves. 
Experience with information in the various sectors and theory building could be 
used to improve the effectiveness of the campaigns. 
 
For now, our search has not revealed any specific assumptions regarding a change 
in cognitions (thinking, norms and knowledge) through ´information diffusion´. It 
would be sensible to study this further, including past experiences that are dealt 
with in this report (e.g. German experience with ‘sympathisers’ and British 
experience with ‘media policy’ in Northern Ireland). The knowledge about the 
effects of communication and information policy may be enhanced by using the 
experiences of the past 20 years in this field120.  
 
4.3.3 Institutional facilities and coordination 
 
Most countries have provided institutional facilities for the coordination of their 
counterterrorism policy. In some countries the cooperation concerns investigation 
and intelligence services, while other organisations also are involved elsewhere. By 
far the most extensive operation in this field has been the creation of the 
Department of Homeland Security (DHS) in the United States. In most other 
countries new multi agency institutes have been created with similar objectives, 
save for the United Kingdom, where the Home Office is responsible for the 
coordination.  
As far as known, studies are available for the US DHS only, to which reference is 
made in working document 5, drawn up by criminologist Petrosino.  
The first reports are not all favourable. For example, there are said to be many 
problems from a conceptual and organisational point of view. The only 
conclusions that can be drawn from this is that it is vital to clearly map out the 
objectives which these organisations aim for and how, and later investigate what 
has been achieved and at what cost121. Attention to the efficacy of the organisation 
and the control of combating terrorism should therefore be high on the agenda. 
Here, too, lessons can be learnt from previous experiences with 
centralisation/decentralisation and recentralisation in government services.  
 
4.3.4 Intelligence activities 
 
A development found in most working documents concerns the increased reliance 
on technological facilities to combat terrorism, which particularly involves methods 
of identifying and localising terrorists. In addition to the introduction of, for 
example, identity papers with biometric characteristics, the emphasis is 
particularly on developments in ICT technology. Databases are created with linked 
data on individual civilians, and advanced techniques of data reduction (dragnet 
research, datamining, Rasterfahndung) are used to try and trace terrorists. In 
addition to the question if this approach is actually effective (do they actually 
                                              
120  See for example Kruisbergen (2005). 
121  Obviously, this also applies to coordination at the European level, supervised by Dutch coordinator Gijs de Vries. 
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reduce the chance of attacks?), another question concerns how security can be 
promoted without impacting greatly on the privacy of the large majority of 
registered people.  
According to working document 5, it became clear in the United States that 
measures to determine and register all sorts of personal details resulted in a tidal 
wave of data, of often poor quality, in which it is difficult to find patterns.  
 
In the field of intelligence activities, there is a general call for better cooperation 
and exchange of information between countries and between services within these 
countries. In a European context, too, initiatives are taken in this field, with the 
aim to establish a free exchange of information between investigation services and 
the clearing of obstacles that play a role in this. The Situation Center (SitCen) in 
Brussels makes analyses of combined data from the various Member States. 
Further studies into the developments in this field are called for. Issues targeted 
include: does it promote investigation; are results found that weren’t looked for 
(´random hits´) and how are these used, and are the rights of the individuals on 
whom information is being collected sufficiently taken into account? 
 
4.3.5 Protection of critical infrastructure 
 
The protection of the critical infrastructure in the countries studied is arranged by 
means of legislation and institutional facilities. The working document on France 
did not contain any information. In all countries on which information is available, 
the government defined the infrastructure and businesses that required special 
attention.  
An interesting aspect is that in Germany and the United Kingdom there are signs 
that the government aims to bring about cooperation between the government and 
industry in protecting the critical infrastructure. The United Kingdom operates a 
detailed strategy aimed at securing the continuity of vital businesses. Special 
measures have been taken in the United States in this respect, for example in 
cooperation with the chemical industry. 
 
4.3.6 Legislation 
 
A first conclusion that can be drawn with regard to legislation on counterterrorism, 
is that the fight against terrorism using legal instruments is more or less the same 
in all countries. This is the result, amongst other things, of international 
arrangements implemented in national legislation. Examples are resolution 1373 of 
the UN Security Council which obliges Member States to freeze terrorists assets, or 
the framework decree on combating terrorism dated 13 June 2002, which a large 
number of EU Member States have implemented in their national legislation. 
While there are many similarities between countries in the fight against terrorism, 
countries may vary in certain areas. The United Kingdom in particular 
distinguishes itself in the EU by its emphasis on administrative measures (‘control 
orders’, which invokes an exemption clause contained in Section 5 of the ECHR). 
Take for example the fact that suspects may be detained without clearly defining 
what they are suspected of and by imposing an obligation to inform the authorities 
in the event of a suspicion that another person is guilty of a terrorist crime, 
whereby the failure to observe this obligation has been made punishable. Below 
we comment on a number of legislation issues also dealt with in this study. 
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The essential question with regard to legislation is the question whether or not it is 
effective. We have not yet been able to find a great deal in this field, simply 
because relevant legislation is still in its infancy. Moreover, it is always difficult to 
evaluate legislation for its efficacy, which applies perhaps even more to legislation 
in the field of counterterrorism122. 
 
Combating terrorist finance is a point for attention in all countries. This is in part 
the result of resolution 1373 of the UN Security Council. Following this resolution a 
list has been published with the names of persons and organisations whose assets 
must be frozen and with whom no business transactions are permitted. Combating 
terrorist finance has also led to new criminal provisions. Many countries have 
instituted special bodies to combat terrorist finance.  
The ‘management’ of lists of terrorists and terrorist organisations is a possible 
point for attention: how does a one get on a list and how can a person be taken off  
it again?123.  
 
Many countries combine criminal measures with aliens law related measures in the 
fight against terrorism. These measures include revocation of double nationality, 
deportation and the refusal of access to the country. An important point within 
this framework is the registration of aliens. This is a common and widespread 
procedure in Germany and the databases can be accessed by intelligence services 
for dragnet research. The United States, too, has an extensive registration system of 
people entering the United States and their activities. These measures aim to 
prevent persons with terrorist intentions from entering the country, to ‘disturb’ 
their activities and to enhance their chance of being caught if they do manage to 
cross the border and unfold their activities. As is the case for all forms of 
registration of certain population categories, these measures also affect innocent 
people, which raises the question of what exactly is the right balance between 
security and freedom. It is not always easy for policy makers to strike a balance 
that is supported across society124. The evaluation of these measures will need to 
look specifically at their efficacy: does the policy help in keeping terrorists and 
recruiters outside? Another key issue concerns any harmful side effects in respect 
of freedoms and human rights.  
 
Inciting terrorism seems to be punishable in all countries, either under general or 
under specific stipulations. The glorification of terrorism (‘apology’) is punishable 
in some countries, usually under general stipulations. Only a few countries have 
included the glorification of terrorism as a specific stipulation in their legislation. 
Incidentally, the discussion of this legislation (par. 3.10.2) showed that the 
                                              
122  See: Leeuw and de Jongste (2006). 
123  For a critical discussion, read Tappeiner (2005). An example of possible complications: the Dutch mission to Afghanistan 
may not cooperate directly with the  local governor, as he appears on a UN terror list, while his loyalty to the new 
government should be above any doubt. Volkskrant, 5 May 2006. Another example is the discussion on excluding 
members of the Hofstadgroep from banking and insurance services based on regulations combating terrorist 
financiering. Lawyers and others (including Afshin Elian) have criticised these measures, of which it is not clear that 
they help fight terrorism, for being used as a form of punishment without interference from the court.  
124  Critical publications have appeared on the use of aliens-law related policy to fight terrorism, where the issue of whether 
or not the policy serves the purpose of security is pushed to the background. Saas (ELISE cd rom), for example, made a 
critical analysis of the French policy on this. 
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distinction between the concept of ‘incitement to’ and ‘glorification of’ terrorism is 
not always clear-cut. 
 
Key special methods of investigation are used in all of the larger countries 
investigated and no specific differences between Member States exist. The report 
by the Council of Europe on special methods of investigation reveals that the full 
range of methods is also available in the Netherlands. The overview of the ‘other 
countries’ revealed that some of the ‘other’ EU countries do not permit the use of 
some methods125. A key point in the special methods of investigation regards the 
requisitioning of personal data.  
 
Crown witness schemes are in place in several countries, and sometimes they are 
reserved for specific offences. Also, suspects who testify may be rewarded by 
anything from ceasing all criminal actions to offering a residence permit to aliens 
willing to cooperate with the Justice Department.  
 
In the end report by the EU ‘peer review’ on counterterrorism, Member States are 
recommended to consider using ‘intelligence’ as proof in the criminal process. To 
the extent verifiable in this report, only the United Kingdom has a relevant scheme 
(‘hearsay evidence’), but this has not yet been used, according to reviewer Lord 
Carlile. A number of countries are known not to allow the use of information 
provided by intelligence services as proof, unless the source of the information is 
revealed, something intelligence services tend to avoid. As is the case for other 
topics, it is not impossible that some EU countries do have relevant schemes. A 
further study could shed light on this, and of course on the specific characteristics 
of these schemes. 
 
National legislation on ‘preventive detention’ seems to vary considerably. Detention 
without concrete suspicion is possible up to 28 days in the United Kingdom. 
Incidentally, the concept of ‘preventive detention’ does not have the same 
meaning in all countries, which is the result of differences in the various national 
criminal processes. A more detailed interpretation of these differences is outside 
the scope of this study, although it is important to shed light on the variation in 
regulations found in this field. 
 
As far as known, the United Kingdom is the only country to use both criminal and 
administrative measures in the fight against terrorism. The first reports by the 
independent reviewer, Lord Carlile (see par. 2.5),  show that the way in which this 
scheme is used is regarded as positive. A further analysis of this report is 
recommended, since the Netherlands, too, is discussing a bill for administrative 
measures against (potential) terrorists in the Lower House126. 
Restricting people in their professions– which can also be regarded an 
administrative measure – is possible in a number of countries for people convicted 
for terrorism.  
 
 
                                              
125  Council of Europe (2005a).  
126  Administrative Measures National Security Act Dutch parliament, (Wet Bestuurlijke maatregelen nationale veiligheid, 
see Kamerstukken II, 30566). 
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4.4 Evaluation of counterterrorism policy 
 
The researchers were also asked to report on anything known about the measures 
described, their evaluation and their effectiveness. This was an open question, as 
the project description had already stated that it is far to early for most measures 
to determine if they have met their target. The question did indeed yield only a 
small number of evaluations which are set out in the working documents and in 
this report. We assume that this is the result mostly of the fact that little is yet 
available in this field, rather than that the authors within their restricted scope 
gave priority to listing the measures themselves. It is expected that material in this 
field will accumulate, so that a follow-up study will yield more information. 
 
Some authors have pointed out the relevance of attention to implementation in 
the evaluation of measures. According to Petrosino (working document 5), the 
United States have a history of many non-implemented recommendations, laws 
and policy documents, which he says raises the question if there is a lack of 
political will, or that policy is developed too hastily in answer to heated emotions 
(working document 5, discussion). This is a classical problem in administrative and 
policy science: does the street level bureaucrat, the police officer, the terrorist 
fighter, that which is expected of him or her, or  - as is often the case in other fields 
– does he do only part of what is expected or perhaps nothing at all. ‘Policy 
shapes implementation, implementation shapes policy’, is Wildawsky’s famous 
statement and it is quite conceivable that such a phenomenon also occurs in 
counterterrorism policy. Others, too, have referred to the emergency measures 
character of many measures, particularly where it concerns legislation (Bigo, 
working document 2). The conclusions of working document 3 (by Martina 
Montauti from Italy) also draw attention to this. All legislation and regulations and 
policy developed in Italy discussed for the period after 1990 dates from after the 
attacks of 11 September 2001 and, according to Montauti, calling this ‘emergency’ 
legislation would not be an overstatement, as it was aimed particularly at 
drastically increasing and refining the tools available. Little information is available 
on matters relating to the implementation of legislation. Before measures can be 
effective, they need to be implemented correctly; and the Italian author correctly 
states that this area offers plenty of room for development.  
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Appendix 1 
Project description 
 
 
State of affairs on counterterrorism measures and their effects 
 
Aim of the project: 
To obtain an overview of policy, specific measures and legislation with respect to 
counterterrorism in de EU, the US and Israel, as well as an insight into the efficacy 
of measures. 
This also includes policies aimed at mitigating the process of radicalisation 
amongst certain layers of the population. 
 
Therefore, the problem definition is twofold: 
1 Which measures are taken and what legislation is developed with respect to 
radicalisation, extremism and terrorism and which considerations and 
assumptions play a role? (part I) 
2 What is known about the effects and side effects of measures directed at 
radicalisation and terrorism? (Part II)  
 
Policy context: radicalisation, extremism, terrorism 
The Netherlands have taken several policy initiatives directed at counteracting 
radicalisation and terrorism. Many measures are presently in the process of 
legislation, others are in the early phase of implementation. Thus, it is too early to 
assess their wanted and unwanted effects. Nevertheless, knowledge on these 
effects is urgently needed for the development of the National Counterterrorism 
Coordinator’s (NCTB) Threat Assessment and its policy framework, which is due 
by the end of 2005. One goal of the study is to make and inventory of the 
knowledge that has already been developed in other countries.  
The project is commissioned and sponsored by NCTB.  
 
Research questions: 
Part I. 
– What variation exists in the EU, USA and Israel in the formulation, 
specification and implementation of policies on radicalisation and terrorism. 
– How is does this connected to the views that exists in the countries as to the 
causes and backgrounds of radicalisation and terrorism. Which factors are 
taken to be susceptible for influence through policy measures.  
– What specific measures are taken? Which goals are formulated and what 
resources are employed to reach these goals?  
– On which policy assumptions are measures being based? What mechanisms 
are supposed to make the measures work? 
– What is the status of the measures with respect to implementation and 
execution? 
 
Part II (to be started by the end of 2005 depending on the results of Part I). 
– Does knowledge exist on the effects of counterterrorism measures and 
measures directed against radicalisation?  
– If so, what is known on the effects, desired as well as undesired effects? 
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– Which measures contribute to the counteracting of radicalisation and 
terrorism; under what circumstances? 
– Which measures lead to an increase of radicalisation and terrorism; under what 
circumstances; under what circumstances? 
– Which side effects appear? I.e. effects on feelings of safety among the 
population, on the burden on those who implement the measures, on the 
public support for the policy. 
– What is known on ‘good practices’ in countering radicalisation and terrorism? 
 
A distinction is made between radicalisation and terrorism. It is assumed that 
radicalisation can occur among certain sections of the population, influenced by a 
variety of factors. A part of those who radicalise may come to the point that they 
resort to violent actions. In other words: radicalisation may lead to terrorism. On 
the other hand, terrorist actions can bring about more radicalisation among wider 
layers of ‘disaffected’ groups, whether or not they are explicitly aimed to do so. 
Radicalisation and terrorism may by taken together as one issue (as is common in 
the Netherlands recently) but both may also be considered as two distinct policy 
issues.  
 
Although the study is directed at the European and Dutch situation in the first 
place, it will include experiences from the US and from Israel as well. In USA, a 
large number of counterterrorism measures have been taken, especially in the 
period since September 2001. Also, a number of publications has appeared to 
discuss these measures.  
Although the situation in Israel cannot be compared to the European (or 
American) situation, the study aims at an inventory of Israeli measures that could 
be adapted to the European context (i.e. experiences with information to the 
public etc.). 
 
 
Provisional categorisation of measures: 
1 Prevention and driving back of radicalisation and the development of 
extremism among sections of the population.  
2 Information of the general public on radicalisation, extremism and terrorism.  
3 Measures in the field of immigration and asylum. 
4 Granting special competences to police, customs, prosecutors, etc.; their 
relation with privacy issues and civil rights. (Including Information sharing 
regulations etc) 
5 Institutional developments (creating special services, departments…) 
6 International cooperation and information sharing 
7 Counteracting financing of terrorist organisations through donations, money 
laundering, drugs trade etc. 
8 Security of infrastructure (transportation, industry, information systems…) 
9 Crisis management: preparation for handling crisis involving terrorist attacks 
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Issues for the NCTB terrorism policy project 
 
9th December, 2005 
 
We have discussed with NCTB the first drafts we received from the authors in the 
EU countries.  
All the drafts cover a wide range of related to counterterrorism policies in the 
respective countries. As not all issues are arranged by formal policies or legislation 
in all countries, we now want to ask all authors to cover all issues on the list below, 
at least briefly. In that way, we want to achieve a full matrix of issues and 
countries, with no ‘empty cells’.  
 
It is conceivable that some of the issues on the list are not mentioned at present in 
the draft because there is no articulated legislation or policy in which it is arranged 
for. If this is the case, please describe the practice in your country. This may often 
be the case with respect to measures related to prevention radicalisation and 
extremism, informing the public, etc. 
 
The following list is proposed:  
 
Introduction 
– brief description of the development of the ideas on terrorism in the various 
countries in the last two of three decades. If applicable, please make a link 
between the present mainly jihadist terrorist threat and earlier 
radical/extremist/terrorist episodes. If possible, indicate  what can be learned 
from the earlier experiences (i.e. ETA, IRA, RAF, BR, etc.) 
 
Legislation issues: 
– formal definition of terrorist offences 
– implementation of EU definition of terrorist offences 
– newly defined specific terrorist offences (e.g. recruitment, training, 
preparation…. ) 
– special arrangements for preventive detention without charge in terror cases, 
with or without contact with lawyers, for how long… 
– crown witness/ ‘pentiti’ legislation, for organised crime or specifically for 
terror 
– arrangements for the use of intelligence in court / use of security service 
agents as covered or anonymous witnesses  
 
Policy areas: 
1 Prevention of and driving back radicalisation and the development of extremism 
among sections of the population.  
– policies (documents?) on radicalisation of Muslims through certain mosques, 
the Internet, prisons? 
– any national frameworks for local policies directed at prevention of 
radicalisation? 
– stimulating a dialogue between communities (i.e. Muslim councils, 
organisation of debates/events, etc.) 
– attribution of certain roles to community leaders (i.e. imams etc.) in the 
prevention of radicalisation 
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– do policymakers make a connection between integration of minorities and 
prevention of radicalisation, and if so, how? 
– monitoring of places where radicalisation is thought to be taking place? 
– withdrawal of certain privileges for religious organisations/institutions 
– Does any elaborate policy (document etc) exist in which the means and aims 
with respect to prevention of radicalisation is explained? 
– Are any measures in place directed at disruption of radicalisation processes? 
 
2 Information of the general public on radicalisation, extremism and terrorism.  
– Are there any campaigns, websites, leaflets etc. in which the national CT 
policies are being explained and are citizens told how to react, etc.? 
– Does any elaborate policy (document etc) exist in which the means and aims 
with respect to informing the public is explained? 
 
3 Measures in the field of immigration and asylum. 
– Is any specific policy being developed, directed at radicalisation/terrorism, to 
prevent certain (categories of) persons from entering the country, or to deport 
persons from the country for reasons of radicalisation/terrorism? 
– Is any specific policy developed on the permission of residence for (specific 
categories of) religious leaders ? 
 
4 Granting special competences to police, customs, prosecutors, etc.; their relation 
with privacy issues and civil rights. 
– Any arrangements for tracing (potential) terrorist through combining files with 
personal data? Data mining?  
– Is deployment of Joint Investigation Teams arranged for? 
 
5 Institutional developments (creating special services, departments…). 
– Any recent new structures for coordination of ct efforts? Which policy goals 
were formulated? 
– Are new arrangements created for the sharing of information between services, 
local, national, international? 
– Were new CT units created among the security services? 
 
6 International cooperation and information sharing. 
– What relevance is attached to European cooperation in the field of CT? How 
are the European policies translated into national policies?  
– Which UN Conventions have been ratified and implemented? Has the country 
reported to the UN on CT policies in the last three years?  
– Are bilateral relations with specific countries developed related to CT in the 
Arab world? 
 
7 Counteracting financing of terrorist organisations through donations, money 
laundering, drugs trade etc. 
– Is there a national list of terrorist organisations and individuals, have certain 
organisations been banned or added to EU lists? 
– Have policies been developed with respect to transparency of charity 
organisations?  
– Are policies developed in relation to the financial flows related to Dawa 
activities? 
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– Has there been any change in relation to restrictions on confidentiality of 
banking information in the light of CT policy? 
 
8 Security of vital infrastructure (transportation, industry, information systems…). 
– Is any alerting system on risk of terrorist attacks operational or planned? 
 
9 Crisis management: preparation for handling crises involving terrorist attacks 
– What arrangements are in place for decision-making during the first 
hours/days following a major attack ? 
– What specific arrangements are in place for crisis management in case of a 
terrorist attack? 
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